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Abstract 
 
 
During the last ten years, the tendency of rise of the right-wing parties in Europe have become a reality that is 
actively shaping the European political scene. In order to develop a strategy on how to deal with such 
governments that possibly include such parties, it is important to understand their motives and positions – 
especially for parties in countries that are of high importance to Russia, such as those from Central-Eastern 
Europe and Nordic countries. This dissertation examines six major right wing parties from Austria, Hungary, 
Estonia, Finland, Sweden and Norway that are either part of the government of their nation-states, or in the 
parliament opposition. Extensive and thorough analysis of the parties‘ political documents and mass-media 
communications of the parties‘ leaderships was conducted, in order to identify their ideologies and positions 
on the EU, NATO and Russia. The results show that the majority of these parties and their leaderships have a 
positive attitude towards the idea of cooperation with Russia, while at the same time are strongly anti-EU, 
and to a degree, anti-NATO oriented. This research compiles for the first time a detailed examination of the 
politically-relevant right-wing parties from the Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries, while giving 
answers on their political stances towards Russian Federation, EU and the NATO – questions of high 
relevance for Russia‘s security strategy. 
 
Keywords: Right-wing parties, NATO, EU, Russia, Central-Eastern Europe, countries of Scandinavian 
Peninsula 
 
Аннотация 
 
  течение последних десяти лет тенденция роста правых партий в  вропе значительно меняет 
 вропейскую политическую арену. С целью разработать стратегию для таких правительств, в которых 
присутствуют представители правых взглядов, важно понять их мотивы и позиции - особенно для тех 
партий в странах  вропы, имеющих для России большое значение, таких как страны Центральной и 
 осточной  вропы , а также страны Северной  вропы.   этой диссертации рассматриваются шесть 
основных партий правого крыла из Австрии,  енгрии, Эстонии, Финляндии, Швеции и Норвегии, 
которые являются, либо частью правительства своих национальных государств, либо в оппозиции 
парламента.  ыл проведен обширный и тщательный анализ политических документов партий и 
сообщений СМ  лидеров партий, чтобы определить их идеологию и позиции в отношении  С, НАТО 
и России. Результаты показывают, что большинство этих партий и их руководство позитивно 
относятся к идее сотрудничества с Россией и в то же время являются противниками  вропейского 
Союза и, в определенной степени, являются противниками НАТО.   этом исследовании впервые 
дается подробное исследование политически значимых правых партий из  осточной  вропы и стран 
Северной  вропы, давая ответы на их политические позиции в отношении Российской Федерации,  С 
и НАТО - вопросы, имеющие большое значение для Российской стратегии безопасности. 
 
Ключевые слова: правые партии, НАТО,  С, Россия, Центрально- осточная  вропа, страны 
Скандинавского полуострова 
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Introduction 
 
 
The theme of this Master‘s dissertation is the position of major right-wing parties of Eastern Europe 
and Nordic countries towards the EU, NATO and Russian Federation.  
 
The relevance of the topic can be seen in the fact that the right-wing parties are increasing in 
popularity throughout the Europe. Out of six examined parties in this research, two are in coalition 
governments (The Progress Party of Norway and the Freedom Party of Austria), one was in the 
coalition government until the June 2017 (The Finns Party), and two others (Estonian 
Conservative People’s Party and the Swedish Democrats) although opposition parties, currently 
hold the support of voters in their countries above 15%. At the start of 2000, it was hardly 
conceivable that these right-wing political options can achieve good election results, and were often 
considered fringe parties of their national political systems.  
  After the economic crisis of 2008 and the migrant crisis of 2015, right-wing parties started to 
gain more popularity, with some even becoming partners in center-right government coalitions. That 
the right-wing parties in Europe are still in the expansion the results of the 2018 Italian parliament 
election clearly demonstrates, with the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) and the Northern 
League (Lega Nord) winning 32.68% and 17.37% of votes respectively.
1
 These political parties 
have often different view on many topics and issues than their political opponents, which are usually 
centrist or leftist ruling parties. They often express their opposition towards the current state of 
European Union, enforced multiculturalism and liberal policies of their countries, as well as global 
alliances and anti-Russian rhetoric that is currently heavily present among the Western political 
elites and mass media. Therefore, it is important for Russian Federation to understand ideology and 
political stances of such parties towards the European Union, NATO and Russia itself, in order to 
successfully formulate policies and strategies towards the hypothetical or current governments that 
include examined parties. 
 
The aim of this research is to define the position of the six major right-wing parties of Eastern 
Europe and Nordic countries towards the EU, NATO and Russia. 
 
In order to achieve this aim, this research work sets following objectives: 
 
1. To apply the theory of national identity in order to explain the current rise of popularity of 
right-wing parties among countries of Europe that have democratic governments, developed 
economy and high standard of living. 
 
2. To conduct an analysis of examined parties‘ political documents,  in order to reveal their stances 
on the topics of the research. 
 
                                                          
1
Home Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, Archivio storico delle elezioni, Internet, 
http://elezioni.interno.gov.it/camera/scrutini/20180304/scrutiniCI Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
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3. To conduct an analysis of the mass media, especially those that correspond to the examined 
parties‘ countries of origin, in order to reveal the statements of parties‘ political leadership towards 
the topics of the research. 
 
4.  To determine what kind of political course towards EU, NATO and Russia can Russian 
Federation expect from the potential coalition governments that include examined parties 
 
5. To present all the results in a clear and concise way, along with showing the current favor that 
examined political parties‘ enjoy among their voters, in order to underline the importance and 
relevance of this research. 
 
The object of this research work are six right-wing parties of Eastern Europe and Nordic countries, 
while the subject of the research are their stances towards the EU, NATO and Russia. 
 
The geographical framework covers the three countries of the Nordic region (Finland, Sweden and 
Norway), as well as three countries of Eastern-Central Europe (Estonia, Hungary, Austria).  
Scandinavia is a region of high political, economic and geographical importance for Russia. 
Because of its proximity to the Arctic region, the Nordic countries can prove either partners or 
adversaries for the Russian ambitions in the Arctic. Russia needs to understand motives and policies 
of potential right-wing governments (or coalition governments) of Nordic countries in order to shape 
or adapt its policies for the Arctic.  
Economically, this region is important for Russia, as the Nordic markets are attractive for 
both export and import, although the sanctions hampered economic exchange since 2015.
2
 In 
addition, Nordic countries are source of industrial technology and IT know-how, and good relations 
with these countries would go a great length to modernize the Russian industry, R&D and IT 
sector.
3
 Politically, this region is of special interest for Russia. Although there were some difficulties 
and misunderstandings in modern history, the region shows signs of shifting political climate. 
Already in Norway, a Russian-friendly Progress Party is a member of coalition government. In 
Sweden and Finland, right-wing parties are not against establishing good relations with Russia. In 
addition, right wing parties from Sweden and Finland are opposed to NATO membership (while 
advocating establishment of local-regional ones), which means that there is a strong chance that 
NATO will not expand further towards the Russian North-West borders, if those parties attain 
higher degree of power. 
 
  Central-Eastern Europe hosts countries that are either a source of potential hostility 
towards Russia (such as degrading conditions of the ethnic-Russian minority in Estonia, despite the 
latter being the EU member), or potential allies inside the EU, such as Hungary and Austria. As 
mentioned, Estonia is a country where Russia will face a challenge sooner or later: on how to deal 
with the hostile attitude of the Estonian government towards the ethnic-Russian population living 
there. The right-wing party that is gaining popularity in Estonia has expressed even harder rhetoric 
                                                          
2
 Nilsen Thomas, "Trade with Russia; down, down, down", The Independent Barents Observer, 04.01.2016, Internet, 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry/2016/01/trade-russia-down-down-down Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
3
 Mitzner Dennis, "Sweden Is A Tech Superstar From The North", TechnoCrunch, 27.01.2016, 
Internet,https://techcrunch.com/2016/01/26/sweden-is-a-tech-superstar-from-the-north/ Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
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against Russians living in Estonia (and Russia itself), and a government that could potentially host it 
could prove to be even more difficult to manage than the current one. 
Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, is trying to maintain somewhat independent 
course from the EU politics, as it was demonstrated during migrant crisis of 2015. In addition, 
Hungary is developing good economic and political ties with Russia, with Viktor Orbán criticizing 
openly the EU sanctions towards Russia and general anti-Russian stance of EU policies.
4
 Any 
potential political shifts in that country have to be closely followed, with interesting occurrence 
being that the largest right-wing party in Hungary is also advocating good relations with Russia, 
even to some higher degree than a ruling Fidszes party. Austria traditionally maintains good 
relations with Russia, and sees itself as a bridge between East and the West. Austria makes an 
interesting case, as the main right-wing party entered a coalition government in December 2017, and 
thus it is in position to influence the countrie‘s politics. Given that the party maintains close 
relations with Russia, it can serve as a model on which the effects of rule by the right-wing parties 
can be examined in practice, and especially whether they would hold true to their political program 
and/or statements of their leadership in media. 
 
Chronological framework of the research mainly covers the period of the last 10 years (as that is in 
practice a timeframe of the last two national elections cycles in most of the countries), but in order 
to understand all the processes that shaped the parties history, ideology, successes and failures, it is 
necessary that sometimes we go further down the history. 
 
The methodology applied in this research was mostly focused on chapters two and three. Content 
analysis was used during the research of the official documents of the examined political parties, 
such as manifestos, political programs, presidential/parliament election programs, etc., as well as 
during the research of examined parties‘ leadership statements in mass media. System analysis was 
applied in order for better understanding of the political positions of examined right-wing parties 
towards the political system of their national countries and the EU, as one of the aims of this 
research is to explain their position towards the European Union itself. In the fourth chapter, 
comparative analysis was used, in order for the final conclusions to be made based on previous 
individual examined parties stances on the EU, NATO and Russia. In addition, interviews with 
representatives of examined parties were conducted in order to clarify the position of their parties 
towards the researched question.     
 
The primary sources that were analyzed and used for this research consist of examined parties‘ 
documents such as political programs, manifestos and declarations. They allow us to more clearly 
understand the political course of the party and their proclaimed positions towards the EU, NATO 
and Russia. Political programs are mostly released by the parties during the parliament elections in 
their countries, such as for example the programs of the Estonia‘s Conservative People‘s Party5, 
                                                          
4
 "Orban joins Putin in attack on Russia sanctions", Financial Times, 02.02.2017, Internet, 
https://www.ft.com/content/f1f4482a-e96b-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539 Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
5
 EKRE political program (EKRE Programm – Konservatiivne Programm), Official Website of EKRE, Internet,  
https://ekre.ee/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/EKRE-PROGRAMM-KONSERVATIIVNE-PROGRAMM.pdf Accessed on: 
25.05.2018 
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Norway‘s Progress Party‘s program for national parliament elections in 20156, Hungary‘s Jobbik‘s 
program for national parliament elections in 2014
7
 or Freedom Party of Austria‘s program for 
national parliament elections in 2017
8
. Examples of political manifestos can be seen in Estonian 
People‘s Conservative Party‘s ―Conservative Manifesto‖ or the Finns Party EU election program 
(―Perussuomalaisten EU-vaaliohjelma‖)9. Declarations can be in form of the Freedom Party of 
Austria‘s principle of five-points policy on EU10, or ―Bauska Declaration‖11, signed by the right-
wing parties of the Baltic states. Other primary sources that were analyzed include official election 
results for the examined parties released by the electoral commissions of national countries, and 
opinion polls for the examined parties conducted by various agencies.  
 
In addition, for the states of the examined parties, analysis of mass media was extensively 
used in order to seek statements of the parties‘ leadership, towards the EU, NATO and Russia. 
Finally, the interviews were conducted with the representatives of several political parties with the 
goal of further clarifying the stance of their parties on the EU, NATO and Russia. 
 
The political rise of the examined parties is quite a new phenomenon, and what is more, most of 
them come from countries that are not so interesting for the mainstream academic researches. For 
these reasons it is hard to find academic literature that explores this subject and conduct a proper 
analysis of scientific literature. 
   
Prof. Dr. Natalia Eremina of School of International Relations at Saint-Petersburg State 
University and Sergei Seredenko, the Head of the Legal Research Department of the Institute of 
European Studies in Latvia, former Russian ombudsman in Estonia and a member of the Russian 
Academic Society and the International Institute of the Newly Established States, conducted a 
research on evolution of far-right parties and their influence on the contemporary European party 
and political system, the society and the state, as well as the issues of legal and judicial mechanisms 
of influencing extreme right parties.
12
 The authors argue that the political, social and cultural 
problems are opening up opportunities for far-right parties in their national states, which are 
declaring the need for restoring the link between the state and the society.
13
 The success of far-right 
                                                          
6
 “Tjøme FrP Valgprogram for kommunevalget 2015”, Official Progress Party Website, p.2 Internet, 
https://www.frp.no/~/media/images/vestfold/tjoeme/tj%C3%B8mefrp_valgprogram2015.pdf?la=nb-no   Accessed on: 
25.05.2018 
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7
“Nemzetek Európája - A Jobbik programja a magyar önrendelkezésért és a társadalmi felemelkedésért”, Jobbik, 
2014, p.21, Internet,  
 https://jobbik.hu/sites/default/files/cikkcsatolmany/ep_program_a5_jav.pdf Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
8
 “Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017”, Official FPÖ Website, Internet, 
https://www.FPÖe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Wahlprogramm_8_9_low.pdf Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
9
  "Perussuomalaisten EU-vaaliohjelma", Official The Finns Party Website, Internet, 
https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/EU-vaaliohjelma.pdf Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
10
 Grundsätzliche Positionen", Official FPÖ Website, https://www.FPÖe.at/es/themen/leitantrag/grundsaetzliche-
positionen/ Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
11
 Bauska Deklaratsioon, Official Website of EKRE, Internet,  https://www.ekre.ee/bauska-deklaratsioon/ Accessed on: 
25.05.2018 
12
 Eremina Natalia, Seredenko Sergei, “Right Radicalism in Party and Political Systems in Present-day European States”, 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015, p. 3 
13
 Ibid, p.5 
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political parties can be seen as a sign of ongoing transformation of political systems of European 
states, becoming an integral part of political establishment, while abandoning the behavior of the 
fringe parties.
14
 After the thorough analysis of current right-wing movements and parties in Europe, 
their ideology, motivations and connections with each other, along with the detailed analysis of 
international and national law, the authors conclude that these political forces have been greatly 
underestimated by the general public, since they are more than capable of forming a political trend 
and attract support for the elections.
15
 Thus, the relevance of this topic is more than justified, and as 
mentioned before, especially since some of the examined parties were or at this moment are 
members of coalition governments. 
 
 
  Some Western scholars give thought to the rise of right-wing parties in Eastern Europe, such 
as the Prof. Dr. Michael Minkenberg, a professor of political science at European University 
Viadrina in Frankfurt. In his book “Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical 
Right in the Political Process” he argues that right-wing parties persist even in the countries that 
ascended to the EU, and established democratic systems, and that they are continuing to play a 
significant role in the politics of democratic governance.
16
 The book examines influences of right-
wing parties in Hungary and Estonia, which provided the basis for the research of ideology of said 
parties in this work.  
 
Scientific approach of this research introduces a novelty for examination of right wing parties, as it 
concentrates on specific questions that are relevant for the Russian Federation. In addition, it is done 
from the point of view of potential Russian interests as the Russian Federation has to be prepared to 
deal with sudden political shifts in European governments. While the ideological position of the 
right-wing parties are examined in this research, more important was the analysis of the right-wing 
parties on specific questions – their position towards the EU, NATO and Russia, and what that could 
mean for the Russian Federation if it has to deal with the potential (or current) coalition 
governments that include those parties. Other novelty in the approach is that the parties which were 
not the focus of the previous research were grouped together in such a manner, as to give grounds 
for detailed comparison and evaluation of their positions on said questions. One more important 
element of the research was the analysis of examined parties‘ national mass media, in search of 
party leadership statements which would support or potentially deny the parties‘ positions that were 
declared in official parties‘ documents, such as political programs, manifestos or declarations. 
 
Practical application of this research work can be seen in a form of basis for further research on the 
relevant topics, parties or their political positions towards the EU, NATO and Russia. In addition, 
this research can serve as a guide to the examined right-wing parties‘ policies that can be relevant 
                                                          
14
 Eremina Natalia, Seredenko Sergei, “Right Radicalism in Party and Political Systems in Present-day European States”, 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015, p. 3 
15
 Ibid, p. 199 
16
 Ed. Minkenberg Michael, “Transforming the transformation – The Eastern European radical right in the political 
process”, Routledge, New York, 2015, p. 2, Internet,  
https://books.google.ru/books?id=DssqBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT139&lpg=PT139&dq=Mart+Helme+EU&source=bl&ots=O2N
TdWQcTz&sig=SDByfATi0SzR5SfWnEM_9YglmBs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj8iYPN1aDaAhUEFCwKHX6fBWM4ChDoA
Qg4MAU#v=onepage&q=Mart%20Helme%20EU&f=false Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
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for the Russian Federation, as the countries of parties‘ origin are all quite important from the 
Russian perspective.  
 
In the appendix, several tables, figures and transcripts of the interviews are presented, in order to 
further clarify the conclusions of the research work. Table 1 shows current state of support for 
researched political parties, their last election results and whether they are part of government 
coalition or not. Tables 2-4 show examined parties‘ positions on EU, NATO and Russia, while 
Table 5 provides summary of the main results. Figures 1-5 show the support for each party 
individually on the last several parliament elections in their respective countries, except the EKRE 
which only participated in the 2015 Estonian parliament elections. Interviews will present 
correspondence between the authors of this research and the representatives of Jobbik, Estonian‘s 
Conservative People‘s Party and The Finns Party which additionally shows their parties‘ stance on 
the EU, NATO and Russia.  
  
The structure of the work will follow the set objectives. Chapter one will set the theoretical 
framework for the research, applying the theory of national identity in order to explain why people 
in developed countries give support to right-wing parties during the time of crisis, such as for 
example, economic crisis of 2008 or migrant crisis of 2015. Chapter two will explore the three 
major political parties of Central-Eastern Europe, and present answers on their positions towards the 
EU, NATO and Russia, along with the short examined parties‘ history, ideology and electoral 
success overview. Chapter three will repeat the process of previous chapter, but for the three major 
right-wing parties of the Nordic countries. Chapter four will present joint conclusions of chapters 
two and three, sorted out in tables and figures, in order for easier comparison and understanding of 
obtained results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
1.  Right-wing parties and the National Identity theory 
 
 
It is noticeable that many right-wing parties are using fear of immigrants and the failure of 
their national states to deal with the migration crisis as a platform for their political programs.
17
 The 
influx of immigrants into the European countries is in a steady increase since the beginning of 
2000s, reaching its peak with the 2015 immigration crisis that enveloped the Europe on an 
unprecedented scale, and that was caused mostly by the civil wars and Western military 
interventions in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.
18,19,20
 As the following chapters will 
demonstrate, the once fringe right-wing political options started to successfully challenge the 
mainstream political parties of their national states since they were willing to discuss the topics that 
ruling parties evaded, especially focusing on immigration and the rise of crime that is supposedly 
linked with it.  
 
  A question may be asked, why the citizens of the countries which enjoy high degree of 
economic and social security in the western-democracy type of governments are turning to the 
parties that are promoting anti-immigration and often a racist sentiments. By examining the role of 
the national identity in the society, along with the understanding of social and ethnic identity, we 
may find the answers to those questions. 
 
Some authors define identity as a ―self-perception filled by a cultural formula‖ that is 
organized in three main categories – Individual identity, Group identity and Intergroup identity.21 
Iulian Chifu, Oana Popescu, and Bogdan Nedea argue that in the theoretical debate, one of the main 
points of the identity is to explain the reasons why humans need ―group belongingness, the 
perception of solidarity and of an identity of a superior agenda, shared with other humans that 
would complement the level of prestige and personal (individual)  identity.‖22 One of the answers 
that they are offering is that a man is a social animal which is capable of self-awareness and 
therefore he develops language, verbalization, and construction of social relations based on that.   
                                                          
17
 Van Spanje Joost, “Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties’ Immigration 
Stances in Contemporary Western Europe”, Party Politics, Vol 16, Issue 5, 2010, p.9, Internet, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354068809346002  Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
18
 Ratkovid Milijana, “MIGRANT CRISIS AND STRENGTHENING OF THE RIGHT WING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION”, 
Megatrend Review, Vol. 14, № 3, 2017: 47-60, Internet,http://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/1820-
3159/2017/1820-31591703047R.pdf Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
19
 Intini Dario, “NO MIGRANTS, NO SCHENGEN: HOW RIGHT-WING POLITICAL PARTIES ARE INCREASING THEIR 
POPULARITY IN EUROPE”, Institute of European Democrats, p.2, Internet, 
https://www.iedonline.eu/download/2016/schengen/INTINI.pdf Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
20
 Davis Lewis, Deole Sumit S., “Determinants of Populist Voting”, Ifo DICE Report 4 / 2017 December Volume 15, 
pp.11-15, Internet,  https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/dice-report-2017-4-onlineversion-december.pdf Accessed 
on: 25.05.2018 
21
    Rothman Jay, Alberstein Michal, “Individuals, Groups and Intergroups: Theorizing About the Role of Identity in 
Conflict and its Creative Engagement”, Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, Forthcoming, (May 2, 2013), p.3 
Internet,  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2273330  Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
22
 Iulan Chifu, Oana Popescu, Bogdan Nedea, “Religion and conflict radicaliyation and violence in the wider Black 
Sea region”, Editura Ispri, Bucureşti, 2012, pp. 10-11, Internet, http://www.cpc-
ew.ro/pdfs/religion%20and%20conflict%20radicalization.pdf Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
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Identities are thus collective phenomena of expressing the similarities within the group in 
various ways and at levels that cover ―physical similarity, similarity of tastes and occupations, of 
culture and customs, common language and memory, elements that distinguish a group from 
another.‖23 Affiliation to a group can be assumed by birth, geography, habit of blood relatives etc., 
and identity is thus manifestation of one‘s desire to belong to a group, where he would feel 
solidarity and cohesion with the rest of the members.
24
 
 
In order to understand the ethnic identity, the term ―ethnicity‖ hast to be defined first. 
Ethnicity comes from the Greek word ―ethnos‖, which means company, people, nation or tribe, and 
according to the anthropologist scholars such as George de Vos, ethnicity itself could be defined as 
―those who have in common a set of traditions that they do not share with others with whom they 
enter into contact‖.25 George de Vos suggests that a common set of traditions can be defined as art, 
folklore, common place of origin/birth, religious beliefs and practices, shared history and 
experiences, language, common ancestors, as well as historical continuity – it often includes a myth 
―derived from a blood, biological and genetic descent, unbroken for generations, which is 
considered to be the source of special traits and characteristics of the group‖.26 Other 
anthropologists, such as Rishi Keshav Raj Regmi, argue that the formation of the ethnic identity is a 
combination of factors, such as a common descent, a socially relevant cultural or physical 
characteristics, and a set of attitude and behaviors, while the cultural attributes, such as distinctive 
beliefs, institutions, practices, religion, and language also form the bases of identity.
27
 Physical 
attributes, such as pigmentation of the skin or shape of the body additionally play a role in the 
foundation of the ethnic identity, along with the sharing of the ideas, behavior patterns, feelings, and 
perception of common destiny among the members of the ethnic group, which helps them 
distinguish themselves (―We‖) from others (―They‖).28  
 
Professor Richard Jenkins of The University of Sheffield defines social identity as a process 
of identification – ―how we know who we are and who other people are‖ 29,30  In his view, society is 
structured categorically, and organized by inequalities of power and resources.
 31
. Jenkins further 
argues that the social categorization generates social identity, which produces social comparisons, 
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which produce positive (or negative) self-evaluation.
32
 Comparison and evaluation between groups 
is derived from establishment and maintenance of in-group distinctiveness – interplay of internal 
similarity and external difference.
33
 Groups distinguish themselves from and discriminate against 
other groups in order to promote their own positive social evaluation and collective self-esteem.
34
  
 
Siân Herbert states that the identity is a ―relational concept‖ which draws distinctions 
‗between us and them‘ and fulfills emotional functions, with each person holding a variety of 
identities, one of which is national identity.
35
 Some scholars argue that the national identity is the 
manifestation of the simultaneous impact of ethnic identity and civic identity, with the ethnic 
identity being marked by the fixed cultural markers and bloodlines, while the civic identity 
emphasizes features such as political rights, duties, and values.
36
 Noah Lewin-Epstein and Asaf 
Levanon suggest that the national identity represents a feeling of ―commonality‖, that is defined in 
―opposition to the perceived identity of members of other social groups‖, and it is based on some 
―perceived similarity to some people, and difference from others‖.37 Other scholars name the 
elements of the national identity as a historic territory, collective historical myths and memories, a 
mass public culture, shared legal rights and duties and a common economy with territorial mobility 
for members.
38
  
 
The ethnic identity arguably provides the basic form of identification of ―us‖ and ―them‖ – 
from physical characteristic to the different pigmentation of the skin, eye pupils or even color of the 
hair. Social identity further develops ―us‖ and ―them‖ social comparison division, among the lines 
of a competitive groups. Finally, national identity is formed by both ethnic and social identities, 
providing evolved sense of the identity for the individual – no longer is he just a member of his 
family/clan/tribe, but he is also a member of one ethnic group that forms up a nation, and in most 
cases, a nation-state. Therefore, the label ―Other‖ can be applied by Austrians/Hungarians/Swedes 
on members of whole groups (immigrants) that could be of certain ethnicity (Middle-Eastern or 
African ethnic groups), or even whole nations (Syrian/Libyan/Iraq without distinguishing between 
tribes and ethnic groups of these states). These groups are perceived as a danger to the state and 
especially its middle class (social group), which would have to pay via increased taxes for the 
governmental welfare program that would cover the expenses of refugee sheltering and adoption in 
the national system. 
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During the time of crisis, it is a natural instinct for individuals to seek comfort and support 
among family, neighbors and ethnic group they belong to, whether it is a dominant one in the 
society or not. It is also in nature for people to blame someone for negative situation that is 
impacting their lives, such as for example, an economic recession or a rise of criminal activities. It is 
not unusual that right-wing parties tend to single out one or more groups of ethnic minorities in the 
country and blame them for some issues, such as Jobbik‘s previous strong antagonisation of 
Hungarian Roma population, or Estonian‘s Conservative People‘s Party anti-Russian minority 
rhetoric.
39,40
 Other parties may not be so frank in their rhetoric against some singled out ethnic 
group, but they can point out ―others‖ that are endangering the system of their nation states – for 
example, immigrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa, with culture, tradition and religion 
incompatible with host-nation‘s.41  
 
In their crisis management manual, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
defines this occurrence as ―stigmatization‖ which manifests during the event of crisis when ―the risk 
is not present in the stigmatized minority population but people associate the risk with that 
population group‖.42 CDC further states in their manual that ―this stigmatization can occur without 
any scientific basis, it can come not only from individuals, but entire nations‖.43 In their political 
party programs some of the examined parties tend to blame immigrants as a needles drain on the 
social-welfare system, which instead of benefiting the native population goes to those who are 
ethnically, religiously and culturaly not a part of Western-Christian society.
44,45
 The right-wing 
parties call for national unity, where ―us‖ (Norwegians, Swedes, Hungarians, Austrians) must stand 
united against ―them‖ (Federalization of the EU, immigrants, multicultural policies, ethnic 
minorities), drawing their legitimacy from perception of being ―national defenders‖ against foreign 
threats in whichever shape they can be. That can also explain the general anti-globalization and anti-
establishment tone of their rhetoric, as well as the tendency of the voters to support such political 
options in times of crisis were people herd together by natural instinct (feeling safe inside their 
ethnic/social group), while trying to resist the ―other‖ via the ballot box during the elections.  
 
One interesting development considering the right-wing parties and their perception among 
the voters and media comes from the successful re-imaging or re-branding of themselves, in order to 
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create a more pleasant image for themselves among the voting population of their national states. As 
following chapters will reveal, most of the examined right-wing parties had fascist or Nazi roots, 
where their founders and initial supporters embraced those ideologies. While that was one of the 
reasons why these parties were usually considered outcasts in the political systems of their national 
states, it also prevented any other political option to strike any kind of coalition deals with them, 
which could include them into mainstream politics.
46
 The defining moment in the examined political 
parties was usually changing of the guard at the end of 90s or beginning of 2000, when young, tech-
savvy and ambitious politicians obtained leadership position. Re-imaging touched everything – from 
abandoning the fascist-like logos for the more neutral ones (as is the case with the Finns or Swedish 
democrats) and re-visualization of their websites (which contained a lot of family or nature-like 
oriented pictures), to recruitment of young voters through the heavy presence of party leaderships on 
social media such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram – platforms that are among the most used ones 
by the millennials.
47,48
 In addition, their political programs tend to have a more social-welfare 
dimension - albeit concentrated mostly on the native population - with immigrants presented as a 
drain on the resources and social system of the country.
49
 Parties themselves might be referred to 
more as ―movements‖, which is following the trend among the voters in which they are more likely 
to support ―movements‖ than traditional political parties.50 Thus, the re-branded party becomes a 
more acceptable choice for the positive ―us‖ perception among the population that will stand against 
―them/other‖, whoever that may be. Moreover, in a right wing party‘s program, there is usually an 
emphasis on the threat to the cultural and ethnic identity of the nation state, with ―liberal policies of 
the EU‖, ―mass migration‖, ―forced multiculturalism‖ or ―liberal multicultural policies of the 
government‖ being responsible for endangering them.51 In that way, they are still capable to deliver 
anti-immigration message, and at the same time to appear moderate and concerned in their rhetoric 
as they only seek to preserve national welfare for native citizens.  
 
  Of course, each of the right-wing political parties derive its policy and approach towards the 
voters based on political traditions of the system, people and norms in society, and although there 
are some common themes that are prevailing in their rhetoric (anti-immigration, glorious past, anti-
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globalization etc.,)
52
, the case for each party‘s success should be examined independently, as each 
nation is differently shaped by the history, socio-economical surroundings and politics. That is why 
for example, Progress Party of Norway is seen as a right-wing party in the Nordic political context, 
where in rest of the Europe, it could be seen more as a centrist one.  
 
Nevertheless, national identity, along with the social and ethnic ones, plays an important role 
in explaining both the success and the foundation of ideology of right-wing parties. As stated before, 
the need for people to belong to certain group (family, tribe, ethnic group, nation) is a strong one, 
and if the members of the dominant ethnic group in one state feel threatened by the major influx of 
another culture in a short time span, and furthermore if that arriving culture fails to adopt elements 
of the dominant one (in this case, Western-Judeo-Christian norms and traditions), it is expected that 
a conflict will arise. For now, the conflict is present only  on the political scene, but as the history 
shows, even armed conflicts between ethnic groups in a country can unfortunately become a reality.  
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2 EASTERN-CENTRAL EUROPE 
 
 
2.1. Jobbik (Hungary) 
 
 
Predecessor of Jobbik, Right Youth Movement (Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség), was founded 
in 1999 as a college student organization, and by 2003 became a political party under the name 
―Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary‖ (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom).53  Jobbik has clear 
fascist and Nazi roots, with xenophobic and racist messages disseminated by the party members, 
especially directed against Hungarian Roma population.
54
 Jobbik also boasted its paramilitary wing 
called Hungarian Guard Movement (Magyar Gárda Mozgalom – led by Gavor Vona and dissolved 
in 2009), which used pro-Nazi iconography and symbols of the Hungarian fascist government 
during the WWII.
55
 in January of 2017, in a move to distance itself from fascist roots and in effort to 
appeal to the more moderate voters, Jobbik president Gábor Vona started a charm offensive towards 
Hungarian minorities, by officially congratulating Hannukah to the Jewish population , stating that 
his party ―has a lot to atone for‖.56 That is also a tone of the official Jobbik website where greeting 
message states, among other things, that ―while preserving our national traditions and passing on our 
cultural heritage to the next generations, we (Jobbik) also wish to represent universal humane values 
that are common in all cultures and religions‖57 
 
Ideologically, Jobbik started as a party with the radical Christian and anti-globalist stances, 
along with the anti-Roma, anti-EU and fierce anti-establishment rhetoric that was attributing to the 
rise of the party‘s profile in the Hungary.58 In recent years, Jobbik was pushing for re-branding, 
distancing itself from the more radical voters, and trying to win over dissatisfied voters of the ruling 
conservative Fidesz, presenting itself as a credible governing alternative.
59
  
 
In their manifesto titled "On Jobbik's fundamental principles for government", Jobbik 
presents itself as a former national radical party that transformed into a ―people‘s party‖, with the 
goal of ―to rise above the fault lines characterizing the political left and right, thus committing to a 
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21st-century agenda of building bridges between the groups of the society.‖60 The party believes in 
the ―unity of the people‟s soul and the nation‟s identity‖ and that it represents ―a human-centred 
political approach where people are individuals with freedom, rights and dignity as well as 
members of a community with responsibilities, duties and solidarity at the same time.‖61 This 
manifesto shows that Jobbik is trying to evolve into the more moderate approach, as the founding 
manifesto from 2003 states that the ―Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary is a value-centred, 
conservative, patriotic Christian party with radical methodology.‖ 
 
In their political program from 2014, Jobbik focused on questions of economy, law, and 
security as the main topics of its political campaign.
62
 Already in the 2018 political program, Jobbik 
shifted its attention to the question of ―democratic development of Hungary‖, change of the voting 
system, improvement of the economy and healthcare as the first topics relevant for their voters.
63
 In 
their political pamphlet titled ―15 + 1 points for the successful and happy XXI. century architecture 
of Hungary‖, party proudly states that they achieved renewal of the ―party, membership and 
leadership‖, thus becoming the ―only moderate national party (in Hungary)‖.64 One of the more 
interesting parts of their political views come from the statement that there are more important 
issues in country to be solved than immigration, in addition to the support for domestic animal and 
wildlife well-being and fair treatment.
65
  
 
In 2010 Hungarian Parliament elections, Jobbik secured 47 out of 386 seats in the 
parliament, with 16.67% of the vote, becoming the 3
rd
 largerst political party in Hungary.
66
 In 
December 2011, a new electoral law was passed with two main changes – a single round of voting 
instead of two, and the reduction of number of MPs from 386 to 199. In addition, 106 seats are 
obtained in single-member constituencies, while remaining 93 seats are allocated by proportional 
representation from national lists, and the turnout itself is not needed to be higher than 50% in order 
for elections to be considered valid.
67
  This law was first applied in 2014 elections, where Jobbik 
secured 20.54% of the votes and 23 seats in the Parliament, becoming the 3
rd
 largest political party 
in Hungary.
68
 In the same year, Jobbik secured 3 mandates in European Parliament, with 14.67% of 
votes, becoming 2
nd
 largest Hungarian political option in European Parliament, after Fidesz- KDNP 
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(Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt – Christian Demoratic People‘s Party) coalition.69  In 2018 
Hungarian parliament elections, Jobbik won 19.81% of votes and 26 mandates in the parliament 
(Figure 1).
70,71
 
 
In 2009, Jobbik was founding member of The Alliance of European National 
Movements (AENM), an European political party that consist of mixture of right-wing/nationalistic 
parties and individuals, such as British National Party, National Democratic Party (Bulgaria), 
Tricolour Flame Social Movement (Italy), National Democrats (Sweden), Republican Social 
Movement (Spain) and National Renovator Party (Portugal).
72,73   
 
 
The two members of Jobbik that are prominent in media are Jobbik‘s president Gábor Vona, 
and Jobbik‘s Parliament member Márton Gyöngyösi.  
 
Gábor Vona (born 1978, Gyöngyös) started his political carrer in 1999 by becoming a 
founding member of Right Wing Youth Community. In 2001 he was founding member of the 
Christian Intelligence Association, and in 2003, Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (A Movement 
for Better Hungary), where he became the chairman in 2006. He is noted for his osciliation between 
right-extremism and moderate approach in branding Jobbik, as well as charisma and good personal 
looks which aid Jobbik in promoting itself as a popular party among the Hungarian youth.
74,75
  
 
Márton Gyöngyösi is the vice president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament, 
one of Jobbik‘s members of the parliament. In the party since 2006, he quickly became a member of 
Gábor‘s Vona close circle, and a shaper of Jobbik‘s foreign policy.76 He is thought of as a supporter 
of ―the new Eastern foreign policy‖ that would break ties with Euro-Atlancism and be more close to 
the countries such as China, Russia, Khazastan, Turkey and Arab states.
77
 In 2014, Márton 
Gyöngyösi and his Jobbik colleague Adrienn Szaniszló attended elections in Donetsk and Lugansk 
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People‘s Republics in a role of observers, for which they were banned from Ukraine by the Kiev 
regime.
78
 
 
Jobbik‘s popularity during first half of 2017 was oscillating between 24% (January 2017) 
and 14% (February 2017), while reaching 23% in August 2017.
79,80,81. By September 2017, Jobbik‘s 
support was at 16%.
82
 The fluctuation in the support rating may come from the partiy‘s search for 
the new identity, as switching to more moderate views may have detracted some of the ―old guard‖, 
but at the same time, attracted new moderate voters. In January 2018, few months before the 2018 
elections, support for Jobbik was at 18% (Table 1).
83
  Jobbik campaign for the 2018 elections were 
obviously toned-down with ideology rhetoric, with the party itself going through the re-branding 
phase same as other similar right-wing political options in other European nations, aiming not to be 
branded ―radical-right‖ or ―far-right‖, but a ―moderate nationalist‖ party that would be more 
appealing for the voters. An additional similarity with the other re-branded right-wing parties is 
shown with the Jobbik‘s presence on the social media, where it was the most active party during the 
campaign.
84
 Their result at the 2018 elections created division within Jobbik‘s ranks, with hard-
liners demanding for party to return to its far-right roots, while at the end of May 2018, there is an 
active pressure from the same hardliners on Gábor Vona to resign from his party post, due to the not 
satisfactory election results. 
85,86 
It remains to be seen will the Jobbik split into the two new parties 
or movements between the moderates and hard-liners, or the party would overcome this crisis and 
find some compromise for the 2022 Hungarian parliament elections.  
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Jobbik’s stance on Russia 
 
 
It wouldn‘t be surprising to expect from a strongly nationalistic Hungarian party such as 
Jobbik a clear anti-Russian sentiment, but surprisingly, the reality is opposite. Overall, Jobbik 
disseminates positive message towards Russia, while making a clear distinction between current 
political system in Russian Federation and the one in the times od Soviet Union, for which it 
harbours deep resentment. Today‘s Russia is seen by Jobbik as a model country with strong national 
identity, expressed patriotism, a guardian of traditional Christian and family values, and a champion 
of multi-polar world. 
 
           In 2013, The Voice of Russia published an interview with Gábor Vona, in which an 
interesting question was what would Mr. Vona‘s relations with Russia be if he were a prime 
minister. On that he replied that, together with Turkey, he sees Russia as a country of key 
importance and that ―Russia is the other Eurasian power that could spearhead a real political, 
economic and cultural resistance against the Euro-Atlantic block‖.87 Gábor Vona visited Moscow 
the same year at the invitation of Prof. Alexander Dugin, where he gave a lecture at Lomonosov 
Moscow State University titled "Russia and Europe", while later meeting several high-ranking 
politicians.
88,89
 
 
In summer of 2014, Jobbik vocalized support for Russia in Ukrainian crisis, calling upon the 
Hungarian government and diplomatic corps to ―stop serving American interests unconditionally‖ 
and ―finally stand for Hungary‟s(…)real interests‖, while urging government further to continue the 
dialogue that began in Minsk in order to solve the Ukrainian conflict.
90
 The VP of the International 
Relations Committee in Hungary‘s parliament and a member of Jobbik, Mr. Marton Gyongysi stated 
in an interview that ―Russia correctly resorted to diplomatic methods of protecting the Russian-
speaking Donbass population, which had been subjected to military oppression by Kiev‖.91 
In their 2014 parliamentary election program, Jobbik argued for the establishment of closer 
ties with Russia, as a way for negotiating better gas prices with Gazprom
92
 and tighter technological 
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cooperation concerning Paks Nuclear Power Plant
93
. They also stated that they see Russia as an 
excellent market for Hungarian products, such as food and agricultural technologies.
94
 This stance is 
reinforced by their official policy which sees Russia as the important player in global politics and a 
key to Hungary‘s energy security.95 
 
In 2015, a Jobbik member of parliament Istvan Szavay wrote an open letter to Colleen 
Bradley Bell, Ambassador of the US to Hungary, expressing concern that US has failed to condemn 
multiple and prolonged violations of minority rights of Hungarians in Ukraine, while noting that 
Russia‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, expressed Russia‘s concern and support in this 
issue.
96
  Jobbik news feed is overwhelmingly positive towards Russia, though there are examples 
where such friendly tone is absent, as in the statement made in May 2017 regarding Russian 
motorcycle club ―Night Wolves‘s‖ visit to Hungary.  In the view of Jobbik, such a visit was 
provocative, since this club sports Communist symbols which are forbidden in Hungary and are 
deemed authoritarian. 
97
  
 
The media‘s position on Jobbik in the West, as well as in some Hungarian media, is that it is 
financed by Russia as a part of the larger network of Russian intelligence operation of support 
towards right-wing parties across the Europe.
98,99,100,101
 In May 2017, a German television ZDF 
published claims that Belorussian oligarch Alyksandar Usovsky, under the orders of Kremlin, 
distributed 3,000 euros to Magyar Gárda in October 2014 for an anti-NATO protest, as well as 
10,000 euros to Jobbik, based on a supposed cache of Usovsky‘s emails that was leaked in February 
2017 and published by a Ukrainian website.
102,103
. In an article published in 2015, Stratfor called 
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Jobbik a ―tool of the informational warfare and secret service machinery of the Kremlin‖, while 
stating that ―along the several other far-right forces in EU such as Front Nationale in France, Golden 
Dawn in Greece or the Freedom Party in Austria, Jobbik(…)helps in the division, destabilization 
and de-legitimization of the EU and its member states‖.104 The trend of accusation of alleged 
Russian ties with Jobbik is seen in articles of major Western media, such as New York Times
105
, 
The Telegraph
106
, NBC News
107
, BBC
108
 and EU Observer
109
 among others. Therefore, positive 
stance of Jobbik towards Russia is negatively perceived by Western media and more liberal-inclined 
Hungarian news outlets. 
 
 
Following conclusions can be reached:  
 
 Jobbik sees Russia as a defender of Christian and traditional values in Europe, opposing 
Euro-Atlantic ―liberalism‖  
 
 It also considers that Russia is needed for revival of European continent and liberation from 
Euro-Atlantism and American domination that is prevailing in the current EU 
 
 Jobbik sees Russia as a natural ally of the European nations, which need to stand together 
against multiple challenges such as international terrorism, immigration, negative birth rate, 
stagnating economy and American subjection of European continent. 
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Jobbik seems as an unlikely supporter of Russia, given the history between Hungary and 
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the message towards the Russian Federation is overwhelmingly 
positive, and in case of Jobbik‘s political takeover of the government it may pave the way towards 
increased cooperation with Russia. Though the issue may come up with revisionist policy towards 
Hungarian neighbors that Jobbik propagates, perhaps Russian influence can be enough to contain 
any irredentist tendencies of the hypothetical Jobbik-lead Hungarian government. Finally, by 
securing the full support of Hungary, Russia can open a path towards increased influence in the 
Balkans and central Europe, and contest US/EU influence there from a much better position than it 
currently has. 
 
Jobbik’s stance on NATO 
 
 
During the years, Jobbik expressed negative opinion towards NATO and Hungarian 
involvement in it, while opting more for development of domestic defense capabilities.
110,111
  
 
At the beginning of 2014, Gábor Vona called for a revision of Hungary‘s membership in 
NATO, a statement that was reiterated the same year during the NATO summit in Welsh.
112
 To this 
official Jobbik statement, a line was added that said that ―Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is making a 
serious mistake in history" with entrusting NATO with the defense of Hungary.
113,
 
114
 
 
In September 2015, Jobbik spokesman Ádám Mirkóczki stated that NATO behaved like ―an 
aggressor whose fronts are the most recently joined states, including Hungary‖115 The following 
month, Jobbik publicly condemned formation of the NATO headquarters in Székesfehérvár as a 
command & control node for NATO‘s rapid reaction forces in the region, stressing that such forces 
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and their coordination centers are prime targets for an armed strike.
116
 Same month, Márton 
Gyöngyösi called NATO ―a cover organization for the USA's geopolitical efforts…working on 
creating a monopolar, West-centred world order, which is primarily against Russia‖.117  
 
An article from ―Politico‖ published in July 2017 drew attention of Hungarian public, as  it 
was stated there that NATO was worried about rising activity of Russia‘s intelligence officers in 
Hungary, and that in general, NATO looked upon Hungary as a liability in the alliance, regardless of 
Hungarian contributions so far.
118
 Shortly after this article was published, a National Security 
Committee of National Assembly was conveyed, where Ádám Mirkóczki, a Jobbik board member, 
was put in the spotlight over the apparent lack of trust of NATO towards Hungary, and the supposed 
Jobbik‘s ties to Russia.119 This meeting of National Security Commitie was boycotted by the ruling 
Fidesz party.
120
 
 
The official Jobbik policy that can be seen at their website follows the previous trend of 
denouncing the NATO and its role in Hungary: ―In terms of strategic and military policy, we have 
voiced harsh criticism of NATO. We firmly believe that the organization can only guarantee 
Hungary‘s and the world‘s security if it observes its original mission and remains a defence alliance. 
We support the forces that urge and ease of tensions between NATO and Russia.‖121 
 
Jobbik sees the role of Hungary in NATO not as one as an equal partner, but as a NATO‘s 
base of operation close to the unstable Balkan region and Russia itself.
122
 In their 2014 parliament 
election program, under the chapter ―Defense program‖, it is stated that ―…The full defense system 
must be rebuilt and military capabilities based on the Hungarian industry. Planning must be carried 
out independently of federal systems (NATO, EU)‖123.  In addition ―…Jobbik would therefore 
review(…)the existing treaties defining a unilateral Euro-Atlantic foreign policy as the first step in 
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the change of foreign policy paradigm. We will re-negotiate economic, trade, politics and 
multilateral contracts that violate our national sovereignty and interests. Jobbik classifies these 
contracts with the EU, the agreements with the International Monetary Fund, and the Hungarian 
involvement in various international military missions that are difficult to interpret for our national 
interests arising from our NATO membership.‖124  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that: 
 
 Jobbik sees the NATO as an offensive alliance, damaging to the Hungarian national interests 
and international relations,  
 
 Will re-negotiate Hungarian NATO membership if it manages to obtain power, and possibly 
threat to leave the alliance as whole, 
 
  Jobbik denounces the NATO‘s effort to escalate the conflict with Russia, as it threatens both 
Hungary‘s and world security. 
 
Jobbik is adamant in its negative sentiment towards NATO, and it would be possible to 
expect a more limited role of Hungary, if not a total withdraw from the alliance, if this party seizes 
power. If Hungary leaves NATO, that would be a serious blow to this alliance, since it would lose a 
strategic position in the central Europe. Even if Jobbik doesn‘t manage to pull Hungary out of the 
NATO, it can lead the country towards a more cooperative path with Russia, and in that way hamper 
NATO‘s efforts to contain Russian influence in Central Europe and the Balkans. In addition, 
potential anti-NATO campaign of Jobbik‘s can enhance support for other similar parties across 
Europe to push forward with similar policies, as they often share the sentiment to this organistation. 
Russia will have to devise a smart and careful approach in order to reap maximum benefits if this 
hypothetical scenario does happen, as it would give her more maneuvering space, and perhaps ease-
off the pressure of heavy NATO military presence so close to its borders. 
 
 
Jobbik’s stance on EU 
 
 
An openly Eurosceptic party, Jobbik takes an uncompromising view on Euro-atlanticism, 
seeing it as an enemy to Hungary‘s people and their future. Therefore it is not surprising that this 
party disseminates anti-EU messages, although at the same time it has a presence in the European 
Parliament and is willing to work towards the reformation of the European Union. 
 
Jobbik stance on the future of EU, as based on their press releases, is that of the replacement 
of the concept of ―federal Europe‖ with the one of the Europe based on the sovereignty of nations, 
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especially after Brexit.
125
 This was stated also by Gábor Vona during a Jobbik rally in November 
2015, where he expressed that ―…the leaders of the European Union won‟t be this set of people for 
much longer, but people who think within the scope of a Europe of nations.‖ and that Jobbik is 
―party for Europe‖, while ―we (Jobbik) consider the European Union to be very bad‖.126  In Jobbik‘ 
view, the EU‘s institutional structure has failed, since it cannot meet social, economic, financial or 
demographic challenges it faces,  while the Hungary itself is a victim of a Euro-Atlantism for the 
last twenty-five years, and federalization of the EU is further damaging Hungary‘s interests. 127,128  
 
This stance was officially present in their 2014 election program under the title of ―A better 
future - Instead of the Brussels-based Empire, the Europe of Nations‖. There, Jobbik proposed 
creation of new structures and systems based on the flexible cooperation between individual 
Member States, in which each country would participate to different degrees, in accordance with 
their interests, without aims ―at some kind of homogeneity‖.129  
 
In addition, reforms are proposed for institutions of the European Union, such as The 
Council of Ministers, European Parliament and European Commission.
130
 After the reforms, their 
future roles will be limited to the decision and policy making process of Member States, but only in 
the area of mandatory basic co-operation that each Member State agrees to. The idea is that the 
reformed institutions serve more as platforms for discussion and cooperation between Member 
States in their new role. The Council of Ministers would be an operative body that will promote 
various optional projects, with participation in them being on volunteer basis by Member States. 
European Parliament would also face changes, losing its legislation role and becoming a forum to 
discuss and understand problems of countries of the Union, making policy recommendations for 
European Council along the way. The European Commission, with participation of each country in 
the Union, would hold the governing role, and it would not produce or draft laws, but take upon 
itself to monitor and co-ordinate cooperation of Member States in different areas. Finally, Jobbik 
would argue for reviewing currently unrestricted flow of people, goods, services and capital across 
countries, and it would demand different cross-border agreements in this new system
131
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Jobbik‘s Resistance towards the official EU policies was also noticeable during the ongoing 
migration crisis. The party issued a strong statement against the decision of Hungarian government 
to take in migrants between age 14-18, (after they undergo a mandatory DNA test), going so far as 
to say that ―Orban kneeled before Brussels‖.132  The migration crisis prompted Jobbik president 
Gábor Vona to declare that ―we were witnessing the collapse of the European Union‖, and that ―all 
it needed for such a failure was the appearance of a couple of hundred thousand unarmed 
migrants‖.133 
 
In their view, European Union is a conglomerate serving Washington‘s interests, working 
relentlessly on depriving the continent from all the values that shaped it into what is now. Europe 
suffers from Americanisation and it is deteriorating from a community of national states into a 
―pasteless and futureless consumers disowning their own nations‖, while the Russia‘s ―historic 
duty‖ is to set Europe back on the track of traditions.134 
 
Jobbik started off as a staunch anti-EU party, expressing the wish for Hungary to break off 
from the EU.
135
 They demonstrated such stance in 2012 during anti-EU rally in front of the 
European Commission offices in Budapest, by setting the EU flag on fire. In 2014, a Jobbik MEP 
threw out the EU flag from the window of the parliament during session, proclaiming ―Long live 
freedom, long live our fatherland, we‟ll put away this symbol of high treason…and 
colonization‖136,137  Migrant crisis provided a new direction for  Jobbik‘s EU stance. Instead of the 
desire for Hungary to leave EU, Gábor Vona stated in June 2016 that this crisis is offering populist 
parties across the continent an opportunity to ―transform‖ the block.138,139 True to these word, Jobbik 
showed this kind of behavior with the launch of the European Citizens‘ Initiative for eliminating 
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European wage inequalities.
140
 Gábor Vona emphasized that ―the initiative was reaching far beyond 
the issue of European wages: it aimed for competitive domestic enterprises, a new cohesion policy 
and a new European Union with more solidarity where Eastern Central member states could feel at 
home, too.‖141 This initiative is seen by Jobbik as the first cause that could trigger cooperation 
among the nations of the ―historically exhausted Eastern European region.‖142 
 
As a member of Alliance of European National Movements EU Parliament group, Jobbik, as 
one of the group founders, had a clear ideological influence and vision of the ―New European 
Order‖. Their ideas can be seen on the official website of AENM. Also present on the website are 
messages that Jobbik published in its 2014 parliament program, such as ―The creation of a Europe of 
free, independent and equal nations in the framework of a confederation of sovereign nation states‖, 
―The rejection of any attempt to create a centralized European Super State.‖ and ―The primacy of 
direct votes by the people or their elected representatives over any administrative or bureaucratic 
body.‖143 Current president of the AENM is Béla Kovács of Jobbik. 
 
To summarize: 
 
 Though Jobbik started as an anti-EU party, it now seeks reforms from within the EU 
itself 
 
 It is of the opinion that the ―transformation‖ of the EU can be achieved with other 
nation-minded populist parties across the Europe 
 
 Their final vision of the ―New Europe‖ will be the ―Europe of Nations‖, based on the 
cooperation of sovereign states tied in the loose confederation, while breaking up 
with Euro-atlantism and federal policies of Brusell. 
 
 
Jobbik is one of the political parties that gives clear idea how new Europe should look like, 
publishing them in an official program, and supporting them through the membership in the 
Eurosceptical Alliance of European National Movements EU Parliament group. Notion of some 
kind of ―Hungexit‖ in the future cannot be dismissed, though Hungary is a landlocked country 
almost totally surrounded by EU members, and without an alternative will have to stay inside the 
European Union in order for its economy to survive. Nevertheless, increased presence of Jobbik in 
both government and EU Parliament could influence a lot changes within the EU itself, a situation 
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that can be beneficial for Russia, since their voice could provide a counterpoint to USA‘s influence 
over Brussels. 
 
 
Although Jobbik‘s rating dropped by some degree following parliamentary elections (with 
the spike in rise around peak of migration crisis and Hungarian-EU row), it is still among 3 strongest 
Hungarian parties, and the main challenger of the rulling Fidzes. This is also based on the view that 
Fidesz share many similarities with Jobbik in domestic/foreign policies (though Fidesz is at least 
publicly much less extremist in its view), and therefore Jobbik can always count on disgruntled 
voters of Fidesz to vote for them in the coming parliamentary elections in 2018. Also encouraging is 
the current tendency of Jobbik to slowly back away from the extremist (and borderline fascist) 
ideology and political views, positioning itself more to the center compared to the previous years, 
though radical positions still serve as a cornerstone voter recruitment policy.  
 
Nevertheless, despite all the negative PR in domestic and international media, Jobbik will 
still be a political force in Hungary in the following decade, especially if EU bureaucrats continue 
their crackdown on Hungary due to their stance on migration crisis and foreign policy. Therefore, 
Russia must not dismiss a possible future influence of this party on the Hungarian foreign policy. 
The re-branding which party leadership undertook (as it often happens with far-right parties once 
they achieve a moderate degree of success) may help improve its image among voters and beyond. 
Therefore, possible Russian cooperation with Jobbik-led government must not be dismissed, as 
Jobbik views on NATO, EU and Russia are quite along the lines of close cooperation with the 
Russian Federation. Since Russia is facing a much smaller maneuvering space in Europe, it would 
be prudent to choose pragmatism of cooperation with such right-wing party in case of their 
ascendance into government. As mentioned before, one of the more serious issues that Russia can 
have with Jobbik is their view on people and territory of some neighboring countries, but here 
Russia will need to exercise diplomacy and wisdom in order to protect interests of possible future 
allies among Central European and Balkan Slavic countries, and not to alienate another possible ally 
in the form of Jobbik-led Hungary. 
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2.2. Freedom Party of Austria (Austria) 
 
 
 
FPÖ (Freedom party of Austria - Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) can be considered one of 
the more interesting right wing parties of Central-Eastern Europe. Not only is it on the political 
scene of Austria for a long time, but it was also a part of coalition government three times during the 
last three decades. Currently, it is in the coalition government with the Austrian People's Party 
(Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) since December 2017 and it yet has to show the impact of its 
political ideology and designated course on the politics of Austria. 
 
FPÖ was founded in 1956, as a party with liberal and National-German tendencies, even 
though it had connections to Nazi sympathizers as the founder was Anton Reinthaller - a former SS 
officer and a Nazi functionary.
144,145
 Thanks to its perceived Nazi roots the party was largely 
isolated on the Austrian political scene until the 1979, when FPÖ was first accepted into Liberal 
International (and thus publicly being re-branded as a liberal party) and later in 1983, when it 
entered the coalition with the SPÖ (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs) party.
146
  In 1986 Jörg 
Haider became party chairman with the FPÖ becoming the most vocal opponent of Austria‘s 
accession to the EU while Haider himself was a voice against Austrian‘ system‘s weaknesses, 
scandals, favoritism and inequalities, ensuring a succession of electoral victories for FPÖ.
147,148
 In 
the next decade, Haider tried to introduce ―Austria first‖ ideology in order to oppose the appeal of 
Nazism and Nazi Germany expressed among some of the members, thus becoming the party of both 
German nationalism and Austrian patriotism.
149
 In Austrian  general elections of 1999 FPÖ 
managed to secure 26.91% of votes, forming the coalition government with the ÖVP 
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(Österreichische Volkspartei) four months later in 2000, which provoked an outrage in the 14 EU 
members states who decided to ostracize the country diplomatically.
150
  
 
The EU briefly imposed sanctions on Austria, with the reasoning that this coalition was 
legitimizing extreme right in Europe, but lifted them after understanding that they may be 
counterproductive as they were actually encouraging anti-EU feelings.
151
 But already during the 
parliament elections of 2002, FPÖ experienced sharp decline in support, winning only 10% of the 
votes.
152
 This was the cause of the party split in 2005 (along with the internal disputes), when Haider 
created Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ), which proved as a 
popular alternative for the FPÖ, winning 10.7% of the votes on 2008 parliament elections, with FPÖ 
winning 17.54%). Nevertheless, BZÖ lost much of its support after Haider‘s death just days after 
2008 parliament elections.
153,154
 With Hans-Christian Strache as a new party leader from 2006, FPÖ 
once again started to be more successful party on the Austrian political scene, winning 20.5% of 
votes on 2013 parliament elections, and 26% on 2017 Austrian parliament elections, which led to 
the formation of the governmental coalition with the ÖVP in December 2017.
155,156
 Currently, 
ministers that hail from the ranks of the FPÖ FPÖin the Austrian government are  Minister of Civil 
Service and Sports, Federal Minister of the Interior, Minister of Defence, Minister of Labor, Social 
Affairs, Health and Consumer Protection and Minister of Transport, Innovation and Technology, 
while Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs was independent candidate 
nominated by the FPÖ.
157
 
 
The FPÖ ideology under Strache‘s leadership is said to resonate with that of the Haider‘s 
during the early years of his leadership, meaning that it is concentrated on protection of Austria, 
Austrian national identity and autonomy, as well as Austrian natural livelihood, while advocating 
restrictive policies on immigration and Islam.
158
 In addition, it bases its beliefs that the core 
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institutions of state are at risk and that they need to be defended, such as family which is under 
threat from the people who do not follow the traditional family model, welfare system which is 
placed under strain by the resource-draining immigrants, and the nation itself where the EU and 
immigration are to blame.
159
  
 
  The success of the FPÖ comes in addition from Strache‘s charismatic personality and ability 
to reach out to the youth – from performing nationalistic rap-songs to PR campaign of his healthy 
and active lifestyle, connecting with the Vienna‘s party-going youth in night clubs, to his tech-savvy 
skills at using social media and the Internet.
160
  In their 2008 parliament elections campaign FPÖ 
branded themselves as ―social homeland party‖, concentrating on populist themes such as anti-
immigration policies, EU-skepticism, crime and Austrian nationalism, while stressing the 
interventionist economic and social policies targeted at blue-collar voters and welfare state 
recipients.
161
 This proved to be a success formula, as little is changed by the 2017 parliament 
elections in their program, since during the FPÖ electoral campaign, Strache warned about 
―undifferentiated mass immigration‖ and ―the threatening and mistaken Islamification‖ of Austria, 
as the most pressing issues for the new government.
162
  
 
Although accused of being a Nazi and an anti-semmite, Strache tried to reconcile with Israel, 
announcing his support for recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and supporting Israel's 
construction of Jewish-only settlements in the disputed territory of West Bank.
163
 Nevertheless, in 
April 2018, the representatives of the FPÖ were not invited to participate in the ceremony 
commemorating the 1945 liberation of concentration camp Mauthausen, as the Austrian Mauthausen 
Committee stated that the presence of the FPÖ politicians at the event ―would mean further 
humiliation of Holocaust survivors‖.164 
 
Interestingly, FPÖ as an anti-immigration party drives support from the immigrants from the 
former Yugoslavia, mainly ethnic-Serbian population (with their population of around 300.000 in 
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Austria).
165
 From 2008 onwards, Strache and FPÖ established excellent relations with not only 
Serbian immigrants and first-generation born Serbo-Austrians, but also with political elite from 
Serbia and Republic of Srpska (Република Српска), a Bosnian-Serb entity within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
166
 To show the gratitude for excellent cooperation and relations between FPÖ and 
Serbian community, President of Republic of Sprska Milorad Dodik (Милорад Додик) awarded 
medals to Strahe and Johan Gudenus on the National Day of the Republic of Srpska in Banja Luka 
in January 2018. 
167,168
 In addition, during his visit to Belgrade on February 2018, Strache strongly 
criticized the Austrian decision to recognize the self-proclaimed independence of Serbia‘s southern 
province of Kosovo and Metohija, with Serbian government thanking him for the support on 
important questions for Serbia over the years.
169
 This reinforced the image of Strache and FPÖ not 
only as a ―defenders of Christian values‖ in Europe, but Orthodox Christian as well, which in turn 
could open more ground for cooperation with Slavic Orthodox countries, such as Russia. Whether 
those are honest feelings towards Orthodox Slavic population or not, certainly it was a pragmatic 
decision made by FPÖ leadership in the bid to increase the support of the party for the elections. 
 
 
The FPÖ sees itself as a party committed to the Austria, the freedom and responsibility of the 
individual and the community, democracy, the sovereign state, the principles of the market economy 
and social justice, as well as to the Austria‘s right to the self-determination and preservation of its 
tradition and culture.
170,171 
This is repeated in their political program, where FPÖ states that freedom 
is considered the highest good, and thus, Austria‘s neutrality, national identity and independence 
should be defended at all costs. FPÖ claims to stand for the rule of law, the family as a community 
of a man and a woman with their children as a natural nucleus and staple for a functioning society, 
market economy with social responsibility and welfare state.
172
 Furthermore, FPÖ states that it is a 
patriotic party which places the protection and needs of its own people at the center of its political 
action and policy shaping, thus presenting itself as the people-champion political option.
173
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  Although it can be argued that FPÖ managed to successfully re-brand itself as a center-right 
conservative party which broke its links to the Nazi-origin past, from time to time scandals appear in 
media. FPÖ members are often accused of racism and hate speech, especially the one directed 
towards immigrants coming from Middle East and Africa.
174
 In September 2017, just weeks before 
the elections, a local FPÖ official was expelled for hoarding Nazi memorabilia, including SS 
division insignia and a plaque commemorating Hitler‘s 1938 annexation of Austria.175 In March 
2018, Austrian police in the city of Suben raided homes of six people, among them two local 
councilors from FPÖ, that were suspected of breaking laws against glorifying the Nazis. as the 
consequence of this, the councilors were expelled from the party, after it became clear that they 
were sharing photos and quotes of Hitler on WhatsApp (social media platform).
176  
In response to all 
these incidents, FPÖ leadership vowed that it will ―clean-up its pro-Nazi image‖ while stating that 
―FPÖ recognizes without reserve the Republic of Austria, democracy, parliamentarianism and the 
rule of law."
177
 Despite this negative image in the media, FPÖ still managed to secure its place in the 
coalition government without any major backlash from the EU, as it was case with the 2002 ÖVP-
FPÖ coalition. Not only that, but in May 2018 a survey was conducted which placed the support for 
FPÖ at historical 31%, which was increase of 5% from January‘s 26% of support (Table 1),178,179 
The osciliations of support for the FPÖ during the cycle of six Austrian parliament elections show 
that the party successfully managed the process of re-branding, as the percentage of won votes from 
the 2017 parliament election is higher than during the previous four parliament elections (Figure 
2).
180,181,182,183,184,185
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The FPÖ member who is most exposed to the media is certainly its leader, Hans-Christian 
Strache (born in Vienna, 1969). By profession a dental technician, Strache became involved in local 
Viennese politics in 1991, becoming a leader of the Viennese FPÖ in 2004 and national leader of the 
FPÖ in 2005. Leading FPÖ in the next 13 years, his biggest success came with his party forming up 
coalition with ÖVP and Strache becoming Vice-Chancellor of Austria in December 2017.
186
 
 
Another important member of FPÖ‘s younger guard is Johann Gudenus (born in Vienna, 
1976) - a vice chairman of the FPÖ and since 2017 the chairman of the FPÖ club in the National 
Council (Der Nationalrat – lower house of Austrian Parliament). He is active on the international 
stage, providing links with the polital parties and politicians for the FPÖ, such as Jobbik in 
Hungary.
187
 In addition, the media branded Johann Gudenus as a  driving force in the intensification 
of the FPÖ- Russia  relations.
188,189
  
 
 
 
FPÖ’s Stance on Russia 
 
 
 
Although FPÖ is an openly Russia-friendly political party, it does not exhibit that in their 
official documents beside a call for removal of sanctions that are damaging for Austrian economy 
and agricultural sector, in their program for 2017 parliament elections.
190
 In addition, in Austrian 
governmental program ÖVP-FPÖ states that the neutrality of Austria is an important factor in 
international relations due to its historical position as a meeting point between the East and the 
West, and so it can serve as an active place of dialogue and policy of détente between Russia and the 
Western world.
191
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The real support for Russia can be seen in the statements of the party leadership in the mass 
media during the last two years. 
 
In March 2016, The FPÖ parliamentarians Axel Kassegger and Barbara Rosenkranz were 
among the participants of the "International Yalta Economic Forum", with Kasseger stating that ―it 
is necessary to restore the lost trust‖ between Austria and Russia as the sanctions were hurting the 
Austrian economy.
192
 In December the same year, FPÖ signed agreement on cooperation with 
Russia‘s ruling party United Russia, with Strache leading the FPÖ delegation personally to 
Moscow.
193
 The FPÖ and the United Russia declared to work together in the spheres of youth, 
education, disaster relief and other social organizations,  with the aim of "strengthening friendship 
and educating the young generation in the spirit of patriotism and enjoyment of work".
194,195
 Facing 
the critics from the German Chancellor Angela Merkel for his friendly relations with the United 
Russia, Strache stated that the cooperation agreement which was signed between the two parties was 
the basis for an exchange of ideas in order to counteract the negative Cold War trend in the spirit of 
peaceful development, while criticizing Angela Merkel for trying to isolate the German-dominant 
EU with a confrontational policy on all sides.
196
 
  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported in January 2018 that the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel expressed her concerns that government participation of the FPÖ in Vienna could 
complicate the intelligence cooperation of the Western states as the FPÖ, ―which seeks proximity to 
Russia‖, could gain insights into Moscow that would allow the Russian intelligence services to draw 
information about the activities of Western intelligence services.
197
 Therefore, the report stated, 
Vienna must be prepared for the fact that Western intelligence services would no longer share 
information to the same extent – although this report was later denied by both Angela Merkel and 
Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. 
198,199
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In February 2018, Johann Gudenus hailed the visit of Sebastian Kurz to Moscow and his 
meeting with the Russian president Vladimir Putin as a ― very good signal‖ which shows that 
―Russia is part of Europe and that stability in Europe is only possible with Russia―.200 In addition, 
he stressed that ―we (FPÖ) clearly stated in the government program that we are working towards a 
phased reduction of sanctions, of course with several European partners‖ and that he was 
personally in favor of sanction reduction as they also harm Austrian economy.
201
 
 
In March 2018, FPÖ organized an event to commemorate the Jewish Red Army soldier 
Alexander Pechersky, which was attended by the Russian ambassador in Austria Dmitri Ljubinski 
(Дмитрий Евгеньевич Любинский) and the Israeli politician Michael Kleiner of the Likud party. 
While both of them criticized the destruction of Soviet war memorials in Eastern European countries 
and warned that fascism should never be repeated, Michael Kleiner praised FPÖ and the activities 
Strache that are leading tothe good relations between the party and the Israel.
202
  
 
The following month Austria‘s Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl visited Moscow, emphazing 
the bridge builder function "of Austria between EU and Russia.”203 The Austrian neutrality and 
unwillingness of Austrian government to expel Russian diplomats during the Salisbury case, calls 
for taking down sanctions towards Russia, as well as cordial relationship of FPÖ leadership towards 
Russian Federation have all prompted some media to call FPÖ ―Putin‟s Trojan horse‖ in 
Austria.
204,205
 The FPÖ also drew negative critic from the pro-Western media when Detlef Wimmer 
visited Yalta Economic Forum in 2018, along with a few other FPÖ politicians, which was seen as 
opposition to official anti-Russian EU stance on the Crimea‘s rejoining to Russian Federation.206,207 
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It can be concluded that: 
 
 
 
 FPÖ is an openly Russian-friendly political option in Austria  
 
 Its presence in the new Austrian government provides a large boost to Austrian-Russian 
relations 
 
 FPÖ might be the crucial actor in Austrian politics that will help with taking down Austrian 
economic sanctions towards Russia 
 
It is without any doubt that FPÖ is Russia‘s major ally in the Austrian government, and to a 
degree in the EU, as the party not only understands Russian economic and political position but also 
wishes to expand the cooperation between the two countries. Of course, it is yes to be seen what 
level of cooperation can be established between Russia and Austria on the international level now 
that the FPÖ is in the government, but the signals are encouraging as Vladimir Putin is set to visit 
Vienna at the end of the June this year.
208
 Hopefully, the ÖVP-FPÖ government can serve as a role 
model of the future good relations between European countries and the Russian Federation. 
 
 
 
FPÖ’s Stance on NATO 
 
 
With the FPÖ being a staunch supporter of Austria‘s neutrality, it is not surprising that they 
are against Austria‘s NATO membership, or any military alliance that is non-European at its core. 
 
Based on their political program, it can be observed that FPÖ stands for the military 
neutrality of Austria and compulsory military service, and it is naturally for the increased military 
budget that would provide foundation for the strong military, conscription and ―defense of 
everlasting neutrality‖.209 In their 2016 political program, FPÖ states again their support for the 
mandatory military service in order for Austrian neutrality to be successfully defended. In addition, 
FPÖ is clear that any foreign missions that can be conducted by the Austrian military should be 
voluntary and only for disaster relief, humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and under UN mandate.
210
 
In the government program, defense of Austrian neutrality is a shared goal between ÖVP and FPÖ. 
The program states that since the Austria is closer to the crisis regions (such as the Balkans) than 
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other EU members, it needs to have a strong military and territorial defense, and to contribute to the 
EU missions in the Balkan region. No support for any military alliance is given in the program.
211
 
 
During his visit to Moscow in September 2014, Johann Gudenus criticized EU and NATO, 
stating that the ―policy of the European Union is the policy of NATO and United States‖, and that the 
―Austrian people and the people of the European Union…are friends of Russia‖.212  In March 2015, 
Strache was saying how most of the member-states of the EU are part of NATO at the same time, 
and therefore, EU is geostrategically guided by the US interests instead of European ones, while the 
NATO expanded itself towards the borders of Russia.
213 
In September same year, Strache blamed 
the United States and the NATO for triggering the refugee crisis that has overwhelmed Europe 
stating that the ― The USA and NATO have destroyed Iraq and Libya with their military intervention, 
bombs and missiles; provided financial, logistical and military support to the opposition against 
President Assad in Syria, and thus made possible the destruction, chaos, suffering and radical 
Islamism (ISIS
214
) in the region‖.215  
 
In October 2016, then-presidential candidate of the FPÖ for the Austrian Presidential 
elections Norbert Hofer stated that ―Austria is not a member of NATO, nor do I want Austria to 
become a member of NATO. ― and that ―we can not take part in a European army in terms of 
military action, but Austria could take part in tasks that are humanitarian in nature and relate to 
infrastructure and security‖.216 The following month, Strache said that he believed that NATO was 
a burden for Europe  ―which causes conflict and confusion over its (European) identity‖.217 
 
In February 2017, Heinz-Christian Strache further campaigned for the establishment of the 
EU army that would be independent from the US-domintated NATO, stating that it would be good 
for Europe to ―exit the NATO‖ and have its own defensive army, since the alternative would be to 
―finance the US military industry under American geostrategic command, whatever its interests‖218 
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In addition, he supported the idea that any future European defense army should have nuclear 
weapons, in order to guarantee European independence and security.
219
 
 
In June 2017, Strache protested against NATO troops movement trough Austria for the 
excercises ―Saber-Guardian 17‖ and ―Noble Jump 17‖ that were held in Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Romania, questioning how it was possible that ―NATO forces are rolling through our country as if 
they were at home‖ and that these exercises were neither ―a humanitarian nor a UN mission, it is a 
provocation of Russia and leads our neutrality ad absurdum ―220 The same month, Strache again 
called for the Austrian withdrawal from NATO‘s Partnership for Peace Program, stressing that 
Austria has to remain neutral and not part of any military alliance.
221
 Two months later, Strache 
repeated again stance of FPÖ that the party will guarantee Austrian people that they will never again 
be involved in the armed conflicts, which means clear ―no‖ to NATO membership. In May 2018 
Strache once again repeated the commitment of FPÖ against Austria‘s NATO membership.222 
 
To summarize: 
 
 FPÖ is against Austria‘s membership in NATO 
 
 
 FPÖ will continue to support Austria‘s neutrality, although it may consider membership in 
the indigenous European defensive force 
 
 It remains to be seen how FPÖ will handle the ministry of defense  
 
It is absolutely clear that Austria will remain a neutral country in the near future, even more so 
with the FPÖ in government. Any increase in the military budget or in the capacity of the armed 
forces should not be of any concern towards Russia, as the FPÖ clearly states that strong military is 
needed in order to guarantee sovereignty and neutrality of Austria (especially from US-dominated 
military alliances), and in case of foreign involvement, the army capacity will be mobilized for 
peacekeeping or disaster-relief missions, sanctioned by the UN. How will this look in practice 
remains to be seen, but it is encouraging that the current minister of defense hails from the ranks of 
FPÖ.  
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FPÖ’s Stance on EU 
 
As stated before, FPÖ was the most vocal critic against Austrian ascension to the EU in 
1995. In the present, they continued with anti-EU/pro-reform stances and declarations, as it can be 
seen from their program and leader statements. 
 
In its political program, FPÖ states that it is committed to the Europe of ―historically evolved 
people and autochthonous ethnic groups‖ and not the ―artificial coexistence of diverse European 
languages and cultures through forced multiculturalism, globalization and mass immigration‖, 
while at the same time ―Europe cannot be reduced to the political project of the European 
Union.‖223  Party further states that it is committed to the Europe of self-determined nations and 
countries with the Europe‘s future fate to be shaped by the freedom of its states. FPÖ sees the 
European integrations not as a federalization process but as the ―fellowship of those states which, 
geographically, spiritually and culturally, make up Europe and which have committed themselves to 
the Western values, the heritage of cultures and the traditions of the European nations‖.224  FPÖ is 
adamant that while they are committed to the European contract with a list of rights and obligations 
for the Union and Member States, the constitutional principles of sovereign member states must take 
absolute precedence over EU laws. FPÖ will maintain Austrian neutrality in the face of non-
European powers and non-European military alliances, although it will be committed to a common 
foreign and security policy of sovereign European nation-states.
225
 
 
The FPÖ styles itself as the ―Europe friendly, EU-critical‖ party, and rejects that existing EU 
regulations and mechanisms ―have no alternative‖, stating that the proponents of the EU 
centralization distinguish two basic types of Europeans – the ―good Europeans‖ and the ―bad 
Europeans‖, who are unwilling to follow the path of further centralisation.226 In the party‘s view, a 
―good European‖ can only be the one who ―recognizes the cultural pluralism of this continent, seeks 
to preserve the identities of the nations of Europe, would like to build a prosperous future of 
coexistence and that it also has in mind a strengthening of democracy in Europe‖.227 It praises the 
European Economic Community (EEC) as a model community of the sovereign nation states, while 
criticizing the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 which created European Union, and which was in their 
view, the first and significant step towards the "United States of Europe".
228
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The FPÖ states its five principles for the future of the European Union:
229
 
 
1. Preservation of national sovereignty, against ―Brussels centralism and escalating EU 
bureaucracy‖. FPÖ is against centralized federation along the lines of the United States of America, 
but for the European confederation of sovereign nation states.  
 
2. Preservation of the cultural identity of European nations and resistance towards the mass 
immigration, islamisation, Turkey‘s EU accession and creation of multicultural societies in Europe. 
FPÖ stands for preservation and development of the European civilizations on the cultural basis of 
the ―West and the values of Christianity‖. 
 
3. Preservation of nation-state economies, against the ―dictates of multinational corporations and 
the misconstruction of the euro currency‖. FPÖ strives for a reconstructing of the euro area and the 
possibility of an independent economic and monetary policy. 
 
4. Preservation of national solidarity system and Austrian social networks, and against the escalating 
globalization as well as against ―wage dumping‖ and ―the dictates of the international financial 
markets‖. 
 
5. Preservation of traditional family, and against ―gender mania, decadence and hedonism‖, with 
pro-natality family policy for both Austria and European nations.  
 
For guidelines for the FPÖ members of the parliament in Austria and at the European level 
the party suggests that ―every effort must be made to reverse the course of centralization in 
Brussels‖ and to ―to shift the legislative power back to national parliaments by amending the EU 
Treaties‖.230 The FPÖ further argues for halving of the EU budget as well as Austrian EU 
contributions, while at the same time calls for the full stop of EU integrations towards the 
―geographically, culturally, religiously and ethnically non-European regions of Asia and Africa‖.231 
Moreover, the FPÖ has an issue with the Schengen treaty, as in its view it hurts the Austrians with 
the increase of organized crime, trafficking and crime tourism which started to thrive with the lack 
of control in the internal borders of the EU.
232
  
 
The other issues FPÖ has with the EU are the following:
233
 
 
1. FPÖ states that the Austrian participation in the ESM (―European Stability Mechanism‖) and 
EFSF ("European Financial Stability Facility") is an unnecessary strain on Austria‘s budget, and that 
there should be referendum on Austria‘s further membership. 
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2. FPÖ is against data-gathering ―monitoring instruments‖ such as SWIFT agreement, Passenger 
data storage, INDECT etc., which they see as espionage measures by foreign states, and suggest 
dismantling of them, which would also signal independence of Europe form ―Brusells‟centralism 
and US hegemony‖ 
. 
3. FPÖ is strongly against regulations of ―curvature of the cucumber, standardized tractor seat, 
regulating the flow rate of shower heads and the suction power of vacuum cleaners‖ which are 
proclaimed by the EU, for which FPÖ believes that they have to be decided at the regional and 
national levels.  
 
4. FPÖ argues for greater priority for the domestic workers, as the freedom of movement and work 
inside the EU brings ―commuters from the East‖ and thus ―enormous displacement‖ of Austrian 
workers. Therefore, these kinds of EU laws have to be re-negotiated.  
 
5. FPÖ believes that a complete break-up of the Eurozone and a return to national currencies could 
be considered, as the current system divides the Europe into ―creditors and debtors‖, as the nations 
of Europe are not equal economic-wise. 
 
6. FPÖ sees potential exit from the EU not ―as a taboo, but an „ultima ratio‟ ―, in the sense of 
―protecting the Republic of Austria and its autochthonous population” against the further 
centralization of the EU. 
 
In their 2011 political party program, FPÖ clarifies again its position towards the support of 
Europe of free nations and self-determined countries, rejection of diversification of European 
nations and languages trough forced multiculturalism, globalization and mass immigrations.
234
 The 
sovereignty of nation-states has to take absolute precedence over EU laws, and while the party is in 
support of common foreign and security policy of Europe, it must be free of influence from non-
European powers and non-European dominated military alliances.
235
 
 
In the political brochure titled ―INFO – KOMPAKT DIE FREIHEITLICHE PARTEI 
ÖSTERREICHS (FPÖ)― from 2016, FPÖ confirms its position that it stands for a Europe as a 
federation of self-determined nations and states, formed in the Western Judeo-Christian traditions, in 
addition to the reduction of Austrian EU contributions, no EU accession for the Turkey, rapid 
reconstruction of the Eurozone, etc.
236
 
 
In their political program for Austrian Parliament Elections in 2017, under the chapter ―Our 
identity‖, the FPÖ states that it supports Europe as an alliance of self-determined nations and 
fatherlands, which will stand against the centralized and bureaucratic EU of today.
237
 The FPÖ 
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repeats that the goal of European integration must be a Community of those states that are 
―geographically, mentally and culturally‖ part of the Europe and Western values, and it calls for 
reorganization and reformation of the European Union.
238
 Moreover, FPÖ is stating again that it is 
against ―uncontrolled mass immigration and Turkey‟s EU membership‖, while in addition advocates 
for exit from ESM-EFSF in order to protect Austrian tax payers.
239
 
 
In Austrian governmental program for 2017-2022, created jointly with its coalition partner 
ÖVP, some of the FPÖ influences are visible in the chapters dedicated to the EU, such as ―less but 
more efficient‖ EU, reduction of EU bureaucracy, comprehensive European debate on the reform 
and future of the EU, no approval for EU accession of Turkey, Austrian Presidency of the Council 
of the EU in 2018, etc.
240
 Nevertheless, there are still strong pro-EU statements in the program, 
which is not surprising given that FPÖ is coalition partner of pro-EU ÖVP only since December 
2017.
241
 
 
Given the extensively layed-out stances of FPÖ towards the EU, it will be enough just to see 
few recent statements of the party leadership, in order to recognize that FPÖ is still following the 
course they laid out in their political program, EU-wise. 
 
Commenting on the Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2158 of 20 November 2017, 
popularly known as the ―French Fry Regulation‖, FPÖ once again stated that this reveals the ―EU 
regulatory nonsense" and that ―the EU should focus on the essential core tasks and decisions, 
while everything else should be left to the nation states.‖242,243 In May 2018, Marie Le Pen, leader of 
the French Front National stated that she is gathering likely-minded EU-critical political parties 
from around the Europe for her alliance called ―Europe of Nations and Freedom - Europe des 
nations et des libertés‖ (among which are the FPÖ and Italian League National),  in order to achieve 
good results for the upcoming European Parliament elections.
244
. Joint statement by the gathered 
parties was released, which said that ―the huge victories that have recently won in Austria or Italy 
(the Free Party of Austria) The FPÖ and the League (the MENL members) are in fact a success for 
all who have committed themselves to defending a real Europe, our common civilization, against the 
European Union that has usurped her name and her principles."
245
 The same month, Strache 
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criticized the EU in failing to deal with the ―big problem (the migration crisis), and that citizens 
have loss of confidence in the EU because of its inefficiency.
246
 Besides criticizing the EU for not 
being close to the European citizens, Strache also compared EU Commissioners with "Soviet 
commissioners", and that the EU is a "taboo that you have to break," and "an abolished construct".
247
   
 
It can be concluded that the: 
 
 FPÖ is anti-federalist, Eurosceptic, pro-―Europe of nation states‖ party 
 
 It will continue to be a staunch anti-EU political force in Austria in the future 
 
 It remains to be seen how much influence it will have on EU policies of Austrian coalition 
government 
 
The anti-EU federalization orientation of the FPÖ is more than clear, and it would be quite 
surprising if the party changes its stance anytime in the future. Therefore, it can be expected that the 
FPÖ will maintain its current rhetoric, and seek to profit on general discontent from the EU form the 
population in the form of new voters. As it support already risen to more than which they won on 
last parliament elections, FPÖ will continue with the anti-EU stances and policies while seeking 
alliance with emerging likely-minded political options in Europe (such as Northern League) and 
already well-established Eurosceptic parties. Additionally, the time will play a crucial factor in 
observation of FPÖ‘s influence on the Austrian government, and whether they will be able to 
radicalize the stances of the EU-friendly ÖVP in the future. 
 
The FPÖ is certainly a party with a long history of political successes and failures. It can be 
argued that it is currently experiencing its highest moment, as the party gave not only the vice 
chancellor to the current government of Austria, but it managed to secure the most important 
ministries. Russia is clearly having a major ally in Europe within FPÖ, and it should do its best to 
maintain cordial relationships with the party and the FPÖ ministers within Austrian government. As 
said before, FPÖ can become a role-model for any future potential coalition government that is 
including Russian-friendly political options. In addition, this will be a perfect test to see if such kind 
of party on this position can actually influence policies of a country hard enough, that for example, 
the EU member state starts to be very vocal and supportive towards the idea of lifting the sanctions 
imposed towards the Russia. In addition, once the normal economic relations resume between the 
EU and Russia, governments that had supportive stance towards the Russian Federation should have 
preferential treatment for investments and business ventures, in order to show that countries can gain 
a lot from cooperation with Russia, instead of economic and political confrontation. 
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2.3. Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (Estonia) 
 
 
A relatively new party on the Estonian political scene, Conservative People‘s Party of 
Estonia (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond) or EKRE is actually an estension of Estonian 
conservative and right-wing ideology, since the party was created by a merger of previous 
conservative, agrarian and right-wing parties and movements that were present on the Estonian 
political scene since early 1990s. Altough described as nationalistic, radical right-wing party, EKRE 
is not un-democratic per its political program, nor has it a militant wing as some right-wing parties 
of Eastern and Central Europe have.
248,249,250
   
 
  In 2012, Estonian Nationalist Movement merged with the Estonian People‘s Union, and 
formed the Conservative People's Party of Estonia. The chairman of the party became Margo 
Miljand, while honorary chairman was Arnold Ruutel, president of Estonia from 2001 to 2006, and 
the last Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist 
Republic.
251,252
 The Estonian People‘s Union itself was established also as a merger of four smaller 
agrarian and rural parties in 2000, winning the 13% of the vote in 2003 elections.
253
 It was a part of 
two government coalitions that ruled Estonia from 2003 to 2007, but due to the political scandals of 
the party leader Villu Reiljan (then Minister of Environment) and some other ministers that were 
members of this party, it lost many supporters by 2007 elections, winning only 6% of the vote.
254
  
 
After the party split in spring 2010 and disastrous 2011 election results which saw only 2% 
of votes in favor of the Estonian People‘s Union, a decision to from a new party was made, and thus 
EKRE was created.
255
 EKRE also includes members from parties that preceded the People‘s Union 
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such as The Estonian Country People‘s Party (founded in 1994), Estonian Rural Union (founded in 
1917, re-founded in 1991), Estonian Pensioners‘ and Families‘ Party (founded in 1991) and 
Farmers‘ Assembly (founded in 1921, re-founded in 1992).256  EKRE tried to capitalize on popular 
resentment of ―poor Estonian taxpayer‖ having to bail-out wealthier Eurozone members in Southern 
Europe through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), in addition to opposing the same-sex 
marriages, and the signing of the new border treaty with Russia.
257
 
 
EKRE states its goal as ―securing Estonia‘s independence and sovereignty in both internal 
and external policy‖, with the rule of laws ―based on the democracy and the separation of powers, in 
which the law applies equally to all the people‖ is set as the political base of the party.258 In addition, 
EKRE lists three core values, which are:
259,
 
260
 
 
1. endurance of the Estonian values, based on support for the language, culture, education, family, 
traditions and national economy; 
 
2. participation society of equal opportunities, where ―open, honest and democratic governance‖ 
allows all citizens to reach fulfillment and get involved in politics; 
 
3. socially and regionally balanced development and wellbeing that are guaranteed by a ―fair and 
strong state‖ by implementing caring and knowledge-based policies and by developing an 
ecologically sustainable living environment.; 
 
In their 2015 Riigikogu (national parliament of Estonia) program, EKRE declares that their 
goal is to preserve Estonians, the development of the state and the real increase of welfare for its 
citizens, while the Estonian state must be ―caring, prosperous, respectful of traditions and safe.‖261 
Besides economic and social program that favors the ordinary citizen, EKRE stands for stopping the 
mass migration, forbidding sale of land to the foreigners, increasing the military forces of Estonia, 
militarizing the border with Russia and closing of the information channels that spread ―anti-
Estonian propaganda‖.262  
  
In March 2012, EKRE adopted the so-called ―Conservative Manifesto‖ (Konservatiivne 
Manifest). In the first paragraph, EKRE clearly states that ―in the re-independent Estonia, the 
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survival of the Estonian people has been under greater pressure than in the past decades.‖263 
Because of the lack of vision from the previous governments, and in EKRE‘s view, disastrous 
economic and social policies, ―there is a real danger that there is no sensible future for any segment 
of society - workers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, rural people, fellow citizens, children-adolescents 
and the elderly‖.264  EKRE believes that such future ―must and will be avoided‖ by joint efforts of 
responsible political forces and the people, and that the Estonian Conservative People‘s Party ―as a 
national progressive party‖ wants to actively contribute to the ―emergence of new positive 
developments that can make life better everywhere in Estonia‖265 EKRE concludes this manifesto 
with the rallying cry – ―People first!‖.266 
 
EKRE cooperate with other nationalistic political parties in the Baltics, which is visible in its 
adoption of so-called ―Bauska Declaration‖ in August 2013. Signed jointly by the EKRE, 
Nationalist Union (Tautininkų Sajunga) from Lithuania and National Alliance ―All For Latvia!‖ 
(Nacionālā apvienība Visu Latvijai!),  Bauska Declaration states that ―we (signatory parties) affirm 
the supremacy of our national sovereignty over the supranational institutions and we stand against 
any attempt to absorb our independent nation states by any kind of European Super State.‖267 In 
addition, the signatory parties are fully against any immigration and immigration policies of 
Western Europe, and that they hold values of family and patriotism to be fundamental. They are 
opposed to the ―cultural Marxism, post-modernistic multiculturalism and destructive liberalism‖.268 
Further into declaration, the parties jointly state their opposition to the foreign financial influence in 
their respective countries, ―Russian imperialistic policies‖ – which are a threat to their ―national 
languages, borders and glory of our heroes (that) are sacred and cannot be subjects to negotiation‖, 
as well as ―any violation of our sovereignty and any intrusion to our internal affairs‖269.  
 
In addition to demanding from Russia to pay up for what they see as ―compensations for 
occupation by Soviet communist regime‖, parties state that they ―believe…that a fight against 
external dangers and global challenges would be in vain until our national pride, spiritual unity and 
faith into ourselves have been restored‖ and that they will ―heed the call of nationalism, convey its 
positive meaning, and spread it within our living nations, within national education and creative 
culture, in particular.‖270 Based on the language used and messages that were disseminated with this 
declaration, nationalistic, populist and right-wing nature of EKRE is more than visible, along with 
the open hostility towards both EU and Russia. 
 
In 2018, EKRE organized a torchlight procession for Estonia‘s Independence Day for the 
fifth time in a row, an event which is seen as gathering for ultra-nationalists and Nazi 
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sympatisizers.
271,272
 In addition, EKRE‘s youth organization, Blue Awaking (Sinine Ӓratus), 
actively participates in such events. Founded and lead by Ruuben Kaalep, Tartu city councilor and 
EKRE board member, Blue Awaking is not only concerned with question of Estonian nationalism, 
but it also tries to reach out to other nationalist movements in Europe thus establishing the idea of 
―ethnofuturism‖ – a nationalist concept for a Europe which is based on identity and roots.273 EKRE 
and Blue Awakening follow the trend of re-branded and new nationalist parties, and are extremely 
tech savvy – EKRE with its youth wing leads all Estonian parties in Facebook ―likes‖, creating a 
large gap between them and other Estonian political options.
274
 In June 2016, the European Young 
Conservatives (EYC), a group of youth wings of Europe's conservative and center-right political 
parties, expelled Blue Awakening from their organization.
275
 The Blue Awakening demanded from 
EYC to expel the youth wing of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), to which 
EYC responded that they are ―the youth organization of the Alliance of Conservatives and 
Reformists in Europe, which means that (our) primary goal is to propagate the free market and 
classical liberal values in Europe… but we are not a nationalist organization and we do not aim to 
preserve Europe's ethnic identity‖.276 
 
 
The three EKRE members that are the most often present in the media with statements, are the Mart 
Helme, Jaak Madison, and Mart Helme‘s son, Martin Helme. 
 
Mart Helme (born in 1949, Pärnu) comes from the Estonian Legion veteran family (a 
military unit within the Combat Support Forces of the Waffen SS-Verfügungstruppe)
277
, as stated on 
the official website of the EKRE. From 1995 to 1999, he was Estonia‘s ambassador to Russia, 
taking part in the negotiation of the border deal between two countries. Currently, he is EKRE‘s 
chairman (re-elected in April 2018) and vice chairman of the Riigikogu Defense Committee.
278,279
 
 
  Jaak Madison (born in 1991, Järvamaa), is a younger-generation EKRE politician, currently 
holding a posts in parliament of Estonia as a Vice Chairman of the European Union Affairs 
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Committee and as a vice-chairman in the EKRE.
280,281
 In 2015, he got into spotlight with the scandal 
around his defense of Nazi economic policies, written in his blog post in 2012, which caused Social 
Democratic Party to cancel the talks about government coalition with EKRE after parliament 
elections.
282
,
283
 
 
  Martin Helme (born in 1976, Tallinn), is a son of Mart Helme, vice-chairman of the EKRE 
and member of Estonian parliament. He came into the spotlights of the media in 2013, where he 
proposed the immigration policy along the rule – ―if you are black – go back‖, while stating that he 
wishes for Estonia to be ―a white country‖284 
 
Being a young political party, EKRE participated in only one parliament election, in 2015. 
They won 8.1% of votes, earning them 7 out of 101 places in Estonian parliament.
285
 EKRE is 
currently not present in the EU parliament, although it is considering to participate in the elections in 
2019 (already holding talks with partner parties from Finland, Austria, Poland and Hungary), with 
the potential candidates being Mart Helme, Riigikogu MP Henn Põlluaas and Jaak Madison.
286
 The 
support for EKRE is on the rise in 2018, reaching 18.4% in January, while experienced drop of 3% 
of support among the Estonian voters in May (Table 1).
287,288
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
280
 Biography of Jaak Madison, Official website of EKRE, Internet, https://ekre.ee/team/jaak-madison/ Accessed on: 
25.05.2018 
281
 Михайлов Сергей,  “Март Хельме переизбран председателем EKRE”, Eesti Rahvusringhääling, 22.04.2018, 
Internet,  https://rus.err.ee/824456/mart-helme-pereizbran-predsedatelem-ekre Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
282
 “Sotsiaalmeedias levib veel üks EKRE poliitiku vastakaid arvamusi tekitav postitus”, Eesti Rahvusringhääling, 
03.03.2015, Internet,  https://www.err.ee/530768/sotsiaalmeedias-levib-veel-uks-ekre-poliitiku-vastakaid-arvamusi-
tekitav-postitus Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
283
 “Mikser välistas valitsuskoostöö EKRE-ga”, Eesti Rahvusringhääling, 03.03.2015, Internet,  
https://www.err.ee/530738/mikser-valistas-valitsuskoostoo-ekre-ga Accessed on: 25.05.2018: 25.05.2018: 
284
 Teder Merike, “Martin Helme soovitus immigratsioonipoliitikaks: kui on must, näita ust”, Postimees, 29.05.2013, 
Internet,  
https://www.postimees.ee/1252028/martin-helme-soovitus-immigratsioonipoliitikaks-kui-on-must-naita-ust Accessed 
on: 25.05.2018 
285
 Voting results of the 2015 Estonian Parliament Elections, Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon, Internet, 
http://rk2015.vvk.ee/voting-results.html Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
286
 2019 European elections: Parties, candidates biding their time, Eesti Rahvusringhääling, 16.03.2018, Internet,  
https://news.err.ee/690089/2019-european-elections-parties-candidates-biding-their-time Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
287
 "Poll: Estonian Reform Party's support highest in five years", Eesti Rahvusringhääling, 28.01.2018, Internet, 
https://news.err.ee/677698/poll-estonian-reform-party-s-support-highest-in-five-years Accessed on: 25.05.2018  
288
 "Coalition Government boosted by resurgence in Social Democrats' support", Eesti Rahvusringhääling, 18.05.2018, 
Internet, https://news.err.ee/832519/coalition-government-boosted-by-resurgence-in-social-democrats-support 
Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
48 
 
EKRE’s stance on  Russia 
 
 
EKRE owns much of its popularity to the strong anti-Russian rhetoric that was adopted by its 
leadership after the 2014 crisis in Ukraine, and therefore it can be seen as staunch anti-Russian 
political party (or at least anti-Russian minority in Estonia).
289
 This can be viewed in both their 
political programs and in statements of their leadership. In their political program for 2015 
parliament elections, EKRE advocated for creating a militarized border with Russia, as well as for 
re-negotiation of Estonia-Russia border treaty.
290
 In addition, EKRE is a proponent of creating a 
wall that will physically divide Estonian border with Russia.
291
  
 
In their ―Eurovision platform‖, EKRE strongly expressed its disapproval with the visa-free 
regime with Russia, which in its view, will lead to ―massive Slavic migration wave that will bring 
Estonia back to 1986‖, and ―allow the Kremlin to aggressively „protect‟ its people‖ in Estonia.292 In 
addition, EKRE states that the membership in the EU does not change Estonia‘s geopolitical reality 
and that Estonia needs to seek additional guarantees of its security among other EU Member States, 
while at the same time EKRE will work on preventing Estonia to have any ―Moscow-friendly‖ MEP 
in the European Parliament, in order to protect ―Estonian national interests‖.293   
 
In their official political program, EKRE states that in relations with Russia it emphasizes 
1920 Tartu Peace Treaty as a basis for Estonian-Russian relations. EKRE here also repeats the 
desire to cancel current border treaty with Russia and re-negotiate a new one. In addition, EKRE 
wishes to ban all ―propaganda against Estonian state, its people, and history‖, while demanding from 
Russia reparation for ―All the occupation losses, including losses of victims and their families of 
forced labor under communist repression‖.294 In their political pamphlet ―Conservative Vision‖ that 
envisions Estonia in 2030, EKRE sees Estonia having a ―constructive communication‖ with Russia, 
with ―problems and injustices arising from history‖ being ―rehabilitated‖ by it.295 
 
EKRE party leadership is consisted with the anti-Russian messages that are disseminated by 
their political programs and pamphlets. A year before EKRE‘s foundation in 2011, its future leader 
Mart Helme was advocating for increased trade with Russia, stating that current Estonian export 
volume to it was around 15%, but that Russia‘s ―imperial and neo-imperial policies‖ actually 
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prevented the increase of trade between two countries.
296
 In November 2015 EKRE accused Center 
Party and Socialist Party that they are advancing Russian interests in Estonia.
297
 In April 2016, Mart 
Helme stated that having good relations with Russia is the biggest guarantee of Estonian security, 
although Russia first had to recognize Estonia under the Tartu Peace Treaty, and to recognize that it 
held Estonia under ―50 years of occupation‖.298 Furthermore, ―Russia needs to apologize and admit 
that it conducted crime against humanity towards Estonian people‖.299  
 
In May 2017, Helme was highly critical of the decision to include Russian songs at the 
yearly Music Festival in Tallin, as it would cause ―divide in the Estonian society‖.300 In the same 
month, EKRE sent a bill to the country's parliament proposing that immigrants from non-EU 
countries (mainly, Russia) and 'non-citizens' (mainly country's ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking 
residents) be stripped of the right to vote in upcoming local elections.
301
 Defending this bill, Mart 
Helme said that ―voting rights for non-EU immigrants and 'non-citizens' served to worsen the 
effectiveness of local government‖ as ―non-citizens supposedly vote for candidates that are 'hostile 
to the country's indigenous population'‖.302  
 
In June same year, EKRE leader stated that ―Our (Estonian) destiny is Russia‖ and that 
future Estonian president has to keep close eye to both developments in the EU and in the Russia.
303
 
Following month, Helme stated that Estonia must support the United States and not the EU 
concerning Russia sanctions policy, as in his opinion, Estonian government decision to support the 
EU on sanctions policy against Russia damages the country‘s relations with Estonia‘s primary 
guarantor of security, the United States.
304
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In September 2017, Mart Helme expressed his discontent at the established Estionian-
Russian border agreement and perceived bilingual policy of Estonian government.
305
 The same 
month, EKRE leader stressed that Russian language is wide-spread in Estonia, and that ―"It is 
perfectly obvious that the knowledge of Estonian is an inevitable precondition for the well-being of 
Estonia in terms of both the labor market and social life,"‖306   In November 2017, Helme stated that 
Russia was preparing grounds for major cyber-warfare operation against Estonia, in the case of 
conventional war against Baltics, Scandinavia and Poland.
307
  
 
In January 2018, EKRE leader accused Minister of Justice, Urmas Reinsalu, of breaching 
constitution by allowing the use of Russian language in courts for dealing with non-constitutional 
court process, although Estonian constitution fully allows that.
308
 For their pre-election campaign, 
among other things, EKRE stated in the campaign video that it is fighting against ―Russification‖ of 
Estonia.
309
 Jaak Madison, in an open letter in March 2018, announced that he plans to visit Crimea 
after a fund-raising campaign, in order to help out the Estonian community of 600 people, who are 
living there. Although he referred to Crimea as an occupied territory, he was accused of being a 
―useful idiot‖ for the Russians by other political forces in Estonia.310, 311,312  The same month, Jaak 
Madison called for respecting the decision of those EU countries that did not expelled Russian 
diplomats after pressure from UK government, as it is a sovereign right for each country to decide 
its own course of action.
313
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Based on the party programs and previous statements, it can be concluded that: 
 
 EKRE sees Russia as a threat to Estonian nation and its sovereignty 
 
 EKRE advocates irredentist policies towards Russia 
 
 the party would be very strict in its policies towards Russian-speaking minority, possibly 
further deteriorating their status inside the Estonia 
 
As expected from far-right Estonian party, EKRE has, if not openly hostile stance towards 
Russia, then unrealistic expectations of what Russia has to do in order for EKRE to maintain good 
relations with her. In addition, EKRE‘s leader Mart Helme is the most vocal in his anti-Russian 
rhetoric. EKRE will most likely seek support in Europe by other anti-Russian oriented parties, and 
therefore, if attaining power, it will prove as a major challenge for Russia to deal with, especially 
given the vulnerable state of Russian minority in Estonia. 
 
 
 
EKRE’s Stance on NATO 
 
 
 
EKRE is a party that is defending what they see as ―Estonian national interests‖ while to a 
degree, having a negative stance towards full-time presence of major NATO forces that are not 
under direct command of Estonian military leadership. In their ―Conservative vision from Estonia‖ 
political pamphlet, EKRE is adamant that in 2030 Estonia will still be active member of NATO, 
basing its security on this membership, along with the ―compulsory military service, total security 
and international cooperation‖.314 This is also repeated in their official 2015 Party Program, as well 
as EKRE‘s disagreement of participation of Estonian military forces in EU rapid response force (EU 
battalions), ―due to the scarcity and fragmentation of military resources.‖315 In addition, EKRE 
stated in their program that ―we (party) consider it important to conclude additional co-operation 
and mutual assistance agreements with Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Norway (and preferably with 
Finland and Sweden), which will provide immediate military assistance to each other in the event of 
aggression.”316 
 
In January 2014, Mart Helme said that the permanent bases of the United States as a member 
of NATO are unnecessary and unrealistic, ―in spite of Russia's immediate rearmament‖, and that 
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such proposals to the US administration are ―inappropriate and counterproductive‖. 317 In addition, 
he added that EKRE believes that participation of Estonia‘s military forces in foreign mission is a 
waste of unnecessary resources, and that Estonia has to develop strong defense capabilities, which 
can provide safe passage for the NATO forces in case of any aggression towards Estonia.
318
 In late 
2015, a scandal erupted in Estonia, with racial-inspired incidents between black NATO staff and 
local Estonian population. While EKRE was blamed for supporting racism in Estonia, Martin Helme 
stated that ―EKRE supports Estonia's membership in NATO in its program‖ and that racial attacks 
were not connected to his ―if you are black – go back!‖ anti-immigration slogan.319  EKRE‘s leader 
supported the idea of creating a NATO battalion that would be based in Estonia, but on the 
condition that it is under direct command of Estonian High Command, and not Bundeswahr or 
Pentagon in the event of conflict.
320
  
 
Jaak Madison pointed out in April 2017 that ―it is clear that joining NATO was a right and 
necessary step for Estonia.‖, while stating that since it takes 30 days for Article 5 of NATO to be 
activated, and that too only with the consent of all the Member States, Estonia has to rely on its own 
defense capabilities first.
321
 In July 2017, Martin Helme stated that Donald Trump (who was 
presidential candidate in that time) said the truth, that NATO may not come to aid to Baltic 
Republics in case of war, even when Estonia fulfills yearly 2% GDP NATO participation quota.
322
  
In an interview  in August 2017, Mart Helme expressed his dissaprovement for NATO‘s mission in 
Afghanistan, saying that NATO should strengthen military security in Estonia instead of spending 
huge amount of finances, men and equipment on a lost cause.
323
 
,324
 Jaak Madison stated in 
September 2017 that ―we (EKRE) have been one of the most active NATO supporters who see 
Estonia in this community‖325  In December 2017 during the meeting with NATO Military 
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Committee chairman Gen. Petr Pavel, Mart Helme said that the establishment of a permanent 
NATO naval unit for the Baltic Sea is critical for Estonia, adding that "…in order for it to be 
possible to send in troops to help Estonia, a corridor needs to be established for NATO aircraft that 
is protected by a NATO naval unit from the surface”.326  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that: 
 
 EKRE views Estonia‘s NATO membership as crucial tool in defense of the country against 
any hypothetical conflict 
 
 Nevertheless, EKRE argues that NATO forces should be under command of Estonian 
General Staff, rather than for them to be ordered from Washington or Berlin 
 
 EKRE will support NATO and Estonia‘s NATO membership, only as long as it shows 
dedication in preserving the Estonian sovereignty 
 
While it cannot be said for EKRE that it is an anti-NATO party, it is also not uncoditionally 
NATO-dedicated one. Often EKRE‘s leadership criticized NATO‘s role in foreign military 
operations, citing the need of protection of NATO‘s periphery countries first. EKRE doesn‘t have 
big faith in other NATO member states that they will defend Estonia in case of a hypothetical war, 
while it sees the United States as the only NATO member that can really contain any perceived 
threat to Estonia. Nevertheless, EKRE fully support Estonia‘s NATO membership and no major 
change of current Estonia‘s NATO policy can be expected even if EKRE does obtain a position 
within a future Estonian government. 
 
 
EKRE’s stance on EU 
 
 
As seen from the Bauska declaration, and from the general tone of the party ideology and 
political program, EKRE can be considered not only a Eurosceptic political option in Estonia, but 
also in some aspects fully opposing one. At the EKRE‘s Congress in April 2014, the so-called  
―Eurovision Platform‖ was adopted, which states that ―…our political party is based on the 
sovereignty of the Estonian people, the legal continuity of the Republic of Estonia and the 
supremacy of our constitution‖ and that ―we (Estonians)  belong to the Union of Independent States 
of Nations, and not to the Euro-federation. ―327 In addition, the platform states that ―…the 
politicians who build the European Union, are abusing the people's mandate, violate our 
constitution, undermine democratic order and endanger the survival of the Estonian nation, our 
language and culture.‖328 In general, this platform calls for return of decision-making powers to the 
                                                          
326
 “EKRE MP: Permanent NATO naval unit needed on Baltic Sea”, Eesti Rahvusringhääling, 14.12.2017, 
Internet,  https://news.err.ee/648739/ekre-mp-permanent-nato-naval-unit-needed-on-baltic-sea Accessed on: 
25.05.2018 
327
 Eurovalimiste Platvorm, Official Website of EKRE, Internet, https://ekre.ee/eurovalimiste-platvorm/ Accessed on: 
25.05.2018 
328
 Ibid 
54 
 
Member States, cutting-off of the Brussels‘s bureaucracy, removal of Estonia from the European 
Stability Mechanism, less EU laws, and reformation of Europe back to the alliance of the Nation 
States, among other things.
329
 
 
In their official political program, under the title ―Foreign and security policy‖, EKRE stated 
that ―Estonia‟s foreign and European policies, as well as the fundamentals of national defense and 
security policy, are shaped comprehensively.‖330 EKRE views Estonia‘s place in Europe as one of 
the ―shapers of diversity of Europe, with the population policies that strengthens European cultures 
and nation-states and helps to keep them sustainable.‖331 For Conservative People‘s Party of 
Estonia, the Estonian Constitution is supreme law, and it would not comply with the EU laws or 
other regulations that can ―jeopardize the survival of Estonia as a nation state or is at odds with the 
Estonians' sense of justice, morale and good practice‖.332 
 
Additional perspective of Estonia towards the future of the EU can be viewed in their 
political pamphlet called ―Estonia 2030‖, where among other things, is stated that 
Estonia is actively involved in shaping European development and has sufficient information and 
competence to play an equal role in European politics with other countries. They see the Europe 
working as an alliance of nations, which values the cultures and national affairs of different 
nations.
333
 
 
In February 2016, Martin Helme wrote on his Facebook page that the ―disintegration of the 
European Union would be the best thing for Estonia, as the possibility to leave the union virtually 
does not exist ―, adding that Estonia has a status of ―province‖ inside the EU, and that ―…since I can 
see no possibility for somehow making the European Union better, nor do I see a possibility of 
Estonia stepping out of it, the best outcome for our future would be if this terrible Socialist union 
disintegrated.‖334  During the interview in April 2017, Mart Helme stated that Estonia is not 
completely sovereign, as ―More than 80 percent of our (Estonian) legislation is from the European 
Union‖, while the same time, Helme underlined that EKRE doesn‘t wish for Estonia to leave the 
EU, which is somewhat contradicting the official stance of the party that favours the referendum on 
the Estonia‘s EU membership. 335,336,337 In May 2017, Jaak Madison stated that his party always 
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stood against EU as a federal state, and that national parliaments have to have a greater role in 
shaping inside it.
338 
  At the end of September 2017, EKRE‘s members staged a picket against 
Angela Merkel, during her visit to Tallinn, in opposition to the EU‘s refugee policy, with 
demonstrators calling Angela Merkel ―the midwife of multiculturalism‖.339,340  
 
 In December 2017, Mart Helme stated that Estonia must support Catalonia's aspirations 
toward independence, as ―they (Catalons) have chosen a course of sovereignty regardless of the 
intimidation and twisting of arms from Brussels and Madrid‖341. He stated further that ―us 
(Estonians)… as a small country should recognize the aspirations of Catalans and not swear blind 
allegiance to Merkel and Juncker‖, and that ―events occurring in Catalonia clearly characterize the 
agony of the European Union,"
342,343
 During the UN Jerusalem vote in December 2017, EKRE‘s 
chairman Mart Helme criticized the Estonia‘s vote in favor of the UN's Jerusalem resolution as a 
"foolish decision", while adding that Estonia made a decision damaging to country's security while 
most of the EU countries kept a clear mind and remained impartial in the UN.
344
 In addition, he 
blamed ―Estonia's leftist, pro-Berlin and -Brussels government‖ that it made a decision ―damaging 
to Estonia's security‖ as in his opinion, the United Sates are the only country capable of ensuring 
Estonia and the region's security.
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It can be concluded that: 
 
 EKRE is against federalization of Europe and supports the idea of sovereign nation-states. 
 
 It is highly possible that EKRE would support referendum on potential Estonia‘s exit from 
the EU if circumstances would allow for it. 
 
 EKRE will call for increased role of Estonian parliament in the Estonian ‗affairs, over the 
supra-national EU laws and recommendations.  
 
 
EKRE is openly against any kind of further federalization of European Union, which they are 
stating that clearly. Same as for NATO, EKRE views EU firstly as a beneficial tool for Estonia, 
rather than viewing it through the ideological prism. They are against any kind of supra-national 
control of Estonia since it would hurt its sovereignty and right to decide its own actions. If the EU 
keeps the current form, then EKRE will support the Estonia‘s membership (although they may cause 
resistance towards EU immigration policy), but if the EU pushes for a more integrated model, 
EKRE will likely find itself as a party that organizes Estonia‘s ―exit‖ from the EU. 
  
EKRE is growing in the popularity and its re-entrance to the Riigikogu after 2019 Estonian 
parliament elections shouldn‘t be much of a surprise. The question is whether it can find a coalition 
partner to form up the new government, or will it be still in the opposition. Nevertheless, ascension 
of the EKRE in the government of Estonia could prove problematic for Russia, as its propagated 
nationalism is based on Russophobia and the defense of Estonian involvement in the Second World 
War on the side of the Nazi forces (such as a yearly public celebration and remembrance of veterans 
of Estonian Legion). EKRE is a NATO-oriented political option (at least, as long as it serves as a 
factor of defense of Estonia), and will highly likely will continue the present Estonian course of 
NATO cooperation. Russia should worry about the rights and potential major segregation of 
Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, as well as potential re-negotiation of the Border Treaty, if 
EKRE becomes a dominant political force Nevertheless, in that case, some common ground would 
need to be found between EKRE and Russia in order to protect and preserve the Russian-speaking 
minority in the country, and ease military tensions in the Baltic region. 
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3. Nordic region 
 
 
3.1. The Finns Party (Finland) 
 
The origins of the Finns Party can be traced back to the 1959, when the Finnish Agrarian 
Party (or Finnish Rural Party - Suomen Maasedun Puolue – SMP) was founded in opposition to the 
urban elite and claimed to speak on behalf of the common man in rural Finland, the so-called 
‗forgotten people‘ (―unohdetun kansa”) in town and country, who felt detached from the ruling class 
in the urban south. The Finnish Agrarian Party exploited the existing center-periphery divide in 
Finland, and achieved considerable electoral success in 1970, 1972 and in 1983, when the party won 
approximately 10% of the vote on each election. As the Finland was transforming from 
predominantly agricultural to a high-tech communication-based society, so was the popularity of the 
Finnish Agrarian Party falling. Finally, as the SMP ran into serious financial difficulties, new 
nationalist populist party, the True Finns Party (re-named in English to the Finns Party in 2011), 
absorbed its remains in 1995, and thus, in a way, became spiritual successor of the old SMP.
346 
 
 
The rise of popularity for the Finns Party began in the late 2000s, with the 2007 
parliamentary elections funding scandal damaging reputation of the Finland‘s three biggest political 
parties that were involved in it. This was used by the Finns Party, which branded itself as an anti-
establishment party and representative of ordinary people (while mixing left-leaning social and 
economic policies with nationalism and conservative values), to present itself as a true alternative to 
the mainstream parties and their consensus-oriented EU policies, winning 9.8% of the votes in the 
elections.
347  
This was significant increase from 1.57% of votes in 2003 and 4.05% in 2007 (Figure 
3).
348,349
  
 
The party‘s biggest success came during the 2011 parliamentary elections, where it won 
19.1% of votes, becoming the third strongest party in Finland.
350
 In 2015, Finns Party entered 
coalition government for the first time, marking this event pinnacle of the party‘s political influence.  
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Already in 2017, it was ousted from the government coalition, mainly thanks to the internal 
leadership split.
351,352 
 
Until he left the Finns Party in 2017, Timo Soini, (party leader from 1995 to 2017), accepted 
for Finns Party to be branded as populist one, although refusing the extreme-right label for it.  In 
addition, the Finns Party rejected neo-liberal economic policies, as it inherited centrist economic 
policy of the SMP, making its right wing populism socio-cultural one, rather than socio-economic.  
It continued to champion the rights of the ―forgotten people‖ against the elite, while in addition, 
vowed to fight against immigration and multiculturalism and to limit the Europeanization of 
Finland.
353
 The sociological polarization is a common theme in Finnish society, as historically the 
axes of divide were East/West, Socialism/Nationalism, Urban-rich/Rural poor and 
Cosmopolitan/Local, among others. Thus, The Finns Party is relying on the center-periphery divide, 
exchanging the agrarian focused populism of the SMP for the more general cultural divide based on 
the ethno-nationalist program.
354 
The Finns Party tries to position itself against the urban Helsinki-
based cosmopolitan elite that are consolidated around the south coast, in favor of the ―forgotten 
people‖ who are mainly working in rural areas. In addition, it draws on traditional Christian values 
which are seen as pure and morally superior beliefs than those of the privileged elite. The Finns 
Party also takes strong socially-conservative stance on matters such as religion, morality, crime, 
corruption, law and order, being in essence more authoritarian than libertarian, and fully supporting 
the Finnish state.
355 
Other aspects of their ethno-nationalistic focus came through the strong 
emphasis of the Finnish national cultural heritage, negative perception of the Swedish influence, and 
suppression of minorities such as gypsies and Lapps (Sami). According to their perception, The 
Finns Party actively promotes patriotism, strength and unselfishness of the Finnish people. Their 
narrative is based on the view, that Finland managed to overcome suppression caused by powerful 
and expansionist neighbors, and developed from the poor and peripheral country into a recognized 
nation of progress and wealth, thanks to the internal strength and endurance.
356 
 
 
The party experienced massive fall in support since it joined government in 2015, mostly 
because party leadership broke the promises they made during elections towards their voters, and 
made compromises with the ruling coalition. The three most salient electoral promises made by the 
party were that there would be no EU bailouts, no cuts in welfare and that halt would be put to 
immigration. During the Finns Party participation in the coalition government, EU took the decision 
to provide more economic support to Greece and the Finnish government voted in favour. In 
addition, the government made substantial cuts in welfare during the economic crisis, an in autumn 
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2015, Finland saw massive influx of refugees. This all lead to the Finns Party public inter-political 
struggle and conflicts, while groups of party members openly criticized party leadership for 
prioritizing power over ideological purity.
357,358
 
 
In June 2017, The Finns Party splintered into two parliamentary groups, four days after Jussi 
Halla-aho was elected as a new party leader. Twenty-one out of the Finns Party‘s 38 MPs defected 
to the new parliamentary group that was first called ―New Alternative‖ (and after, ―Blue Group‖), 
under the leadership of the Finns Party‘s former leader and current foreign minister Timo Soini. The 
government crisis was averted after the New Alternative MPs were allowed to stay on their previous 
positions, which they held in the ministries and parliament while they were members of the Finns 
Party, which was now ousted from the governmental coalition.
359,360
   
 
The party leadership is recovering from the split in 2017. The old party leader, Timo Soini, 
lead the Finns Party since the 1995, and saw the party rise from the humble success on elections to 
the third biggest party in Finland and part of governing coalition. He himself attained a post of 
Foreign Minister, a role that he still fulfills in the coalition. Nevertheless, because of the 
compromises that The Finns Party had to make in order to be in the government, and downfall of 
popular support for it, Timo Soini was defeated on party leadership elections in 2017 by hardline 
representative Jussi Halla-aho, an event that sparked the party split and propped Soini to create new 
MEP group from the former Finns Party MEPs.
361
   
 
The Finns Party also has a youth wing, called ―The Finns Party Youth‖ which styles itself as 
a ―Finnish conservative, nationalist and populist political youth organization.‖ On their official 
website, the Finns Party Youth states that ―conservatism and nationalism are above all the defense 
of western democratic ideals, with the respect for unique Finnish national identity and efforts to 
reform Nordic welfare state. ― In addition, The Finns Party Youth sees populism as a ―political 
philosophy that is for the people, by the people, against interests of the elite, corruption and overt 
bureaucracy.‖ They also state that ―Electioneering on multiculturalism at the expense of Finnish 
and western culture appears to us short-sighted.‖ In addition, they state that ―on the European level 
The Finns Party Youth supports independent and sovereign nation-states and is against European 
federalism.‖ which is fully along the lines of the main party. Given that during the 2017 party split, 
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almost all the Finns Party Youth stayed loyal to the new leadership, it is certain that their ideals will 
shape the future generation of party functionaries and leaders.
362
  
 
Jussi Halla-aho (born in 1971, Tampere), is the current leader of the Finns Party. In 2011, 
Halla-aho became a chair of  parliamentary Administration Committee (a committee that handles 
immigration issues as well as domestic security matters), a post from which had to resign in 2012, 
due to receiving a Supreme Court verdict violating the free exercise of worship and for incitement 
against an ethnic group.
363
 Halla-aho is known for his radical views on immigration and the EU, and 
he has openly criticized Timo Soini‘s leadership for being too soft on these issues, which was the 
reason he became his opponent on party leadership elections in 2017.
364
 He represents the forces 
inside the Finns Party that were unsatisfied with the political course of the party during its 
participation in coalition government and is dedicated to return the party to its original values. 
 
Laura Huhtasaari (born in 1979, Mänttä) is a former religion teacher and a special education 
teacher. She was elected in a city council  of Pori (in 2012 and 2017), and in 2015, she became 
Member of the Parliament (Suomen eduskunta), where she also currently serves as a member of the  
Legal Affairs Committee, the Education and Culture Committee, and the Finnish Delegation to 
the Nordic Council. In June 2017, she was elected as the first vice president of the Finns Party being 
personally endorsed by the Jussi Halla-aho, and in August she was chosen as the presidential 
candidate of the Finns Party for the 2018 presidential elections.
365,366
 Although she won only 6.9% 
of votes on the presidential elections in February 2018, Laura Huhtasaari came in the  3
rd
 place. 
Some Finnish political analysts believe that the presidential race had a different meaning for the 
Finns Party, as they counted on more long-term effect. With the media representation of Huhtasaari 
and her public appearance, the Finns Party can now present new strong political leader (along with 
the Jussi Halla-aho) for the next parliament elections, which can potentially restore party‘s 
reputation after the infighting in 2017.
367
 In addition, Huhtasaari opened some new topics that were 
not so much represented in the political arena in the recent years, such as family policy, gender 
equality, welfare issues - such as health and medical care and education, while trying to attract more 
female votes for the party.
368
 The support for the Finns Party among Finnish voters oscillated 
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between 9.6% in January to the 7.7% in May 2018 (Table 1).
369,370
  Next parliament elections in 
2019 will surely be a decisive test for this new direction and leadership of the Finns Party: either 
they will manage to recover themselves from the party split, and regain their 10-15% share of votes, 
or they will lose significance on the Finish political scene.   
 
 
The Finns Party’s Stance on Russia 
 
 
In 2014, The Finns Party parliamentary group approved the EU's decisions on certain 
embargoes on Russia, but was critical of economic sanctions. True Finns thought that the sanctions 
would have an economic disadvantage for Europe and especially for Finland since strong counter-
measures were expected from Russia. In their view, counter-measures would not be targeted fairly 
across the EU, with Finland, the Baltic States, and Germany being the most impacted by them.
371
 In 
addition, they advocated maintaining of good bilateral relations with Russia.
372
 Their forecast turned 
out to be correct when in January 2015 Finnish exports to Russia were down by 43 percent against 
the previous year, while imports fell by 36 percent.
373
  
 
In an interview on January 2015, Jussi Halla-aho  stated that ―We (Finns Party) see Russia 
as a threat to European security and values and think it is strategically necessary to remove 
countries like Ukraine from the ”grey zone” and Russian sphere of influence.”374 Jussi Halla-aho 
again expressed negative sentiment against Russia in February 2017, describing Russia as ―an 
existential threat to Finland‖, but nevertheless ―great country in many respects‖ with ―interesting 
history and society and people‟s minds‖.375 In December 2017, only 40% of Finns regarded Russia 
or the political processes happening inside it as a threat, as opposed to 56% who did so in 2014.
376
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In 2017, True Finns spearheaded a law that as an experiment allows students in Finland 
opportunity to study Russian instead of Swedish, the country's second most-spoken language.
377
  By 
the end of February 2018, the National Board of Education will choose schools that will be admitted 
to the language experiment, with the total of 2,200 students to be offered the opportunity to 
participate in the experiment throughout the country.
378
 
 
The Finns Party candidate for 2018 presidential elections, and rising star among senior 
leadership of the party, Laura Huhtasaari, made several statements regarding Russia in her 
interviews and blogs. 
   
  In an interview from December 2017, Huhtasaari stated that ―Russia will always be a 
potential threat to Finland‖379, while at the same time adding that while (Finns Party) ―will never 
accept the way in which Russia took Crimea… We should acknowledge the facts and focus on 
solving the situation in eastern Ukraine.‖380In addition, some of her supporters for presidential race 
identified her political position as ―against NATO, good relations with Russia and opposed to 
immigration‖.381   
 
Before the elections, Huhtasaari further stated that ―It is not necessary to have common 
values to cooperate with one's neighbors. There is no alternative to reaching agreements with 
Russia," while emphasizing the necessity of focusing on issues that unite Helsinki and Moscow, 
such as trade and cultural exchange.
382
  In addition, in an interview in December 2017, Huhtassari 
said that "I am in favor of trade, I am in favor of cultural exchanges, I am in favor of diplomatic 
relations and it is really important that we are in good standing with the Russians ."
383
 Given that 
Laura Huhtassari is opposed to the NATO membership of Finland, and that advocates Finland‘s exit 
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from the European Union, she could well be one of the key players in Finland politics in the coming 
years.   
 
 
Taking all of this in account, it can be seen that the following is stance of the Finns Party 
towards Russia: 
 
 Russia is seen as a potential threat 
 
 Nevertheless, there are grounds for mutual economic and cultural cooperation which have to 
be developed 
 
 Sanctions against Russia that were imposed by the EU and USA hurt Finland‘s economic 
interests more than those of some other EU member states (mainly Germany) 
 
While Finns Party is not overly supporting of anti-Russian option, they are still seeing it as a 
potential threat to Finland. Nevertheless, there are areas where deeper trust and cooperation can be 
established, such as in economic and cultural spheres. As long as Finland stays out of NATO, and 
concentrates more on creating a regional defense bloc made of Nordic countries (an idea that is 
active among certain political options), it can count on Russia‘s understanding and goodwill. If 
Finns Party again joins coalition government, their ministers might serve as a bridge towards 
improvement of Finno-Russian ties in the future. 
 
 
The Finns Party’s stance on NATO 
 
 
In December 2017, support for NATO among Finnish population was around 19%, which 
was considerable decline from 2014-2016, when crisis in Ukraine reached its peak.
384
 In a survey 
conducted in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016, more than half of Finns Party members were 
opposed to Finland‘s membership in NATO.385,386,387  On their website in October 2016, Young 
Finns stated that they are fully opposed to Finland‘s NATO membership, and that with the growing 
tensions between Russia and NATO, Finland would find itself in a huge security risk by being a 
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NATO member.
388
 In February 2017, Halla-aho stated that even though he is personally in favour of 
Finland‘s membership in NATO, he will not use his position in the Finns Party to promote it, mainly 
because he believes that it is not a realistic option for Finland.
389
  Interestingly, this is in contrast to 
the Laura Huhtasaari clear anti-NATO position.
390,391
 
 
Finns Party 2015 parliamentary elections program established the current view of the party 
towards the NATO. The opinion of the Finns Party expressed in the program is that there is no 
concrete justification for the Finland‘s membership in NATO which can presume that the defense of 
Finland will be improved with it. In fact, the Finns Party believes that security policy choices of the 
country will become narrower and that new obligations will arise for the international crisis 
management if Finland is a part of NATO. The Finns Party support military non-aligned Finland 
that this prepared for the defense of the entire country through a regional defense system based on 
general conscription. In addition, reasons why Finland should not join NATO, in the Finns Party 
view, is that in a long-term, NATO membership will lead to decline of conscription system and thus 
weaken nation‘s defense capabilities. Also, the Finns Party is concerned with financial obligations 
of NATO member states, as NATO‘s recommendation for the defense budget of each state is 2% of 
GDP, while Finland is currently at an estimated 1.3% GDP. Therefore, the Finns Party is strongly 
for ―Finns defending Finland‖ and independent decision-making process for its security 
environment.  It should be noted however that in case that Sweden does join the NATO and that the 
political climate in the Finland is such that its citizens are in the favour for nation‘s NATO 
membership, before it can be considered by the state, it has to go through the referendum first.
392
 
 
The Finns Party views on the defense policy offer some interesting insight towards their 
relation to EU battle groups, Ottawa agreement and Nordic Sphere co-operation. In their opinion, 
EU battle groups as a concept offers little to Finnish security, as it requires significant funding on 
Finland‘s part, while not being able to receive proper security guarantees. In addition, the Finns 
Party believes that each nation thinks of their own interest.  In their opinion, Sweden does not want 
a defense union with Finland, and it sees it as a buffer state, while Norway, Denmark and Iceland 
rely on NATO, and for these countries, ―the Nordic defense co-operation looks like a spicy add-
on‖.393 Although critical of its neighbors, the Finns Party recognize some benefits of Nordic defense 
co-operation - especially in the areas of procurement, training and joint exercises, including in 
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international crisis management. The Finns Party sees international crisis management as a practical 
and flexible structure for co-operation, where ―each country decides on a case-by-case basis, and 
even in a smaller group of countries, progress can be made.‖394 Although not directly tied to their 
stance on NATO, the True Finns critical position on Otawa agreement may be of interest for Russia, 
as the True Finns advocate Finland‘s withdrawal from the agreement, and a heavy usage of anti-
personnel land mines to secure its eastern border.
395,396
 
 
  In December 2017, during the interview of presidential candidates, a question was raised – 
what would they do if Estonia was attacked by Russia, since Finland is a member of the EU. Laura 
Huhtasaari, expressed her doubts about the mutual assistance clause of the EU and insisted that 
Finland must under no circumstances tolerate military activity in its sovereign territory, which 
means that the EU support and troops should not go to Estonia through Finland, including any 
NATO troops.
397
  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that: 
 
 Although the leadership is somewhat divided on the Finland‘s NATO membership issue, The 
Finns Party in general is advocating military-neutral Finland 
 
 NATO membership is seen as a threat to the national defense system of Finland (increased 
expenditure, abolishment of conscription, limited decision making power during security 
crises etc.)  
 
 If the majority of Finland population demands NATO membership, and if Sweden becomes 
a NATO member, referendum on Finland‘s NATO membership must be held before any 
decision can be made by the government. 
 
Given that a newly-elected president of Finland is known for his cautious stance with NATO 
(meaning that he won‘t personally push for the membership), and that general sentiment among 
Finnish population is prevailingly against NATO membership, it is safe to assume that the Finns 
Party will keep their current views on this issue.
398
 There shouldn‘t be any radical changes in their 
stance, as even during the pinnacle of Ukrainian crisis, the Finns Party didn‘t change their stance in 
their political program. Although again, the Finns Party cannot be perceived as ―Russian-friendly‖ 
one, it is certainly not its adversary, and does not form its security policy mainly on ―Russian threat‖ 
scare tactics, but is mainly concerned with limitation of its sovereignty over security decision 
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making power in case of NATO membership. Therefore, if some of the future government includes 
again the Finns Party, or it is formed mainly by it, Russia can expect continuation of reasonable 
dialogue with Finland and perhaps, fully evade potential Finland‘s NATO membership. 
 
 
The Finns Party’s stance on EU 
 
 
Although the Finns Party is known to be an anti-EU political option in Finland, Timo Soini‘s 
vision was more pragmatic than ideological one, as it was seen from his actions during the Finns 
Party short time in the coalition government.  For 2014 European Parliament election, the Finns 
Party decided to tone down their anti-EU image, as Timo Soini decided to bring the party into the 
Finnish government. Therefore, their 2014 manifesto was more in the lines of an an EU-critical 
reform party.
399,400
 The manifesto applauded David Cameron‘s proposal for a thorough reform of the 
EU as well as the Dutch government‘s idea to roll back the EU‘s powers in certain policy areas. It 
also criticized the rescue packages and all related policy measures, such as the European Stability 
Mechanism, but it didn‘t demand that Finland leave the EU or the Eurozone, stating at the end that 
there should be ―less, but better EU‖. 401 It is also worth noticing that after 2014 parliament 
elections, the Finns Party left the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group headed by the 
UK Independence Party, and joined the the British Tories in the European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) group, along with the Danish People‘s Party.402,403 
 
With the Jussi Halla-aho as the new party leader, it can be expected that the Finns Party will 
take more anti-EU stance than before. For now, the party seems content to still advocate ―EU 
reformation‖ than EU exit, as it can be seen in their political program on their official website. 
 
In their political program, Finns Party outlines 4 key points in their EU policy:
404
 
 
1. EU federal development must be countered and the Member States' sovereignty guaranteed  
 
2. Support package policy needs to be stopped 
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3. Economic Cooperation needs to be further developed 
 
4. EU democracy needs to be strengthened 
 
Further, Finns Party goes in-depth in explaining their EU points in the program. Considering 
increasing federalization of the EU, Finns Party states that while they support the basic idea of 
European integration – to safeguard peace by combining financial interests, they are absolutely 
against the building of ―Federal Europe‖ state. In their view, the EU is primarily a Free Trade 
Association, making decisions at EU level when necessary and at national level as much as possible. 
The reasons why federal Europe wouldn‘t work, in Finns Party eyes are ―economic, linguistic, 
cultural and historical differences between Member States‖, although they fully support the 
development of the internal market by dismantling of trade barriers and the minimal amount of any 
new regulations. Other issues that the  Finns Party cares about are the budget of the EU, taxation of 
the Finnish citizens by the Union, increased power of Brussels and representation of Finland in 
European Parliament. Last point is especially underlined by Finns Party, as they argue that current 
13 Finnish seats out of 766 (as per 2014 European Parliament Elections) constitute only 1.7%, while 
the 98.3% of non-Finnish members have power to decide which laws will apply for Finland. 
405
 
 
Opposition for support package policy is also one of the main points of the Finns Party‘s EU 
policy. Their concerns are that it is not up to Finnish taxpayers to support or finance other Member 
States, or to participate in rescue packages and solidarity mechanism, which in their view 
undermines the unity of Europe. Further criticizing EU policy, they state that EU‘s common 
currency euro is above all a political project aimed towards the federal Europe. Therefore Finland 
needs to be prepared for the possible breakdown of the euro, such as preparing the Bank of Finland 
and other national central banks to re-introduce their own currency.
406
 
 
Finns Party also calls for reformation of the EU, as EU in the current form, ―with its 
democratic deficits and endless bureaucracy…is more and more the problem itself than the 
solution.‖ They propose several changes to the functioning of the union, such as creating a voting 
system for selecting Commissioners in national, country-specific elections for EU Commission, 
creation of a lighter Union (as per British view), reinstating some of the rights to the member states, 
and launching of bureaucratic cuts in the EU, among other things. In addition, Finns Party supports 
the referendum on the EU membership for the Finland, along the model of the Britain.
407
 
 
The political program of Finns Party for the European Union is confirmed by various 
statements and comments of the Finns Party leadership. In October 2016, Young Finns published on 
their website support for the referendum on Finland‘s exit from the EU.408  In January 2017, Halla-
aho stated that he still supports Finland‘s exit from both the EU and Eurozone, viewing it as a 
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strategic goal for Finland.
409
  His statements from June 2017 further confirmed his anti-EU stances, 
as in his speech he mentioned Finland‘s issues with the EU, such as the free movement of labour 
inside EU, common currency and federalization.
410
  Halla-aho also argued for increased immigration 
control, criticizing other EU members who allowed influx of migrants and asylum seekers.
411
 
Perhaps the best outline of the future stance of Finns Party towards the EU can be seen in a speech 
of Halla-aho from June 2017, after his election as the chairman of Finns Party. In this speech, he 
stated that the Finns Party has become “a channel for those who believe in independent nation 
states and a rigorous immigration policy”, as well as that the national legislative bodies are 
sliding towards “transnational bodies (EU)”, that immigration is becoming uncontrolled and that 
even multiculturalism itself is starting to be a concern for ordinary Finnish citizen.
412
 He further 
stated that the “current amount of (EU) integration is appropriate, but no more is needed” as the 
“current state of the European Union is such that the integration that has already been 
implemented has created problems that can not be solved except by adding further integration”413 
Nevertheless, Halla-aho is aware that the resignation from the EU is not an option as long as the 
majority of Finns favor membership, although in his opinion, the basic task of the Finns Party is to 
―promote and maintain a critical and reasoned debate”, as it is the only EU-critical party in 
Finland.
414
  
Laura Huhtasaari shares the same view as Halla-aho and the Finns Party political program. General 
position of Huhtasaari can be seen in her so-called ―May Day Speech‖ in 2017, where her 
statements can be summarized as following:
 415
 
 
1. Returning back to national currency and abandoning of the euro 
 
2. Developing and carrying on Finland‘s own industrial policy with a healthy protectionism of the 
welfare state 
 
3. (Finland) Taking the lead role in reforming the EU by dismantling its centralized decision-making 
bodies and restoring decision-making power to the Member States. 
 
4. Cutting off Finland‘s participation in solidarity program aimed towards financially unsuccessful 
EU members 
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5. Transformation of the EU into a free trade zone for independent states, with the return of the 
decision-making power to the Member States 
 
6. Resignation of Finland from the EU if it does not reform. 
 
 In November 2017, Huhtassari stated in an interview that the EU federation is progressing in 
every area, as Finland already has a common social policy, common army, common asylum policy 
and a common monetary policy with the EU, and that Finns Party hopes that with Brexit, EU will 
return to a purely commercial union.
416
 During her presidential campaign speech in December 2017 
Huhtassari stated that EU application of the Paris Climate Agreement is disastrous for Finland as, in 
her view, it doesn‘t take into account that Finnish energy and industrial plants have already 
minimized their emissions and that further restrictions will cause ―the industry to leave Finland‖.417 
She also criticized EU defense policy, as she feels that Finland has to reject the EU military and to 
maintain strong national defense. Finally, she stated that if today‘s progress of the EU federalization 
continues, Finland will become “a region of the EU without the possibility of really affecting (our) 
destiny‖, and in January 2017, she openly accused Germany that it this the only country that benefits 
from the common currency, to the expense of all other Member States.
418,419
  
 
To summarize:  
  
 Finns Party is fully against the federalization of the EU, but supports economic union 
between sovereign nation-states of Europe 
 
 As soon as the popular sentiment increases against the Finland‘s EU membership, Finns 
Party is expected to support a referendum on Finland‘s exit from the EU 
 
 According to the Finns Party, immigration, taxation, free movement of labour force and a 
common defense policy are the most pressing issues that Finland is facing with the EU 
 
Although in recent years, the Finns party made considerable success on the political scene, going 
so far as to enter the coalition government, most of the success was nullified with the leadership 
split in mid-2017 and the party‘s exit from the government. Finns Party is not in a position today to 
influence so much politics in Finland as it was perhaps a year ago. Their staunch anti-EU stance, 
among their other policies, brings them enough votes to still be relevant on Finland‘s political scene. 
Halla-aho is not expected to change his views towards the EU, which is also true for  Laura 
Huhtasaari, who is seen as a potential future leader of Finns Party. Her success on the elections 
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(third candidate), although perhaps small in percentage of votes compared to Sauli Niinistö, the 
current president of Finland, came after a major blow to Finns Party political reputation and internal 
structure. With the European Union falling deeper in political, economic and social crisis, the right-
wing parties of Europe will rise in popularity and support. Same can be expected for the Finns Party 
– with the next crisis Finland faces, whatever its nature may be, The Finns Party will start to gather 
popularity once more, and perhaps join some new coalition government, possibly even as soon as 
after the Finnish parliament elections of 2019, thus influencing anti-EU policies of the country 
anew.  If by some chance they enter the next coalition government, and this time really follow their 
political program trough, Finland can take different turn, although not necessary with negative 
impact towards Russia, as the Huthasaari and even Halla-aho can be seen as a hardline right-wing 
Finnish leaders that understands why it is important to maintain good relationships with Russia, and 
not to be part of a NATO at the same time. 
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3.2. Swedish Democrats (Sweden) 
 
 
Founding of Swedish Democrats can be traced back to 1988, when former members of the 
far-right parties and organizations, such as Progress Party, Swedish Party, White power movement 
etc, decided to make a new political party, under the guidance of Leif Zeilon.
420
 Nicholas Aylott, a 
senior lecturer in political science at Södertörn University in Stockholm, stated that when the 
Swedish Democrats were formed, it was by the people ―who could reasonably be classified as a 
Nazis‖.421 
 
Stefan Löfven, current prime minister, stated that Swedish Democrats were originally a Nazi 
and a racist party, a sentiment that is shared by  Anna Kinberg Batra and Jan Björklund, party 
leaders of the Moderate party and the Liberals respectively.
422 
Since its founding, Swedish 
Democrats attracted neo-Nazis, including Swedes who fought for Nazi Germany in the Second 
World War.
423
  
 
All of this called for re-branding of Swedish Democrats, starting with excluding radical 
claims from their program, to a new, less controversial party logo in the shape of Anemone 
hepatica flower (instead of logo that was almost exact copy of UK‘s National Front).424, 425, 426 This 
supposed reformation was reinforced by party president Jimmie Åkesson, who claims that the 
extremists were kicked out of the party.
427
 
 
With obvious effort to distance themselves from fascist and Nazi roots, Swedish Democrats 
currently define themselves as ―neither a right nor left‖, claiming that they believe in a strong 
welfare society while being inspired by the traditional conservative ideas. They further state that 
their policy aims to unite and to bring people around common basic values with a common view of 
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―gender equality, freedom of speech, democracy and what is right and wrong‖.428  Among the main 
points in party‘s polices are stopping of mass immigration, rejection of multiculturalism, referendum 
on EU membership, re-negotiation of Schengen Agreement, reinstatement of military service and 
increased defense budget, and preservation of Swedish cultural heritage.
429
 The support for Swedish 
Democrats comes mostly from citizens concerned with growing occurrence of rapes, violence, bomb 
attacks and assaults, while critics of the party point out party‘s fascist roots, xenophobia and 
racism.
430
  
 
The party‘s first real success came with the 2010 elections for the Swedish parliament 
Riksdag. Having won 5.7% of votes (improvement by 2.8% compared to 2006 elections), Swedish 
Democrats secured 20 seats in the parliament, entering Riksdag for the first time in history.
431
 This 
event is also important as it marks the crisis of traditional parties, and growing trend towards right-
wing options in Sweden.
432
 The party managed to be even more successful in 2014 Riksdag 
elections, having won 12.86% of the votes (increase of 7.1%), and securing 49 seats in the 
parliament (Figure 4).
433
  
 
In the same year, Swedish Democrats also entered the European Parliament for the first time, 
securing two seats by winning 9.67% votes in the elections.434 Though they had original agreement 
to support Le Pen‘s European Alliance for Freedom in the EU Parliament, Swedish Democrats 
switched their allegiance in order to make alliance with Nigel Farage‘s UKIP in the Europe of 
Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group, a move which soured the relations between SD and FN.435 
This was seen as maneuvering by UKIP to help Swedish Democrats loose the status of a ―pariah‖ in 
the mainstream politics, due to the party‘s fascist roots.436 In June 2014, Europe of Freedom and 
Democracy was renamed to Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, whose charter states that it 
favours ―open, transparent, democratic and accountable co-operation among sovereign European 
States”, while rejecting “the bureaucratisation of Europe and the creation of a single centralised 
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European superstate”.437,438 It currently has 41 members in European parliament, and Swedish 
Democrats‘ Peter Lundgren is one of the vice-chairs inside this group.439 
 
Popularity of Swedish Democrats is on the rise in 2017, having peaked with 20% support in 
June, making every fifth Swedish citizen potential voter of this party.
440
 Though the support slightly 
declined by September 2017, with support of 18.1% of the population, Swedish Democrats can most 
likely count to make even better results for the Riksdag elections in September 2018.
441
 The reason 
for predicting the good election results can be seen also in the support of Swedish Democrats in 
January and May 2018, where they had 21.9% and 20% of support among Swedish voters 
respectively (Table 1).
442,443 
 
 
Two members of Swedish Democrats have tendency to appear often in media: its president Jimmie 
Åkesson, and the leader of the party‘s parliament group Mattias Karlsson. Jimmie Åkesson (born 
1979, Ivetofta) started his career in Swedish Democrats in 1995, as a member of the youth section. 
In 1998, he was elected as a councilman in  Sölvesborg Municipality, and at the same time, as a 
deputy  chairman to Sweden Democratic Youth (Sverigedemokratisk Ungdom), where he would 
attain the position of the chairman from 2000 to 2005. Åkesson became a party leader for the 
Swedish Democrats on May 7, 2005, and has been leading the party until now.
444
 
 
Mattias Karlsson (born 1977, Rottne), joined Swedish Democrats at the end of 1990‘s. He 
participated in creation of the new party program, alongside Jimmie Åkesson and Mikael Jansson, 
party chairman until 2005. In September 2014, he became parliament group leader in front of 
Swedsih Democrats in Riksdag. He is currently considered as one of the main ideologists of the 
party.
445,446
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Swedish Democrats are a party that will definitely have impact on Sweden‘s political scene 
in the coming years. Since the change of political program in 2002 and the change of party leader in 
2005, Swedish Democrats saw a steady rise in support from Sweden‘s population. As a leading 
party of the right sector in Sweden, it is important to understand its position towards EU, NATO and 
Russia, as there is a realistic chance that it will be a part of policy-making process in Sweden as 
early as the next parliament elections in 2018. 
 
 
  
Swedish Democrats’ stance on Russia 
 
 
Although cooperation between Russia and a nationalistic party such as Swedish Democrats 
may seem challenging, they in fact have a lot of common ground. Though historically Russia could 
be seen more as a regional adversary than a partner, some of the points on which both sides agree 
are preservation of national and cultural heritage, rejection of NATO enlargement, reservation 
towards increased federalisation of European Union and international terrorism issues.   
 
Patrik Oksanen, a political editor of Swedish daily newspaper Hudiksvalls Tidning, in 2015 
claimed that there is a ―faction within the Swedish Democrats party which takes a more positive 
view of Russia and views Vladimir Putin as an inspiring ideological example to follow‖, as opposed 
to the ―more traditionally-minded right-wingers who take a more skeptical view of Russia.‖447 
International think-thank, European Council On Foreign Relations, listed in 2016 Swedish 
Democrats as an ally of Russia in European Parliament, along with the Dutch PPV, UK‘s UKIP, 
Italy‘s Northen League and France‘s Front National, based on their voting patterns in parliament on 
topics such association agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova and ongoing Ukrainian civil 
war.
448,449
   
 
Besides being suspected of working for Russian interests in European Parliament, Swedish 
Democrats were also accused by their political opponents that they are taking side of Belorussian 
government interests, based on their vote casting during certain resolutions.
450
 Some Swedish media 
noticed appearance of legal spokesman of Swedish Democrats, Kent Ekeroth, on RT news, which 
was enough to declare this party as an ―ally of Vladimir Putin‖, while stating that RT News also 
played Swedish Democrats‘ made documentary ―No money/No home‖ on air in November 
2015.
451,452
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Jörgen Fogelklou, District Chairman of Swedish Democrats Göteborg, in an interview to 
Göteborgs-Posten in September 2016, stated that ‘‘Swedish democrats are deeply critical of Russia's 
current regime, something that has been said by some leading party delegates―.453  In the same 
interview, Björn Söder (party security spokesman), Mikael Jansson  (party defense spokesman) and 
Julia Kronlid (party foreign-speaking spokesman) underlined that ―…we are even more critical of 
Russia's superpower fraternities who violate international laws and hold an even greater 
democratic deficit. Any other attitude would be illogical and inconsistent‖. Richard Jomshof, party 
secretary further in the interview declared that he has ―extreme problems with Putin‖ while Mattias 
Karlsson stated that ―the recurrent attacks and assassinations of oppositionists in Russia prove that 
Putin, consciously or because of inability, has failed the most basic tasks of a democratic 
conservative leader, i.e. to guarantee and maintain freedom of speech and law and order” 454 
 
Kent Ekeroth, in an interview for Svenska Dagbladet in September 2016, stated that he is 
critical of both Russia and Putin and that he never ―trusted them‖.455  In the same interview, on an 
observation that Sweden security services warned that Russia is allegedly using nationalist parties in 
Europe to destabilize countries like Sweden, Ekeroth replied that he has not seen any Russians 
trying to use them, and that he cannot see the supposed links with Russia that media tries to show.
456
 
The following month, Jimmie Åkeson was attacked in the Riksdarg  by the Moderate Party 
(Moderata samlingspartiet) leader Anna Kinber Batra and the Center party leader (Centerpartiet) 
Annie Lööf  for the supposed Swedish Democrats ties with Russia and purported protection of 
Russian interests before Swedish, to which Åkeson replied that ―We (Swedish Demcrats) are the 
party that has clearly pointed to the threat from Russia, the threat from Putin‖ and that it is one of 
the worst conspiracy theories he has heard in the parliament.
457
 That didn‘t stop Anna Kinber Batra 
of the Moderates to seek negotiations with Swedish Democrats, which prompted Prime 
Minister  Stefan Löfven to accuse her of losing a political compass since she was negotiating with a 
party that ‖you (Batra) yourself say is racist and pro-Russia‖458 
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Mattias Karlsson, in an interview for a Dagens Industry news media in January 2017, stated 
that eleven years ago, he personally wrote an article in Swedish Democrats news agency, where he 
pleaded for ―increased resources for defense, warned of Russia's rebuilding and the Putin‟s regime's 
increasingly totalitarian move‖.459  Few months later, reacting on accusations for supposedly 
Russian links within the Swedish Democrats, Karlsson, warned that Social Democrat would ―seek to 
depict (his) party and its supporters as influenced by Russia, or even as active agents or spies‖ and 
that the ―Social Democratic government are using Russia as a means to try to silence the opposition, 
and trying to make everybody who doesn't share their political views suspect of being a Russian 
spy‖ 460. Swedish media reacted along the same lines, already accusing Swedish Democrats that they 
are ―Trojan Horse‖ for the supposed Russian intelligence operation for influencing the elections in 
2018. While role of Swedish Democrats as a potential ―Trojan Horse‖ is not proven, supposed 
Russian influence of elections is backed up by claims by MUST (Militära underrättelse- och 
säkerhetstjänsten / Military Intelligence and Security Service) and Säpo  (Säkerhetspolisen / State 
Security), though again without concrete evidence.
461,
 
462,
 
463
  
 
During the Russian local elections in September, a parliament member of Swedish Democrats, Pavel 
Gamov, was present in Moscow in a role of an observer, for which he was accused by Swedish 
media that he is ―legitimizing regime of Vladimir Putin‖.464 This is consistent with a message that 
―vote for Jimmie Åkesson is a vote for Moscow‖, as disseminated by their political opponents.465  
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In short:  
 
 Swedish Democrats do not share a priori anti-Russian sentiment as other mainstream parties 
in Sweden 
 
 They have common grounds to develop relationship with Russia, especially since they 
aligned themselves with Russian-friendly political options in EU parliament 
 
 Though critical of Russian government in some aspects, at the same time they are neither 
basing their ideology on anti-Russian sentiment, nor stimulating such a sentiment among 
their voters. 
 
Therefore, it can be said that although Swedish Democrats are far away from being an open 
political party in support of Russia, they are also not basing their program or message with anti-
Russian sentiment. In the case that deeper cooperation between Sweden under larger influence of 
Swedish Democrats and Russia is needed, common ground such as defense of traditional values, 
international terrorism and conservative ideas should be exploited in order to improve the relations 
between the two countries.  
 
 
 
Swedish Democrats’ stance on NATO 
 
 
Swedish Democrats are a party that publicly opposes the NATO membership, though around 
half of their supporters would be in favour of Sweden‘s NATO membership.466 In April 2016, 
Swedish Democrats were accused of pro-Russian stance, as they were willing to vote in Riksdag 
against "Memorandum of Understanding on Host State Support" with NATO, instead opting for a 
―defence federation‖ with Finland.467,468 It seemed that Swedish Democrats were willing to 
cooperate with the Leftist party which was also against such treaty, but only two days after the 
statement that SD won‘t support Host State memorandum, its parliamentary group revoke the 
support for the Left Party initiative.
469
 This caused a rift among the elder party members on the 
NATO stance. A joint statement from Björn Söder (SD security policy spokesman), Mikael Jansson 
(SD defense policy spokesman), Roger Richtoff (Member of the Riksdags Defence Committee) and 
Jeff Ahl (deputy member of the Defense Committee) was issued in the name of the Swedish 
Democrats, stating that ―we say no to a Swedish NATO membership‖ and that ―the answer to 
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maintaining the balance and security is to form a defense federation with Finland‖, which, by their 
own words ―…at a meeting with the NATO delegates in Brussels, it was clear that they had no 
objection to strong Swedish defense, preferably in association with Finland. Russia has also not 
expressed any other view.‖470,471  
 
Mattias Karlsson expressed further support for the possible military alliance with Finland in 
favour of NATO, stating that they are very similar countries, with similar values and security 
policy.
472
 This was also official position of Swedish Democrats in their 2014 program for Riksdag 
elections, where they advocate for creation of Nordic alliance, as well as continuation of 
maintenance of neutrality and non-alignment.
473,474
 Nevertheless, they are not against using 
resources gained by joining NATO‘s Partnership for Peace program, as stated at their website.475 
 
The anti-NATO stance that seemingly originates from Swedish Democrats has enough 
support among the people to be considered as beneficial to the party. The SVT broadcaster 
published results of a poll in Jun 2017, where results showed that 43% of respondents express a 
negative attitude towards the idea of Sweden‘s ascension to NATO.476 Therefore, if Swedish 
Democrats stay at their current position that they favour a regional (and Nordic) alliance, which is 
more along the nationalistic message that the party disseminates, they could potentially count on 
support of almost half of Swedish population.  
 
The following can be concluded: 
 
 Swedish Democrats are against Sweden joining NATO, but for fully using current resources 
provided by the organization to non-NATO member states, such as Partnership for Peace 
program and others 
 
 Swedish Democrats would prefer full military alliance with Finland and integration of two 
country‘s defense system than joining NATO 
 
 Voters of the Swedish Democrats might put pressure on party leadership to change stance on 
NATO in the future, though party elders might resist such course of action. 
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That Sweden is increasingly approaching potential NATO membership can be seen in 
military exercise Aurora 17, held in September 2017. It is the most massive military exercise 
conducted on Sweden soil to date, which includes around 21.000 military personnel from all 
branches of the Swedish Armed Forces, as well as military personnel of NATO member states, such 
as France, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Germany and the United States.
477
 A Sweden‘s 
NATO membership would mean additional threat to Russia and Russian interests in Baltic Sea. At 
the same time, it would mean escalation of conflict potential in the region, since Sweden would be 
effectively member of an offensive alliance directed towards Russia. Therefore, it would be in 
everyone‘s best interest if Swedish Democrats truly pursue their agenda of purely Nordic alliance 
with Finland – it would give both countries sense of security and mutual assistance, while keeping 
the non-alignment approach. Meanwhile, Russia would not feel threatened by alliance of countries 
that lack any serious offensive capabilities of their own, which in turn could be seen as a solution to 
deescalate the current tensions in the region.  
 
 
 
Swedish Democrats’ stance on EU 
 
 
The official position of Swedish Democrats is that they consider that they have to work in 
the name of the Swedish people in Riksdag and EU Parliament in order to decide which EU laws 
and regulations will apply to Sweden. But their long term goals are those of stopping the transfer of 
power to Brussels and working towards the trend of intergovernmental cooperation between the 
states, instead of supporting increased sovereignty and federalism of the EU.
478
 
 
Stated positions of the Swedish Democrats are summarized at their official website as a 
referendum on EU membership, continuing resistance towards EMU (European Monetary Union), 
restored border protection trough renegotiations of the Schengen Agreement, and no acceptance of 
Turkey to the EU.
479, 480 
Jimmie Åkesson and Johnny Skalin (EU Political Spokesman Sweden 
Democrats) in an article for Svenska Dagbladet, stated that referendum for Sweden‘s membership in 
the EU is needed as ―The EU that Sweden voted for in 1994 was something completely different 
from the EU we currently have…today's union has evolved into a supranational political superpower 
that increasingly impedes the self-determination of individual nations‖481 
 
One of the anti-EU views that Swedish Democrats expresses is their stance on 
multiculturalism, for which they believe is negative since it ―leads to fragmentation and segregation 
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where culture clashes occur‖482 At the same time, Swedish Democrats support strong anti-
immigration policy, opposed to the ―open-doors‖ policy advocated by the majority of the EU 
decision-makers.
483
 That opinion strongly corresponds to the general public concern in Sweden, as 
there were several high-profile incidents connected to migrants and asylum seekers during the last 
years, including 38 reported sexual assaults at a Stockholm music festival during the summer 
2016.
484
 Strong anti-immigration policy that Swedish Democrats enthusiastically disseminate 
propelled some to mark SD as a ―one issue partyOn the other hand, it addresses a pressing issue in 
Swedish society, where some 20% of Sweden‘s 9.5 million people are immigrants or children of 
immigrants.
485
,
486
 Therefore, it is not surprising that the use of the phrase ―Swedish values‖ is on the 
rise in newspapers and blogs, where it was mentioned 1.600 times in 2016, compared to just 286 
times in 2012.
487
 It is easy to understand why Swedish Democrats are forcing the immigration issue 
in both their program and campaigns, and why it provokes clashes with the official EU‘s open-doors 
migration policy. 
 
That the Swedish Democrats is openly eurosceptical party is confirmed by Matias Karlson in 
an interview in May 2017, where he stated that people were starting to realize that the (Sweden‘s) 
state‘s sovereignty was being compromised. 488  In his opinion, Sweden is becoming more 
Eurosceptic, since the people saw the problems with Euro and all the problems European Union is 
facing in general, while the feeling that Swedes are not governing their country anymore is growing 
among the citizens. He further observed that the position of Swedish Democrats is the one which 
demands Swexit (exit of Sweden from the EU) as soon as possible, since the membership in the 
European Union is hurting Sweden‘s financial and cultural stability, and is making the country less 
protected against the organized crime.
 
With the 54% favourable view on the EU among Swedish 
population, anti-EU messages that are disseminated by the Swedish Democrats have a fertile ground 
among the other 46% of citizens.
489
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      As mentioned before, Swedish Democrats have two members inside the European Parliament.  
Some party critics share an opinion that Swedish Democrats run for European Parliament elections 
only because the financial incentive, since they receive financial support for the staff and travel 
expenses, or to promote Russia‘s interests in the EU Parliament.490 Taking into account that SD 
members in the EU parliament voted against the Association Agreement with Ukraine, Mattias 
Karlsson stated that it wasn‘t because of ―Moscow wishes‖, but that it was based on a Swedish 
Democrats‘ view that this means a clear step towards Ukrainian EU membership, which in turn 
would cause further reduction in Sweden‘s influence in the EU and additional costs for Swedish 
taxpayers. To distance his party from the claims that it is ―pro-Russian‖, Karlsson additionally stated 
that Swedish Democrats voted for EU sanctions against Russia and for resolution that condemns 
supposed persecution of opposition forces by Russian government.
491
 
 
 
To summarize: 
 
 Swedish Democrats are openly ―anti-EU‖ party 
 
  They are proponents for a reformation of the EU along the line of cooperation among the 
sovereign nations, instead of further concentration of power in Brussels 
 
 They are willing to hold a referendum on ―Swexit‖ and Schengen agreement 
 
    With the rise of various problems that EU was inefficient to deal with, such as migration crisis, 
over-bureaucratization, forced multiculturalism and terrorist threats, even the traditionally liberal 
society of the Sweden is experiencing a turn to the right among its citizens. Growing eurosceptism 
and increased support for once marginalized political party, along with the first real success in the 
elections in the past 7 years, leads to the conclusion that Swedish Democrats have realistic chance of 
becoming a more serious policy maker inside the Swedish society. Based on their stances on 
questions such as EU, NATO and relations towards Russia, it can be expected that if Swedish 
Democrats take power in Sweden during the next ten years, Russian Federation might find if not an 
ally, then at least a government more open to the idea of cooperation and not dependent on the 
NATO bloc. The preference of Swedish Democrats for a smaller, local alliance would further 
benefit Russia, since military capabilities of such an alliance would be negligible compared with the 
potential presence of NATO in Scandinavian countries. 
 
With potential rise of SD to policy-making level, the EU would find itself with one more 
member that is against centralization of power and bureaucracy in Brussels, and that is fighting for 
more local sovereignty. In the most extreme case, a ―Swexit‖ might further erode the power and 
significance of the EU. 
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Next Swedish general elections are going to be held on September 2018. If the trend of 
growing support for Swedish Democrats continue, they may well pass the current 18-20% they have 
among the population now, which will make them second strongest party in Sweden. If they manage 
to increase support to around 30%, they might even become strongest party in Sweden, pushing out 
Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterna) from the lead position. Since Center Party was 
already willing to enter in negotiations over some issues with Swedish Democrats, it wouldn‘t be 
hard to imagine some future Swedish Democrats-Center Party-Moderate Party coalition 
government. If that doesn‘t happen, at least Swedish Democrats can count on strong opposition role 
until 2022 general elections. Results like these were hardly imaginable in the early 2000. Reforms 
that the new leadership brought, along with the total re-branding and (supposed) expelling of fascist 
elements from the party made its presence socially acceptable on the mainstream political scene. By 
concentrating on an important issue that is dividing Swedish public – immigration, Swedish 
Democrats are securing a place in both media and in voters‘ attention.  
 
For Russia, larger policy-making role of Swedish Democrats can mean new opportunities for 
improved cooperation and security in the Baltic region. Though Swedish Democrats base their 
political identity on nationalism (though they supposedly cleared their ranks from Nazi supporters), 
they do not strike out as a party hostile to Russia, as some other Swedish parties demonstrate. On 
contrary, they are not pushing the agenda of Sweden‘s NATO enrolment, they are highly critical 
towards current EU establishment and political course and they seem to be taking more ―live-and-
let-live‖ approach towards Russia, something that should be taken into account. 
 
 
    If Swedish Democrats do attain a measure of power in the future, it would perhaps be prudent 
from the Russian side to discreetly support the creation of a Nordic alliance, as a mean to contain 
NATO‘s expansion in the region. As stated before, by creating such an alliance, both Sweden and 
other Scandinavian countries could get a sense of security without the need to invite other alliances 
or foreign powers to build missile and/or army bases, military airports etc. It would be safe to 
assume that Russia wouldn‘t feel threatened by such an alliance, as it would clearly lack any 
significant offensive capabilities against Russian territory, while with its either official or unofficial 
support, it would do wonders to counter hostile propaganda-induced label of ―aggressor‖ and ―factor 
of regional destabilization‖. 
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3.3. The Progress Party (Norway) 
 
 
The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet - FrP), is one of the more interesting parties in the 
Nordic region. Not only is it in government coalition since 2013, but it is also not quite ―right-wing‖ 
in the usual context of the political party spectrum, although it is considered so in the Norwegian 
political environment. Certainly, it is a party that raises questions and points out issues in the 
Norwegian society that other parties do not, such as immigration and crime, and it mostly owes to 
that a high degree of current popularity, as it will be presented further down in this research. 
 
The predecessor of the Progress Party was established in 1973, as the ―Anders Lange‘s Party 
for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention" (Anders Langes Parti til sterk 
nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter og offentlige inngrep – ALP).492 Journalist by profession, Anders 
Lange was a critic of state intervention and in his view, welfare state‘s over-regulation.493  On the 
elections same the year, Anders Langes party received five percent of the votes and four 
representatives in the Storting (Norway‘s parliament). 494 The cause of the breakthrough of such a 
party in the relatively stable Norway‘s political system was described as a combination of factors: 
growing anti-tax sentiment in public opinion, a change in voting patterns in the aftermath of the 
polarizing Norwegian referendum on accession to the European Community in 1972, and the 
charismatic personality of Anders Lange.
495
 After the death of Lange and internal disputes in the 
party, it changed its name to Progress Party in 1978, with Carl I Hagen elected as the chairman. 
 
 During the next two decades, the Progress Party reoriented its political message from tax-
protest party towards the anti-immigration and anti-crime party, while the critique of the welfare 
state was replaced with the ‗welfare chauvinism‘, pleading for better care for ethnic-Norwegian 
inhabitants.
496
 In the elections in 1997 and 2001, the Progress Party won around 15% of the votes, 
while in 2005 and 2009, it managed to secure around 22% of votes during parliament elections.
497
 
Success of the Progress Party can also be seen in the perception of Norway‘s citizen who consider it 
as the only alternative to the existing political actors, since they are the ones that open the debates in 
the public over the burning issues in the country (such as immigration, crime rate, terrorism etc.), 
while at the same time propose solution to these problems.
498
 There are indicators that the Progress 
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Party rhetoric has a lot in common with right-wing, anti-immigration rhetoric of similar parties in 
Europe.
499
 
 
The Progress Party can be defined as a right-wing populist party, as it holds anti-
establishment and anti-immigration views, and has a strict position on law and order.
500
 Although it 
is viewed as a right-wing party in the local political context, it managed to successfully re-brand 
itself into a more mainstream political option, therefore becoming desirable partner for centrists 
such as Liberal and Christian parties, with which they later formed a governmental coalition.
501
  
Nevertheless, from time to time members of the Progress Party make controversial statements, such 
as that made by Minister of Justice and FrP member, Sylvi Listhaug, that the opposition Labour 
party is supporting terrorists, after parliament voted down FrP‘s proposal that supreme court is 
allowed to deprive Norwegian citizenship from individuals without court decision in some 
conditions.
502
 
 
Some classified the Progress Party as the ―moderate right-wing populist party‖, who toned 
down much of its rhetoric in order to enter the government.
503
 This proved true as in September 
2017, the Progress Party, along with the Conservative party and two other minor coalition partners, 
won narrow victory against left-wing political opponents in coalition around Labor party of 
Norway.
504
 The message that it sent to voters was clear – the immigrants are taking advantage of the 
system and the taxes are too high, which obviously grants FrP fair share of the support in the 
elections.
505
 Since 2013, the Progress Party backed the Conservatives‘ coalition compromise on tax 
reforms - including cutting corporate and wealth taxes, which passed with Labour‘s support, while it 
managed to obtain support for laws that tightening immigration policies - the number of asylum 
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applications fell from over 16,000 in 2015 to about 1,200 in late 2017.
506
 Some concessions were 
also needed to be made, as the coalition government agreed to rule out oil and gas explorations off 
the coasts of Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja, to maintain a strict alcohol policy and to grant 
permanent residency to the children of illegal immigrants who have lived in Norway for more than 
three years.
507
 These concessions were not well received with the Progress Party own electorate, 
as gas exploration and stricter immigration policies were for several years among the party‘s main 
electoral promises.
508
 Among major victories of the Progress Party in the coalition government are 
the formation of a new ministry for immigration and integration, the adoption of stricter rules for 
granting of permanent residencies in Norway, along with the toughening of the criteria regarding 
the social benefits that refugees are eligible for.
509
 
 
By their own words, ―the Progress Party is a libertarian party that believes in freedom for the 
individual, lower taxes, prosperity and a limited government that empowers people.‖510 They further 
establish themselves as a party that is based on ―Norway's constitution, Norwegian and Western 
tradition and cultural heritage based on Christian philosophy‖511 Libertarianism plays central role in 
the ideology of the party, with minimal government interference in daily people‘s lives but with 
stricter laws against any crimes committed.
512
 The Progress Party reinforce their strict stance 
towards the immigrants in their 2017-2021 Action Plan, insisting on total ban of burka and hijabs, 
labeling them ―women-discriminating garments‖, with promises of additional mechanisms for both 
integration of immigrants to Norwegian society and additional policies that can prevent mass 
immigration to Norway.
513
 The Progress Party policies are based on ―people‟s government, with 
decentralized political power and decision in elected bodies and are employed to legislate binding 
referendums as part of our constitutional system‖.514  
 
In 2001 and 2005 parliament elections in Norway, The Progress Party secured 14.70% and 22.0% of 
votes respectively.
515,516
 The Progress Party managed to achieve 22.9% of votes in 2009 
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parliamentary elections, securing 41 seats out of 169.
517
 In 2013, the Progress Party had decline of 
votes, securing only 16.3%, and loosing 12 seats in the parliament.
518
 In 2017, it won 15.2%, with 
27 seats in parliament (Figure 5).
519
 Current support for the Progress Party is around the results of 
the previous parliament elections, with 13.1% of voters support in January and 14% of support in 
May 2018 (Table 1).
520,521
 In 2013, Conservatives formed coalition government with Progress Party 
and in January 2018, the coalition between them was renewed, with the addition of center-right 
Liberal party, after some concessions were made over environment and oil exploitation.
522
,
523
 In the 
current coalition government, the Progress Party has the following ministers - Minister of Justice, 
Public Security and Immigration, Minister of Agriculture and Food, Minister of Fisheries, Minister 
of Petroleum and Energy, Minister of Transport, Minister of Health and Care Services and Minister 
of Finance.
 524
 In overall, the Progress Party has 8 out of 20 ministers in the current coalition 
government, although not the foreign and defense ministry – positions which allow for more 
concrete shaping of the country‘s internal and external policies.   
  
Following members of the Progress Party were prominently represented in the media during past 
year: 
 
Siv Jensen (born in 1969, Oslo) is the Progress Party leader since 2006 and Finance Minister 
of Norway since 2013.
525
 She is known for her pro-Israel and anti-Islam stances among the 
politicians in Norway.
526
 
,527,528
   As a Minister of Finance, she was credited for Norway‘s strong 
economy and for the government‘s business-friendly tax cuts.529 
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Ketil Solvik-Olsen (born in 1972, Time) is the Second Vice President of FrP and Minister of 
Transport since 2013. In 2005 he was elected to the Storting, where he was a member of 
the Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment from 2005 to 2011, and a delegate to 
the United Nations General Assembly from 2011 to 2013.
530,531
 
 
Christian Tybring-Gjedde (born in 1963, Oslo) is a career politician and Progress Party 
member, who served first as a member of the parliament‘s Finance Committee until the 2013, when 
he went to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.
532
 He currently holds a post of second vice-
chairman there
533
. In 2010, he came into the media spotlights after he co-authored op-ed titled 
―Dream from Dysneland‖ for the  Aftenposten – Norway‘s largest printed newspapers in the 
circulation, where he attacked Labour party‘s open-immigration policy, while stating that the 
Norwegian culture is being expelled due to ethnic-Norwegians slowly becoming minority in many 
places.
534,535,536
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The Progress Party’s stance on Russia 
 
 
  The Progress Party can be seen as a political option in Norway that, although to a degree 
nationalistic, shares positive sentiment towards Russia, stressing the importance of having good 
relations and a need for cooperation. 
 
In October 2015, Christian Tybring-Gjedde, criticized NATO Secretary General for having 
an excessively strong language against Russia and President Vladimir Putin, adding that Russia is a 
crucial ally in fight against the ISIS and that NATO and Russia should create a united front against 
terrorists.
537
 Tybring-Gjedde continued to express positive stance towards Russia, as in July 2017, 
he stated that ―United States are gliding away from Europe‖ and that it is important to have good 
relations with Russia and China. In addition, he highlighted that ―United States has an interest in 
keeping Russia out of markets (of Norway) and losing competition‖.538  
 
In August the same year, Tybring-Gjedde  asked  Norway‘s Foreign Minister Børge Brende 
to remove sanctions against Russia, stating that ―must realize that Russia is not going to leave the 
Crimea‖, and if Russia is complying with Minsk agreements, then sanctions should be removed.539 
Bengt Rune Strifeldt repeated the call for removing sanctions against Russia few days later, stating 
that ―If we are to use the potential which lies in our neighbourly relations with Russia we have to 
work for the abolishment of the sanctions, he have to try to solve the issues on a very different level 
than to introduce sanctions‖, while adding that ―We have a very good cooperation with Russia, we 
have had it for generations, it is a huge market for goods and people, and it is of special importance 
for us living here north in Finnmark‖540 
 
Two months after, commenting on alleged Russian training of amphibious assault of 
Svalbard archipelago during ―Zapad 2017‖ military exercise,  Tybring-Gjedde said that he was 
actively engaging in dialogue with Russia and that ―in a world where there is so much uncertainty, it 
is important that we have dialogue with Russia‖.541  
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In September 2017, Ketil Solvik-Olsen, FrP member and  Minister of Transport and 
Communications  opened , jointly with his Russian counterpart a new bridge between Norway and 
Russia, stating that such cross-border infrastructure was important for developing of cooperation 
between the two countries. In addition to this, other joint projects were being considered, such as 
interconnection of fiber optic cables across the border and visa-free border crossing for residents of 
the border zone.
542
 The same month, Tybring-Gjedde stated that good relationship with Russia is 
crucial, and that Norway has to find a way to cooperate with Vladimir Putin, and not define him as 
an enemy, like the United States and the rest of the Europe did.
543
 State Secretary for the Ministry of 
Industry and Fisheries Roy Angelvik (FrP), commenting on significant drop of export value of 
seafood exports, stated in January 2018 that ―there is too little focus on how important an opening of 
the Russian market may be for Norwegian seafood industry‖, and that he was looking forward to the 
opening of Russian markets in August same year, as it would lead to a significant increase of the 
average seafood export price for the rest of the 2018.
544
   
 
In March 2018, Bård Hoksrud, a FrP member and observer of Norway‘s parliamentary 
delegation to the OSCE, stated that he didn‘t witness irregularities in the polling stations during the 
Russian presidential elections, in contrast to the accusations of the Russian opposition observes that 
there were cases of electoral irregularities.
545
 The same month, Christian Tybring-Gjedde stated that 
he believes that the West's penalty and sanction policy towards Russia is deeply wrong, and that ―it 
is less productive to maintain Russia as aggressive while insisting that we want to normalize 
relations with the country.‖546 In addition, he underlined the importance of understanding the events 
that occurred in Crimea in broader historic and geo-political context, while stressing the need for 
Norway to be partners with Russia in the fight against international terrorism, which he sees as a 
much bigger threat to Norway‘s security than anything else.547 When FrP member Tor Mikkel Wara 
became new Norway‘s Justice, Preparedness and Immigration Minister in April 2018, his party 
colleagues believed that the relationship between Norway and Russia will be one of several 
important things for him, as he wished to focus on the northern regions and the Russian border 
crossing .
548
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It can be summarized that:  
 
 
 The Progress Party sees Russia as a partner to be cooperated with, rather to be confronted 
 
 The Progress Party presence in the Norway government is a positive boost to Norway-Russia 
relations 
 
 If the Progress Party achieves even greater role in some future government of Norway, 
Norway-Russia relations are highly likely to reach historic maximum.  
 
    Russia has an unexpected ally in the Progress Party, and it needs to cultivate this kind of 
relationship. This can lead not only to economic benefits for both countries, but increased political 
capital of Russia in other Nordic countries too. If the Progress Party obtains majority in some future 
coalition government, it can shape and influence Norway‘s policies in a much higher degree than 
within the current levels. Thus, with Progress Party being a very pragmatic party in its core, it may 
move forward with the decision to unilaterally lift the sanctions against Russia. In addition, if high 
level of trust is achieved between Russia and hypothetically FrP-dominated government of Norway, 
perhaps the FrP will less be likely to advocate larger NATO presence in Norway, a move that would 
benefit Russia greatly. It would be prudent from the side of Russia to further develop positive ties 
with individuals within the FrP and Progress Party as whole. 
 
 
Progress Party’s stance on NATO 
 
The Progress Party can be seen as a staunch NATO supporter, as it is visible from both their 
party program and information found at their official website. The Progress Party program states 
that the FrP supports NATO and believes that it ensures ―safety and global peace‖, and that Norway 
should continue its membership in the future, while constantly developing closer ties with allied 
countries.
549
 The Progress Party also emphasizes the North Sea Strategy, which includes UK, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Norway, and focuses on joint training, operations, command 
and control system.
550
 In their political program, FrP states that due to the activities in the Artic, 
Norway‘s marine areas are becoming increasingly important, along with the Norway‘s fishing 
resources and deposits of oil and gas in them. That makes Norway‘s military presence necessary, in 
order to preserve the country‘s access to such strategic resources.551  
 
The Progress Party states that any potential crisis must be handled initially by the Norway‘s 
forces, while at the same time a corridor for the allied reinforcements must be maintained. In 
addition, it claims that Norway is facing many challenges, including international organized crime, 
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terrorism and cyber security. 
552Considering these facts, FrP‘s stance is that Norway has to have an 
active role in NATO, as it is the cornerstone of Norway‘s defense policy, and that the country has to 
participate in joint training and exercises with other NATO member states. FrP singles out the 
United States as the most important ally of Norway, and stresses the importance of continuing 
developing strategic partnership between Norway and USA. FrP also sees the cooperation between 
Sweden and Finland as a natural one, since the party views both those countries holding same values 
as Norway, and concludes that it is important to strengthen Nordic cooperation. Considering the 
defense budget, the goal of 2% GDP for NATO participation has to be met no longer than 2024.
553
 
In the summary of their position towards NATO, FrP states that it will ensure continued Norwegian 
membership and influence in NATO trough active political and military participation, continue to 
strengthen the alliance with the United States as the closest ally of Norway, and advocate that 
Norway serves as a country for both NATO training and infrastructure, in order to enhance 
Norway‘s defense capabilities. 554 
 
In April 2016, Siv Jensen confirmed Norway‘s and the Progress Party‘s commitment to 
NATO and in the position of the Finance Minister, announced the plans for rebuilding of Norway‘s 
military forces, such as procurement of US F-35 fighter jets that were planned to replace Norway‘s 
older F-16 fighter jets.
555
In January 2018, Labor Party of Norway announced that it wishes that the 
country works actively on achieving global nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Non-
proliferation Agreement NPT, with a long-term goal of an international ban on nuclear weapons. 
This sparked debate among political parties in Norway, with the Christian Tybring-Gjedde from FrP 
stating that these are populist moves from the Labor Party, and that NATO‘s central member states 
have even greater need to have nuclear weapons in order to provide sufficient deterrent effect 
against so-called rogue states that can acquire nuclear weapons and use them against what Tybring-
Gjedde  calls democratic countries.
556
 In April 2018, Siv Jensen strongly expressed her support 
towards Norway‘s 2% GDP goal of NATO participation by 2024, stressing that army forces must 
not be weakened in any way.
557
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In short:  
 
 Progress Party has strong pro-NATO stance and sees this alliance as cornerstone of national 
defense 
 
 It will advocate for further increase of Norway‘s NATO participation, both financial and 
military 
 
 Progress Party strongly supports military and political cooperation with United States, as the 
main NATO Member State 
 
As seen both from the official documents and statements, Progress Party is not likely to question 
Norway‘s role in NATO anytime in the future. The only direction that can be expected if the 
Progress Party obtains larger degree of influence in government is higher commitment in this 
alliance. Nevertheless, given the statements of the Progress Party leadership towards Russia, that 
signal the will for cooperation, there might be space for some degree of mutual cooperation between 
both Norway‘s and Russia‘s security interests, as development of positive relations might curb the 
need of Norway for additional NATO bases and/or security personnel, which in turn might benefit 
Russia also as it would not feel threatened by large NATO presence near its borders. 
 
 
 
The Progress Party’s stance on EU 
 
 
Based on their political program, the Progress Party certainly falls under the Eurosceptic 
political parties. It declares that the European Union was established in its time with the purpose of 
promoting peace, freedom and trade in Europe, just to become oversized bureaucracy in Brussels 
which places obstacles in the way of people of Europe. This places the Progress Party firmly against 
the Norwegian EU membership, which is further confirmed by their statement that ―The Progress 
Party support the peoples‟ right to a referendum on a possible membership in the European Union. 
Membership will entail a large decision with consequences for generations to come, and only the 
people directly should be able to make those kinds of decisions.‖, found on their official 
website.
558,559
  
 
In addition, Fpr advocate for stricter border control, as some Schengen country members are 
caving under pressure of illegal border crossings and mass migrations.
560
 Further in their political 
program, the Progress Party states that it will work against continued membership of Norway in the 
EU, on making exports of oil, gas and fish to be subjected to Norwegian law and jurisdiction, re-
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thinking Norways membership in Schengen zone if other member states cannot control their 
borders, and re-negotiating parts of the EEA.
561
 
 
The Agreement on the European Economic Area, which entered into force on 1 January 
1994, brings together the EU Member States and the three EEA EFTA States — Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway — in a single market, referred to as the "Internal Market".562 Although 
EEA does not cover regular EU policies such as Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies, it still 
contains provisions on various aspects of trade in agricultural and fish products.
563
 Fishery and 
seafood industry is especially critical for Norwegian economy, as the Norway‘s profits in 2016 from 
seafood export reached record high of $10.5 billion worth of seafood to the global market, 
representing nearly 10% of the world‘s total seafood supplies in that year.564 Therefore, the Progress 
Party recognizes the importance of the EEA for the Norwegian industry, but at the same time, in its 
political program, it wows to improve this agreement in order to suit more Norwegian interests. The 
Progress Party states that in some areas, EEA must be interpreted stricter, or even be renegotiated in 
order to ―better safeguard Norwegian sovereignty and national interests‖.565   
 
  In April 2018, Per Sandberg, a member of the Progress Party and Norwegian Minister of 
Fisheries, stated that Norway has to renegotiate the EEA agreement as the import duties on 
processed fish in the EU put strain to Norway‘s own economy, and that “full market access to the 
EU is top priority for the government‖. 566  
 
Another issue that recently came up in Norway relating the EU was the signing of agreement 
with EU‘s energy union, which aims to provide EU citizens and businesses with ―affordable, secure 
and clean energy.‖567   The market would be overseen by EU‘s Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER), and the decision of the coalition government of Norway to support such 
deal caused divisions among members of Parliament, Norway‘s top opposition Labour Party and the 
general public, as there are fears that joining the energy union and participating in ACER would 
increase electricity rates .
568
 While Terje Søviknes (FrP), Minister of Petroleum and Energy 
supported the deal stating that there is nothing in ACER that would raise the costs of electricity 
rates, Iceland, another member of EEA EFTA, is currently declining to sign it, which is an action 
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similar to veto in the EEA EFTA relations.
569,570 
This is an interesting development for the Progress 
Party, as they are not political option that pushes for deeper integration with the EU. Will this have 
impact on its voting body, remains to be seen. 
 
It can be concluded that: 
 
 Progress Party will not push for Norway‘s membership in the EU, 
 
 nevertheless, it will continue to support trade agreements, if they are re-negotiated in more 
beneficial framework for Norway‘s own national interests, 
 
 while in government, the Progress Party was not always consisted with its electoral promises 
(ACER affair). 
 
The Progress Party‘s view is more pragmatical than ideological – what is beneficial for 
Norway‘s national interests will be adopted, such as EEA (although some parts needs to be 
renegotiated to better suit the Progress Party taste), and most recently ACER agreement (which is 
seen as beneficial by FrP). What is not – the Progress Party will be against, such as the EU 
membership. Since Norway is not part of the EU, the Progress Party does not mention in its official 
documents a need for the EU to be reformed from its current state, or similar propositions that are 
present in some other conservative parties. While it states that EU moved from its original design to 
a more federalized one, it also acknowledges that Norway should not seek membership in the EU, as 
it would hurt its national interests. Therefore, when anticipating further EU policies from the 
Progress Party, they would need to be assessed first through the prism of ―Norway first‖ kind of 
stance. 
 
 
As stated above, the Progress Party is not a typical right-wing party of Europe, although in the 
Norway political climate, it can be considered so. Even though it is based on conservative Christian 
values, it also show a high degree of flexibility and pragmaticism, such as support for Israel and 
even suggested cooperation with Russia in order to combat international terrorism. Therefore, the 
Progress Party places interests of Norway first, as its seen in arguing for better relations with Russia 
and lifting of sanctions against it, as it would greatly benefit Norway‘s export capacity. Same tactic 
is seen in re-negotiating EEA with the EU where Norway feels its interests are jeopardized, while 
casting doubt on the efficiency of the current Schengen system and its capacity to prevent future 
waves of mass migration. The Progress Party calculated that the EU membership would do more 
harm to Norway‘s interests than current levels of mutual cooperation, and therefore it should not be 
expected for the party to change their stance in the future, especially since French president 
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Emmanuel Macron called for even greater integration of the EU.
571
 And with the same reason, the 
Progress Party will continue to support Norway‘s NATO membership, and especially its alliance 
with the United States, as the cornerstone of Norway‘s defense policy. Nevertheless, the Progress 
Party‘s larger percentage of parliament seats and larger part in government can be beneficial for 
Norway-Russia relations, especially if in the future, the Progress Party obtains the control of Foreign 
Ministry. In turn, Russia should support economic and political initiatives coming from the Progress 
Party ministers, in order to enhance relations with this important country of the Nordic bloc. If 
mutual trust can be built, then perhaps the Progress Party can also feel that there is no need for such 
staunch pro-NATO stance, since there won‘t be any threats to its security, at least in the shape of 
hypothetical full-scale foreign invasion. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
 
It is already evident knowledge that the European political scene is experiencing ―interesting 
times‖, with rise of the nationalist/populist parties and increased division among EU member states 
(mostly on the West-East Europe axis). Moreover, Europe is facing additional challenges from its 
―near abroad‖, such as wars, divisions and insurgencies in the Middle East and Northern Africa, as 
well as somewhat erratic behavior of the most important military power for the continent– the 
United State of America. All of this presents new challenges for the Russian Federation too, which 
needs to constantly adapt to the fast changes that are occurring in these regions. Therefore, 
understanding of political shifts in the European voting patterns and governments is one of the keys 
for successful formulation of new policies and strategies. 
 
The parties that were researched in this scientific work were, those parties that were not so 
much present in the main-stream media, as the right-wing parties of the Western Europe are. 
Nevertheless, the countries of the parties‘ origin are all holding a significance for Russian 
Federation – whether they can be potentially close allies inside the EU (such as Austria and 
Hungary), that are sharing near-abroad and have significant Russian ethnic-minority (Estonia), or 
with which Russia can establish even better cooperation in the critically-important region (such as 
Finland, Sweden and Norway). 
 
  This work for the first time compiles detailed examination of the politically-relevant right-
wing parties from the Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries that are holding high significance for 
Russia‘s foreign and security environment, while giving answer on their political stances towards 
Russian Federation, EU and the NATO – questions of high relevance for Russia.  Taking into 
account the current voter support for the examined political parties, as well as their results from the 
last national parliament elections in their respective countries, the importance of understanding their 
motives for Russian Federation are more than clear. Not only are some of the parties already in 
coalition governments of their national states, but the next cycle of national elections could bring 
additional changes to these governments, with other political options attaining a degree for the first 
time.  
 
In the Table 1 are listed current support of the examined parties (with the first poll rating 
dating from January and the second dating from May), last parliament election results, and finally, 
the current status in the political life of their national states – are they in the opposition or in the 
coalition government. 
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Party Name 
Current poll 
rating  
(01.-05. 2018) 
Last parliament elections 
In the 
government 
FPÖ 
 
(AUSTRIA) 
26% - 31% 
26% 
(2017 Austrian legislative elections) 
YES 
Jobbik 
 
(HUNGARY) 
18% - N/A 
19.06% 
(2018 Hungarian parliamentary election) 
NO 
EKRE 
 
(ESTONIA) 
18.4%  - 15% 
8.1% 
(2015 Estonian parliament elections) 
NO 
Swedish 
Democrats 
 
(SWEDEN) 
21.9% - 20% 
12.9% 
(Swedish general elections 2014) 
NO 
The Progress 
Party 
 
(NORWAY) 
13.1% - 14%  
16.3% 
(Norwegian parliamentary elections 2013) 
YES 
The Finns 
Party 
 
(FINLAND) 
9.6% - 7.7% 
17.7% 
(Finnish parliamentary elections 2015) 
NO 
(YES until 
June 2017) 
 
Table 1 – Current state of support for researched political parties, their last election results and whether they are 
part of government coalition or not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
Some of the examined political parties currently have more voter support than they managed to win 
on previous elections. This can be explained with the shifting political and/or economic situation in 
both national countries and EU as whole. As said before, with each new crisis that EU (as well as 
their national states, with pro-Brussels governing parties) faces, right-wing and conservative parties 
can expect to experience a rise in their support and popularity. This is perhaps not so much due to 
their political ideology, as it is to their populist rhetorics and voters‘ protest against the ruling 
parties.  
 
The Table 2 summarizes the positions of the examined parties towards the Russian 
Federation. Based on the conclusions obtained during the research, three different stances are 
covered: 
 
1. Negative stance towards Russia – this represents the overall negative view of Russia, based on 
the party documents and statements of the leadership. The party views Russia along the lines of 
either adversary, threat to national security or hostile force with which is not possible to negotiate, 
or there is no will to do so. If there is a political will for cooperation or dialogue, it is not expressed 
enough in the public, or it is under-represented in the party documents and/or leadership statements. 
 
2. Neutral stance towards Russia – the political party sees Russia neither as an adversary, nor a 
partner with whom it can or wishes to establish closer connections. The current level of national 
interaction with the Russian Federation is satisfactory at best. Alternatively, the party seeks neither 
deeper cooperation nor confrontation with Russia. 
 
3. Positive stance towards Russia – the examined party openly favors cooperation with Russia, 
and/or sees in it a friendly country with shared values. Statements of party leadership are positive 
towards deeper interaction between the national state and Russian Federation. 
 
 
In general, most of the researched parties have either neutral or positive stance towards 
Russia. Some of them are more pragmatical than ideological, and understand the value of 
cooperation and good relations with Russia. Others see it as a country with national, family and 
religious values that are counter-weight to the left-wing or liberal ideology dominant in the both 
Brussels and pro-EU party discourse. Finally, some of the parties view Russia as a crucial ally in the 
fight against the international terrorism, as the Russian Federation involvement in Syria 
demonstrates the willingness to combat the threat of international terrorist organizations. Russia 
should explore the ways in which it can enhance the cooperation and understanding between 
political options which harbor positive sentiment towards it, as they can prove valuable allies in 
Europe provided they attain a degree of influence and power in the future governments of their 
national states. 
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Party Name 
Stance on 
Russia 
Comment 
FPÖ 
 
(AUSTRIA) 
Positive 
FPO is openly supporting Russia, and it is seen as a major ally 
inside the Austrian government. FPO wishes to take down 
sanctions against Russia which in their opinion hurt Austrian 
economy. 
Jobbik 
 
(HUNGARY) 
Positive 
Russia is seen as a natural ally of the European nations and as a 
defender of Christian and traditional values in Europe, opposing 
Euro-Atlantic ―liberalism‖. Willing to cooperate. 
EKRE 
 
(ESTONIA) 
Negative 
Russia is perceived as an existential threat for Estonia. 
Irredentist policies towards Russian Federation are advocated. 
Swedish 
Democrats 
 
(SWEDEN) 
Neutral 
Although critical of Russian government in some aspects, they 
are neither basing their ideology on anti-Russian sentiment, nor 
stimulating such a sentiment among their voters. 
The Progress 
Party 
 
(NORWAY) 
Positive 
In many instances, party leadership expressed desire for Norway 
to cooperate with Russia and to lift the sanctions imposed 
against it. 
The Finns Party 
 
(FINLAND) 
Neutral 
Although Russia is seen as a threat to the Finland‘s national 
security, the party believes that sanctions against Russia need to 
be lifted. There are grounds for economic and cultural 
developments between Finland and Russia. 
 
Table 2 – Examined parties’ stance on Russia 
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Table 3 summarizes the positions of the researched parties stances towards the NATO. As 
before, the political stances are divided into 3 levels, based on the conclusions obtained during the 
research: 
 
 
1. Negative stance towards the NATO – the researched party is fully against the NATO as 
an alliance. It can either be against national country‘s membership in NATO, or support anti-NATO 
political option if the national country chooses to conduct referendum on alliance membership. The 
party in question can either favor a more localized alliance over NATO, and/or strongly disagree 
with NATO-led military campaigns around the world. 
 
2. Neutral stance towards the NATO – the party is not against the NATO membership or 
against the possible membership if the national state is seeking it. In some cases the political party 
may fully support NATO membership, although it can be highly critical on how military, political 
and financial resources in the alliance are spent, or it might not be for hosting of large number of 
military personnel or bases on its territory.  
 
3. Positive stance towards the NATO - The party fully supports the national state‘s NATO 
membership, or will support pro-NATO political options on the potential NATO membership 
referendum. The party fully supports not only membership, but also active involvement of national 
armed forces in NATO military campaigns around the world. 
 
 
The prevailing negative sentiment towards NATO among the researched parties can be 
explained with the fact that part of their ideology derives from nationalism, where the defense of the 
country‘s own borders with its own resources is considered a priority, rather than relying on foreign 
alliances. That is the case especially if NATO is conducting offensive operation overseas – 
nationalistic parties tend to be conservative with its nation‘s resources, and are not in favor of 
financing some of the NATO member states military adventures. Nevertheless, each party‘s national 
state is in a specific situation regarding local and international alliances, each case for or against 
NATO membership should be viewed and analyzed separately. 
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Party Name 
Stance on 
NATO 
Comment 
FPÖ 
 
(AUSTRIA) 
Negative 
FPO is against Austrian‘s NATO membership. NATO is seen as 
a long arm of US geopolitical interests, which start conflicts 
around the world and push away Russia from European 
cooperation. 
Jobbik 
 
(HUNGARY) 
Negative 
NATO is an offensive alliance that damages Hungarian national 
interests. The party denounces NATO efforts to escalate the 
conflict with Russia. 
EKRE 
 
(ESTONIA) 
Neutral 
NATO guarantees Estonia‘s security, but it has to be less 
involved in foreign missions (including Estonia‘s military) and 
more dedicated to protection of Eastern European allies. 
Swedish 
Democrats 
 
(SWEDEN) 
Negative 
Against Sweden‘s NATO membership, favoring a more local 
regional alliance, although the party is not against using 
resources from the PFP program between Sweden and NATO. 
The Progress 
Party 
 
(NORWAY) 
Positive 
NATO guarantees Norway‘s security. Norway should be more 
integrated in the alliance. 
The Finns Party 
 
(FINLAND) 
Negative 
Holds a prevalently negative view towards Finland‘s NATO 
membership. Although the party‘s members are somewhat 
divided on this issue, the Finns Party in general is advocating 
military-neutral Finland. 
 
Table 3 – Examined parties’ stance on NATO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
What are the positions of the examined parties towards European Union is summarized in 
Table 4. The grading of the political stances is again divided into three levels based on the 
conclusions obtained during the research: 
 
1. Negative stance towards the EU – The researched party has a negative stance towards 
the current form of the European Union. It could either seek a national referendum on EU exit, or 
support the anti-EU position on an EU referendum if the country is not a member of the union. 
Alternatively, it could seek to reform the European Union from within. The party is against 
increased federalization and surrendering of national sovereignty to the Brussels‘s bureaucracy. 
 
2. Neutral stance towards the EU – the party is currently content with the achieved level of 
integration with the EU. The researched party does not seek a national ―exit‖ from the EU, nor does 
it seek deeper integrations besides the current level. Possibly it doesn‘t support the full 
federalization of the EU, but at the same time, it most likely does not seek reformation of the EU in 
the direction of further de-federalization.  
 
3. Positive stance towards the EU – the party fully supports all the EU integrations or the 
potential EU membership of the national state. It embraces the increased federalization of the EU, 
and is strongly against any kind of national ―exit‖ from the EU, or potential EU reformation in the 
opposite direction. 
 
 
The researched political parties have in general a negative stance towards the EU, and they 
can be considered as anti-federalist political options in their national countries. Most of them are 
actually founding their programs on anti-federal EU sentiment, and being populist and nationalistic 
in nature, advocate for the reforms that will lead to the new/old concept of EU – a loose political and 
economic union of sovereign nation-states. Since most of these parties hold a very small number of 
MPs in the European parliament, it is questionable if they really can induce the desired reforms, 
even if they were in coalition with other anti-federalist parties. But their presence in the 
governments of EU member states and questions they raise about the effectiveness of the current 
system certainly add to the EU dialogue and the path of future development that is ahead for the 
union.  
 
In addition, this is an indicator that their support will rise or fall with the success of the 
future EU consolidation and its capability to unitedly respond to any crises that would occur in the 
future. If economic disparity increases, along with the unemployment and immigration rates, those 
governments that fully support the EU may find opposition among the population, which might vote 
for conservative political options that can offer ―less EU and more national‖ programs and political 
options.  
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Party Name 
Stance on 
EU 
Comment 
FPÖ 
 
(AUSTRIA) 
Negative 
Anti-Federalist EU party that rejects forced multiculturalism and 
supports Europe of sovereign nations.  
Jobbik 
 
(HUNGARY) 
Negative 
Anti-federalist EU party that wishes to reform the EU along the 
lines of sovereign nation states. 
EKRE 
 
(ESTONIA) 
Negative 
Against the federalization of the EU, and supports potential 
referendum on Estonia‘s EU ―exit‖ if the union stops to serve 
Estonian‘s national and security interests. 
Swedish 
Democrats 
 
(SWEDEN) 
Negative 
An openly anti-EU party that supports referendum on Sweden‘s 
EU membership, or at least the reformation of the EU along the 
lines of sovereign nation states. 
The Progress 
Party 
 
(NORWAY) 
Neutral 
Will not push for the Norway‘s membership to EU, but will 
continue to economically cooperate with it (EEA and ACER). 
The Finns Party 
 
(FINLAND) 
Negative 
Against federalization of Europe and supports the reforms along 
the lines of sovereign nation states. It will conduct referendum 
on EU exit as soon as the political climate allows for that. 
 
Table 4 – Examined parties’ stance on EU  
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Finally, Table 5 presents a more simplified summary of the main results and the in-depth 
research presented in the previous chapters. It should serve only as a reference point, since each 
party‘s positions on the corresponding topics are summarized in just a single word 
(positive/negative/neutral) without any detailed explanation.  
 
 
Political Party Stance on Russia Stance on NATO Stance on EU 
FPÖ 
 
(AUSTRIA) 
Positive Negative Negative 
Jobbik 
 
(HUNGARY) 
Positive Negative Negative 
EKRE 
 
(ESTONIA) 
Negative Neutral Negative 
Swedish Democrats 
 
(SWEDEN) 
Neutral Negative Negative 
The Progress Party 
 
(NORWAY) 
Positive Positive Neutral 
The Finns Party 
 
(FINLAND) 
Neutral Negative Negative 
 
Table 5 – Summary of the main results 
 
 
 
 
The goal of this thesis was to examine political positions of major right-wing parties in 
Eastern Europe and Nordic countries, i.e. those parties that can or are currently influencing policies 
of their national governments. Russian Federation has to prepare a strategy on how to deal with the 
coalition governments that include either Russia-friendly or Russia-hostile political parties, in order 
to capitalize on possible political shifting of European governments. In addition, as this research 
showed, most of these parties have goals that can correspond to Russian interests concerning the EU 
and NATO. The European Union in its current form is guided by an inefficient bureaucratic 
apparatus that is rapidly losing the support across the continent, especially by the ―new members‖ 
from the Eastern Europe and those who are waiting in line to be accepted in the future, such as 
Balkan countries. As French President Macron stated, ―Europe is almost in the state of the civil war‖ 
between pro-federalist western European governments
572
 and those Central and Eastern European 
countries that favor more national sovereignty over  supra-national state.  
 
                                                          
572
 Crisp James, “Macron warns of European 'civil war' over growing East-West divide”, The Telegraph, 17.04.2018, 
Internet, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/04/17/macron-warns-european-civil-war-growing-east-west-
divide/  Accessed on: 25.05.2018 
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It could be argued that Russia would find more fertile ground for cooperation, trade and 
understanding if the EU reformed in the direction of sovereign nation-states that are taking part in 
volunteer economic alliance. Countries that are EU member states sometimes cannot express their 
independent foreign policy, as they are bound with the Common Security and Defense policy of the 
EU, and often have to support harmful decisions of the Brussels towards their national economies, 
such are for example the sanctions against Russia. Most of the parties examined in this thesis would 
like to change this kind of behavior of their countries, and if they stay true to their political programs 
and statements of leadership, they should be given full support for cooperation from the side of the 
Russian Federation.  
 
In addition, it would be prudent for Russia to support those governments which are holding a 
negative or a neutral sentiment towards NATO. This could be done, for example, by giving support 
for creation of local alliances, which build the sense of security for the countries in question but 
potentially lack offensive capabilities against Russia. Another approach would be by creation of 
stable security environment which wouldn‘t trigger the need for deeper integration with NATO, or a 
desire for NATO membership among corresponding national governments.  
 
As the examples around the Europe showed, the good election results of the right-wing 
parties are becoming more and more common, which was something hard to imagine at the 
beginning of the first decade of the 21
st
 century. Therefore, the Russian Federation has to be 
prepared for any outcome in the changing political scene of the Europe, whether that be the 
increasing rise of right-wing and populist parties, or their return to political obscurity. In any 
scenario, it is most important that the Russian Federation capitalizes in the field of economy, 
security and diplomacy when dealing with future EU governments, and has reliable information on 
how to position itself towards potentially-friendly political options inside the European national 
state governments. The research presented in this thesis will hopefully be of help in such an 
endeavor. 
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Appendix 
 
 
I Figures 
 
 
These graphs will show the percentage of votes examined parties obtained during the last several national 
parliament elections. All parties except EKRE are represented, since EKRE participated only in 2015 
Estonian Parliament Elections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Jobbik Support for Parliament Elections of Hungary 
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Figure 2 – FPÖ Support for Parliament Elections of Austria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - The Finns Party Support for Parliament Elections of Finland 
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Figure 4 - Swedish Democrats Support for Parliament Elections of Sweden 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - The Progress Party Support for Parliament Elections of Norway 
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II Interviews 
 
 
Interview I, Jobbik 
 
 
Platform: Gmail 
 
Sender: Aleksa Filipović 
 
Date of sending the message: 08.04.2018 
Receiver: Mr. Szabolcs Szalay (Jobbik) 
Date of receiving the answer: 18.04.2018 
 
Questions asked: 
 
Questionnaire for Jobbik 
 
1. What is the Jobbik‘s stance towards the EU – does Jobbik advocate referendum on the Hungary‘s 
EUmembership, or is it more inclined for reformation of the EU (for example, moving EU away 
fromfederalization and more towards economic union of sovereign nations)? 
 
2. What is the Jobbik stance towards NATO?Should be there referendum on Hungary‘s NATO 
membership, or is the membership in NATO desirable?Or should be there some re-negotiating of 
Hungary‘s participation in this alliance? 
 
3. What is the Jobbik‘s stance on Russia? Does Jobbik see Russia as a potential partner for 
economic andpolitical cooperation, or as adversary that needs to be contained for preservation of 
Hungary‘s ownsecurity? 
 
Answers received: 
 
―1. What is the Jobbik‘s stance towards the EU – does Jobbik advocate referendum on the 
Hungary‘s EU membership, or is it more inclined for reformation of the EU (for example, 
moving EU away from federalization and more towards economic union of sovereign 
nations)? 
 
Jobbik sees the future of Hungary inside the European Union, although we think that certain 
reforms of the community are necessary. Jobbik has always been very critical towards the idea of 
further centralization and bureaucratization of the EU. Since we were not able to hear any other 
voice then the views of the federalists for a long time, earlier we had several critical statements, 
however we have always supported the idea of the cooperation of the European nations. 
In the last few years, political landscape of the European countries as well as the political discourse 
in the EU has changed. We think that Hungary should sit at the negotiation table and participate 
actively in the reforms, especially when it comes to the labor rights. We support the idea of Mr 
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Macron&#39;s consultation on the future of the European Union and we are very optimistic as 
regards the statements of Mr Juncker on the European Labor Authority. 
 
2. What is the Jobbik stance towards NATO? 
Should be there referendum on Hungary‘s NATO membership, or is the membership in 
NATO desirable? Or should be there some re-negotiating of Hungary‘s participation in this 
alliance? 
 
NATO is the alliance that can guarantee the security of Hungary and we do not want to question 
this. At the same time, since we are in the border-zone of several countries&#39; fields of interest, 
we find it very important that NATO should not take a provocative position towards other power 
blocsbut find the way to ensure the security of its members. 
 
3. What is the Jobbik‘s stance on Russia? Does Jobbik see Russia as a potential partner for 
economic and political cooperation, or as adversary that needs to be contained for 
preservation of Hungary‘s own security? 
 
We see Russia as an important partner for economic cooperation. Jobbik appreciates the 
longstanding and good relations of our countries and we hope that we can develop them further in 
the future.‖ 
 
End of Interview I 
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Interview II, EKRE 
 
Platform: Gmail 
Sender: Aleksa Filipović  
Date of sending the message: 16.04.2018 
Receiver: Urmas Espenberg (EKRE) 
Date of receiving the answer: 17.04.2018 
 
Questions asked 
 
1. What is the EKRE‘s stance towards the EU – does EKRE advocate referendum on the Estonia‘s 
EU membership, or is it more inclined for reformation of the EU (for example, moving EU away 
from federalization and more towards economic union of sovereign nations)? 
 
2. What is the EKRE stance towards NATO? Should be there referendum on Estonia‘s NATO 
membership, or is the membership in NATO desirable? Or should be there some re-negotiating of 
Hungary‘s participation in this alliance? 
 
3. What is the EKRE‘s stance on Russia? Does EKRE see Russia as a potential partner for economic 
and political cooperation, or as adversary that needs to be contained for preservation of EKRE‘s 
own security? 
 
 
Answers received: 
 
“All main information You can find in website of Estonia Parliemet 
 
https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/parliament-of-estonia/factions/conservative-peoples-party-estonia-
faction/ 
 
We never supported leaving NATO, NATO is our main security alliens. 
 
We dont like federalisation of EU, we support strong national states, our views are very close to 
Fidez in Hungary or Poland goverment isuues.‖ 
 
End of Interview II 
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Interview III, Finns Party 
 
Platform: Gmail 
Sender: Aleksa Filipović  
Date of sending the message: 17.04.2018 
Receiver: Mr. Sakari Puisto (Progress Party) 
Date of receiving the answer: 20.04.2018 
  
Questions asked: 
 
Questionnaire for the Finns Party 
 
1. What is the Finns Party stance towards the EU – does the Finns Party advocate referendum on the 
Finland‘s EU membership, or is it more inclined for reformation of the EU (for example, moving 
EU away from federalization and more towards economic union of sovereign nations)? 
 
2. What is the Finns Party‘s stance towards NATO? Should Finland join the NATO or no? And 
should the Finland rely more on some future local alliance than a global one? 
  
3. What is the Finns Party‘s stance on Russia? Does the Finns Party see Russia as a potential partner 
for economic and political cooperation, or as adversary that needs to be contained for preservation 
of Finland‘s own security? 
 
Answers received: 
 
―1. What is the Finns Party stance towards the EU – does the Finns Party advocate referendum on 
the Finland‘s EU membership, or is it more inclined for reformation of the EU (for example, moving 
EU away from federalization and more towards economic union of sovereign nations)? 
 
We do not propose a referendum on Finland's EU membership at least at the moment. A vast 
majority of Finns and younger people especially support the EU membership and the result of the 
referendum would be all obvious anyway. 
 
Instead, for the time being we want to keep up critical discussion on the EU and advocate that 
Finland takes a stronger stance on various issues (for instance on burden sharing of economic 
liabilities and asylum seekers etc) and we are against further centralisation of power within the EU. 
 
 
2. What is the Finns Party‘s stance towards NATO? Should Finland join the NATO or no? And 
should the Finland rely more on some future local alliance than a global one?  
 
Our voters have mixed positions on this issue. As a party we do not propose that Finland joins Nato. 
We support closer collaboration for instance with Sweden. 
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3. What is the Finns Party‘s stance on Russia? Does the Finns Party see Russia as a potential partner 
for economic and political cooperation, or as adversary that needs to be contained for preservation 
of Finland‘s own security? 
 
 
We favor international trade and economic cooperation, and good international relations overall. 
Russia is obviously of high importance to Finland. Related to the economic sanctions and 
current difficult issues, we acknowledge that Finland is a member of the EU and the western 
political system.‖ 
 
End of Interview III 
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